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Abstract: This PhD aims to generate a better understanding of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in
global production networks. CSR is an umbrella term that deals with voluntary activities undertaken by
companies and that indicate an ethos to act responsibly in society. This research focuses on CSR prac-
tices that aim towards improving working conditions in outsourced production factories by implementing
so-called social standards, which often derive from core norms of the International Labour Organization
and intend to secure decent working conditions. While companies claim that they take responsibility for
workers via CSR practices, civil society actors like the Clean Clothes Campaign criticize CSR as public
relations exercise as companies still fail to take ‘sufficient’ responsibility. Based on this contradiction
this PhD aims to reveal the political contestation surrounding CSR and the struggles over CSR between
companies and civil society organizations claiming to represent workers in global production networks.
The main questions are: What practices do companies use to take responsibility for workers in out-
sourced production, how do they legitimize these practices, and how are these approaches contested?
The research is based on theoretical concepts of ‘shared responsibility’, ‘political CSR’ and ‘democratic
legitimacy’. The ‘global production network’ framework and a framework for analysing private regula-
tion, referring to legislative, judicial, and executive regulation, are applied. Empirically, the research
analyses two private standards initiatives that define and institutionalize CSR practices, namely the Fair
Wear Foundation (FWF) and the Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI). The findings are mainly
based on 150 qualitative interviews with representatives from companies, civil society, auditing compa-
nies, and governments. Additionally, documents are evaluated. Empirical research was undertaken in
Europe (mainly Germany Switzerland) and Asia (India Bangladesh). The research findings suggest
that the CSR practices defined by BSCI and the FWF are based on rather different interpretations of
the causes of worker injustice. The BSCI is based on a belief in a concept of liberal democracy. In this
view companies do not need to legitimate their activities, as long as they comply with national laws. Re-
sponsibility is based on a liability model that blames producers and national governments for neglecting
their responsibility towards workers. Companies joining the BSCI take the responsibility of initiating
processes in developing countries that demand governments, producers and civil society actors in these
countries to take responsibility. In contrast, the approach of the FWF is based on an understanding of
‘structural injustice’ and ‘shared responsibility’. In this view violations of labour rights are identified to
be inherent in the complexities of global production networks themselves. No single actor can be blamed
for the injustices, and therefore corporations ‘share’ a responsibility, and must engage in public discourses
according to their power and abilities, what is seen as a ‘political’ form of CSR.
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AVE Aussenhandelsvereinigung des Deutschen Einzelhandels e.V. 
BCI Bangladesh Chamber of Industries 
BGMEA  Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association 
BI  Business Initiative 
BKMEA Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association 
BMZ Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und 
Zusammenarbeit 
BSCI Business Social Compliance Initiative 
CAP  Corrective Action Plan  
CBA  Collective Bargaining Agreement 
CCC Clean Clothes Campaign 
CSO Civil Society Organization 
CoC  Codes of Conduct 
CoE  Committee of Experts 
CR  Corporate Responsibility 
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility 
EC European Commission  
ECCHR  European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights 
EPZ Economic Processing Zones 
ETI Ethical Trading Initiative 
EvB Erklärung von Bern 
FLA  Fair Labelling Organization 
FNV  Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging  
FoA Freedom of Association 
FOB  Free on Board  
FSC Forest Stewardship Council 
FTA  Foreign Trade Association 
FWF Fair Wear Foundation 
GCC Global Commodity Chains 
GVC Global Value Chains 
GPN  Global Production Network 
GTZ  Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
ILO International Labour Organization 
ISCOM International Social Compliance Verification 
LbL Labour behind the Label 
LW Living Wages 
MFA  Multi Fibre Agreement 
MWB Minimum Wage Board 
MSA Management System Audit 
 MSI Multi-Stakeholder Initiative  
MSR  Management System Requirements 
MW  Minimum Wages 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PIC Partners in Change 
PSI Private Standards Initiative 
RMG Ready Made Garments 
SAAS Social Accountability Accreditation Services 
SAI  Social Accountability International 
TDS The Daily Star 
TEA  Tirupur Exports Association 
TK  Taka (Bangladesh Currency) 
TPF  Tirupur Peoples’ Forum 
TSG  Tirupur Steering group 
TU  Trade Unions 
UN  United Nations 
UNCTC   UN Centre on Transnational Corporations 
WO  Workers’ Organizations 
WRAP  Worldwide Responsibility Accredited Production  
WRC Worker Rights Consortium 
WTO World Trade Organization 
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This PhD aims to generate a better understanding of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
in global production networks. CSR is an umbrella term that deals with voluntary 
activities undertaken by companies and that indicate an ethos to act responsibly in 
society. This research focuses on CSR practices that aim towards improving working 
conditions in outsourced production factories by implementing so-called social standards, 
which often derive from core norms of the International Labour Organization and intend 
to secure decent working conditions. While companies claim that they take responsibility 
for workers via CSR practices, civil society actors like the Clean Clothes Campaign 
criticize CSR as public relations exercise as companies still fail to take ‘sufficient’ 
responsibility. Based on this contradiction this PhD aims to reveal the political 
contestation surrounding CSR and the struggles over CSR between companies and civil 
society organizations claiming to represent workers in global production networks. The 
main questions are: What practices do companies use to take responsibility for workers in 
outsourced production, how do they legitimize these practices, and how are these 
approaches contested?  
The research is based on theoretical concepts of ‘shared responsibility’, ‘political CSR’ 
and ‘democratic legitimacy’. The ‘global production network’ framework and a 
framework for analysing private regulation, referring to legislative, judicial, and 
executive regulation, are applied.  
Empirically, the research analyses two private standards initiatives that define and 
institutionalize CSR practices, namely the Fair Wear Foundation (FWF) and the Business 
Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI). The findings are mainly based on 150 qualitative 
interviews with representatives from companies, civil society, auditing companies, and 
governments. Additionally, documents are evaluated. Empirical research was undertaken 
in Europe (mainly Germany & Switzerland) and Asia (India & Bangladesh). 
The research findings suggest that the CSR practices defined by BSCI and the FWF are 
based on rather different interpretations of the causes of worker injustice. The BSCI is 
based on a belief in a concept of liberal democracy. In this view companies do not need to 
legitimate their activities, as long as they comply with national laws. Responsibility is 
based on a liability model that blames producers and national governments for neglecting 
their responsibility towards workers. Companies joining the BSCI take the responsibility 
of initiating processes in developing countries that demand governments, producers and 
civil society actors in these countries to take responsibility. In contrast, the approach of 
the FWF is based on an understanding of ‘structural injustice’ and ‘shared responsibility’. 
In this view violations of labour rights are identified to be inherent in the complexities of 
global production networks themselves. No single actor can be blamed for the injustices, 
and therefore corporations ‘share’ a responsibility, and must engage in public discourses 
according to their power and abilities, what is seen as a ‘political’ form of CSR.  
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Diese Doktorarbeit verfolgt das Ziel, ein besseres Verständnis von ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility’ (CSR) in globalen Produktionsnetzwerken zu entwickeln. Dabei geht es 
primär darum zu verstehen, welche Verantwortung Unternehmen in Europa für die 
Verbesserung der Arbeitsbedingungen in Zulieferbetrieben vor allem in 
Niedriglohnländern haben. Es besteht ein Dilemma auf diskursiver Ebene, zwischen den 
Vorstellungen von Unternehmen und zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen über die 
Verantwortung von Unternehmen. Die Arbeit untersucht folgenden Fragen: Was tun 
Unternehmen, um ihrer sozialen Verantwortung gerecht zu werden, wie rechtfertigen sie 
ihre CSR Praktiken, und wie werden diese kritisiert? 
Theoretisch basiert die Arbeit auf demokratie- und diskursorientierten Konzepten wie 
‘geteilter Verantwortung, ‘politischer CSR’ und ‘demokratischer Legitimität’. Es wird ein 
Analyserahmen entwickelt, der das Konzept der ‘Globalen Produktionsnetzwerke’ mit 
einem Konzept zur Untersuchung freiwilliger Regulierung verbindet.  
Empirisch vergleicht die Arbeit zwei private Standardinitiativen miteinander, die 
Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI) und die Fair Wear Foundation (FWF). 
Ferner spielt die Perspektive zivilgesellschaftlicher Gruppen eine Rolle, wie vor allem der 
Clean Clothes Campaign. Die empirische Analyse basiert auf 150 qualitativen Interviews, 
die in Europa (v.a. Deutschland, Schweiz), Indien und Bangladesh durchgeführt wurden, 
sowie der Auswertung von Dokumenten.  
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Praktiken der BSCI und der FWF auf unterschiedlichen 
Annahmen von Verantwortung und auf unterschiedlichen Vorstellungen über die 
Ursachen von Arbeitsrechtsverletzungen basieren. Die BSCI geht von einem 
Haftungsmodell von Verantwortung aus. Danach sind primär Nationalstaaten 
verantwortlich für die Schaffung guter Arbeitsbedingungen im eigenen Land. 
Produzenten in einem Land können dann jeweils für Verstöße gegen die Gesetze haftbar 
gemacht werden. Als zentrale Ursache für die schlechten Arbeitsstandards werden die 
fehlenden Fähigkeiten der Fabrikmanager gesehen, und entsprechend sind die CSR 
Praktiken ausgerichtet. Die Argumentation der FWF kann dem Modell der ‘geteilten 
Verantwortung’ zugewiesen werden. Danach kann niemand individuell für 
Arbeitsverletzungen haftbar gemacht werden, sondern alle über globale 
Produktionsnetzwerke verbundenen Akteure teilen eine Verantwortung dafür, eine 
Lösung für die Probleme zu suchen. Als zentrale Ursachen für die niedrigen 
Arbeitsstandards werden neben fehlenden Managementfähigkeiten auch die Forderungen 
der Markenfirmen gesehen, und die CSR-Praktiken richten sich danach.  
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The most we can confidently say about corporate social responsibilities’ impact (in 
developing countries) at the present time is that it benefits some people and some companies 
in some situations. (Blowfield & Frynas 2005:507) 
 
Prior to April 2010, the German company Lidl advertised on its website that it promotes 
fair working conditions worldwide. It claimed to take responsibility for good working 
conditions in its supply chains and to strongly contribute to sustainably improving them, 
particularly in developing countries1. Part of this claim was to refer to the membership in 
the Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI). These activities then help justify the 
trust that customers place in the company2.  
On April the 8th 2010, the Verbraucherzentrale Hamburg, the Clean Clothes Campaign 
(CCC) Germany and the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights filed a 
lawsuit against the discounter (Berg 2010). They charge that Lidl’s advertising is ‘unfair 
competition’ as it deceives and misleads its customers. The CCC argues that Lidl uses its 
BSCI membership for ‘social washing’ (Burckhardt 2010). According to the CCC, the 
company refers to its membership in the business initiative in a way that suggests on 
‘obligation’ to implement social standards, while in reality the BSCI only follows the 
‘aim’ of doing so. The CCC presents evidence for working conditions in factories in 
Bangladesh supplying Lidl being considerably worse than promised by the company.3 All 
major newspapers in Germany, Austria and Switzerland and the German TV reported on 
this case and many of the headlines connected Lidl to fraud or deceiving customers, 
exploitation etc.4   
The Lidl case is only one example of the general phenomenon of companies claiming to 
take responsibility for fair working conditions in their outsourced production, while 
NGOs criticize them for not taking responsibility. This research aims at a better empirical 
and theoretical understanding of corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices in global 
garment production networks (GPN)5. It shall help to evaluate whether or not CSR 
practices like those of Lidl are today’s ‘grand illusion’ trying to deceive customers.6 
                                                      
1 “Als BSCI-Mitglied setzt sich Lidl für sozialverträgliche Produktionsbedingungen ein. Auf diese Weise leistet Lidl einen 
grossen Beitrag zur nachhaltigen Verbesserung der Arbeitsbedingungen in der weltweiten Lieferkette, vor allem in 
Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländern” (Klage der Verbraucherzentrale Hamburg e.V. gegen Lidl Dienstleidungs GmbH & 
Co KG, 6.4.2010), www.vzhh.de, 10.4.2010 
2 “Als Unternehmen ist es grundsätzlich unser Bestreben, die sozialen und ökologischen Belange in Einklang zu bringen, 
um das in uns gesetzte Vertrauen zu rechtfertigen.”, www.lidl.de, 12.4.2010 
3 http://www.vzhh.de/~upload/vz/VZTexte/TexteRecht/Lidl_Klage.pdf (22.4.2010) http://www.saubere-
kleidung.de/downloads/2010-04-08_Studie_Klage-gegen-Lidl.pdf (22.4.2010) 
4 Deutschlandfunk 8.4.2010: Verbraucherzentrale verklagt Lidl wegen Etikettenschwindel bei Textilien; Spiegel 8.4.2010: 
Discounter in der Kritik: Experten werfen Lidl Aussitzen vor; FAZ 8.4.2010: Täuschungsvorwurf. Verbraucherzentrale 
Hamburg klagt gegen Lidl; FR 8.4.2010: Faire 80 Stunden Arbeit pro Woche; FTD 8.4.2010: Arbeitsbedingungen im 
Ausland. Verbraucherschützer verklagen Lidl; SZ 8.4.2010: Das verkaufte Gewissen; SWR “Betrifft” zu Lidl in 
Bangladesch, 28.10.2010 
5 Here, ‘global production networks’ refers to the complex system of global production (! CH 4). I use (global) ‘supply 
chains’, in contrast, when referring to the production chain more from a company perspective.  
6 ‘The Grand Illusion’ is a movie directed by Jean Renoir in 1937 with which he wanted to show the futility of war. 
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Most clothes are produced in low-income countries where labour regulation lacks to 
effectively protect workers’ rights. In a competitive environment producers try to lower 
their production costs in order to attract buyers, often by reducing labour costs. This has 
been criticized to lead to a race to the bottom with regards to working conditions (Klein 
2000; Hale & Shaw 2001; Wills & Hale 2005). Some claim that economic globalization 
has led to the retreat of the state, where governments are either unable or unwilling to 
ensure that working conditions in factories do not violate national or international labour 
standards (Strange 1996). As global competition is also not regulated with mandatory 
international rules that would sanction all market players, workers are not protected 
against exploitation.  
In the context of the retreat of the state, civil society organizations and global social 
movements were established with the aim of supporting factory workers in their struggles 
for better working conditions (Cohen & Rai 2000; Sluiter 2009). They initiated a public 
discourse on corporate responsibility and workers’ rights, criticizing global brands and 
retailers in Europe and the US for not ‘adequately’ taking responsibility for workers in 
their supply chains. The CCC, a leading non-governmental organization (NGO)7 in the 
area of worker rights, asserts that “millions of women employed in factories and 
workshops” are paying for the profits of discounters like Lidl, Aldi and Walmart (Hearson 
2009). Social movements connect different groups with similar priorities and aims, 
inform the public and mobilize consumers to articulate their protests through ethical 
campaigns. They show ethics of care not only for the national sphere, but also for distant 
relationships articulated through global supply chains (Barnett & Land 2007; Hughes, 
Wrigley et al. 2008:349f). Such campaigns are said to shape everyday practices of 
consumption, as consumers take into consideration the companies’ ethical reputations in 
their own purchasing practices. NGOs, ethical campaigns and social movements define 
for the meaning of companies to take ‘adequate’ responsibility for their workers and 
suggest where ‘responsible’ consumers should and should not shop. By shaping ethical 
preferences they exert normative power over corporations and state agencies (Clarke, 
Barnett et al. 2007a:241; Hughes, Wrigley et al. 2008:351).  
Partly as a reaction to NGOs and their ethical campaigns companies voluntarily engage 
in voluntary CSR practices, such as adapting and implementing social standards in their 
supply chains (Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson et al. 2001). Many have joined a so-called 
voluntary private standards initiative (PSI) that aims at harmonizing CSR efforts of 
individual companies and thus making private regulation more efficient, and maybe more 
effective and credible (Vogel 2009:9). PSIs usually define social or environmental codes 
of conduct and the measures that participating companies take in order to implement 
these codes in their supply chains. There are two different types of private standards 
initiatives: In so-called business initiatives (e.g. Common Code for the Coffee Industry 
Initiative, Responsible Care Initiative, Business Social Compliance Initiative) companies 
                                                      
7 I usually refer to the CCC as NGO; however, as the NGO is a large network that connects more than 200 organizations, I 
sometimes also refer to it as ‘social movement’.  
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alone decide on the rules applied, while in multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSI) (e.g. the 
Forest Stewardship Council, the Ethical Trading Initiative or the Fair Wear Foundation) 
diverse stakeholders share decision-making power (O'Rourke 2006; Vogel 2009).  
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The number of voluntary regulation initiatives has proliferated in the last 20 years. Today 
many different initiatives to improve working conditions co-exist in almost every 
industry sector and they are competing for new members (Vogel 2009:4). Each single 
initiative claims that the participating companies take the utmost responsibility for 
improving working conditions in their supply chains (Featherstone 2004; O'Rourke 
2006). Many regard private regulation initiatives and the connected CSR practices as an 
effective and credible way of closing public regulation gaps in developing countries and 
of reducing the adverse effects of economic globalization for workers in developing 
countries (United Nations 2007). 
However, as the Lidl example illustrates, some voluntary efforts to implement social 
standards into global supply chains are strongly criticized8. Researchers question the 
effectiveness of voluntary regulation, particularly on the intended beneficiaries, i.e. 
workers in developing countries: “The most we can confidently say about CSR’s impact 
(in developing countries) at the present time is that it benefits some people and some 
companies in some situations” (Blowfield & Frynas 2005:507)9. A few empirical studies 
show that the impacts of the much-praised multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSI) are also 
very low (Locke, Qin et al. 2006; Barrientos & Smith 2007). Other articles criticize that 
the impact on the poor and poorest in developing countries is not known, low, or can 
even be negative (Bendell & Murphy 2002; Dhanarajan 2005; Jenkins 2005; Nelson, 
Adrienne et al. 2005; Utting 2005b; Prieto-Carrón, Lund-Thomsen et al. 2006; Blowfield 
2007; Newell & Frynas 2007; Nadvi 2008). It is further criticized that private regulation 
does not touch the root causes of poor working conditions in global production networks, 
namely power relations in the global economy (Prieto-Carrón, Lund-Thomsen et al. 2006; 
Fuchs 2007). On the contrary, by reproducing the (power) structures that cause the main 
problems in global supply chains, voluntary regulation may even make it more difficult to 
solve problems in the long run.  
Other studies argue that PSIs are not credible or legitimate. The credibility of voluntary 
regulation is criticized because consumers or other groups cannot easily test whether, for 
instance, a piece of garment was produced in compliance with the social standards as 
companies assert. Whereas consumers can test product quality themselves, they have to 
trust those saying that the working conditions are ‘good’. The Lidl case illustrates that 
this can become difficult. This is all the more challenging as companies have been 
criticized for engaging in corporate responsibility activities as a public relations tool in 
                                                      
8 Much of the critique refers to voluntary corporate responsibility practices in general and not to specific private regulation 
initiatives. 
9 CSR initiatives “fail to address difficult questions about treatment of suppliers and workers’ rights or about community 
reinvestment and obligations to invest over the long term or to provide job security. The range of development issues they 
address, while important, is limited.” (Newell & Frynas 2007:679) 
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order to improve their reputation (Christian Aid 2004; Blowfield & Murray 2008): “CSR 
emerged among leading firms and business schools as a public relations tool, a way to 
deflect criticism, engage critics and potentially capitalise on emerging business 
opportunities associated with doing, and being seen to be doing, good” (Newell & Frynas 
2007:670). Furthermore, political scientists argue that private regulation often lacks the 
democratic legitimacy that is required to decide upon matters of regulation, and 
management scholars similarly criticize that common CSR practices do not provide the 
companies with moral legitimacy (Palazzo & Scherer 2006; Scherer & Palazzo 2007; 
Palazzo & Scherer 2008; Scherer & Palazzo 2008). This critique is particularly 
problematic in cases where private regulation replaces public regulation like in the case 
of regulation of social standards (Dingwerth 2005; Pattberg 2005; Utting 2005b; 
Dingwerth 2007; Fuchs & Kalfagianni 2007; Nölke & Granz 2007).  
Is CSR in supply chains the ‘grand illusion’ created by companies and their consultants 
to deceive the consumers and the public – and at the same time to prevent the states from 
fixing mandatory rules? I argue that there is no simple answer to this question because of 
the great variety of CSR and private regulation initiatives. This research takes the 
perspective that CSR and private regulation practices are politically contested by many 
different actors in global production networks (Levy & Kaplan 2007; Levy 2008). Each 
actor is embedded into a different local and socio-economic context and has his own 
interpretation of corporate responsibility.  
My research aims to understand how CSR is politically contested in global 
production networks. My research questions are:  
• How do brands and retailers define their responsibility for good working conditions 
in their supply chains, what practices do they use to implement their approaches, and 
which arguments do they present to legitimize their approach? 
• How do other actors in global production networks criticize or even try to 
delegitimize CSR approaches and what arguments do they use?  
I specify the questions for the empirical research in chapter 4. With this rather descriptive 
analysis of arguments regarding corporate responsibility in global production networks, I 
aim to provide a better empirical knowledge of different practices and understandings of 
corporate responsibility in global garment production networks. This is important, 
because there are many very different approaches, and all claim to promote good working 
conditions. The research reflects that corporate responsibility is no single truth. From the 
analysis of arguments, I derive some more theoretical proposals regarding the limitations 
of voluntary corporate responsibility, and how practices can be evaluated.  
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The empirical research presented here focuses on one specific sector, the garment 
industry. This sector is particularly interesting because protests about poor working 
standards have been ongoing for the past 20 years. Partly due to the strong protests in this 
sector, private standards initiatives and corporate responsibility practices are further 
developed than in most other industry sectors. Most corporations therefore have 
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developed strategies and arguments, and other sectors could learn from a detailed analysis 
of this sector. Empirically, the study focuses on two case studies, i.e. two private 
standards initiatives: (1) the Business for Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI) set up by 
companies in 2003, is a business-initiative; (2) the Fair Wear Foundation (FWF), by 
contrast, is a multi-stakeholder initiative that was launched by the CCC and set up in 
cooperation with industry groups and funded by the government in the Netherlands in 
2004.  
The two initiatives were selected because they both follow the aim, to improve working 
conditions in factories supplying European companies, but with two very different 
approaches. They differ strongly in how their credibility and legitimacy are perceived and 
evaluated. The CCC has been criticizing the BSCI for not being credible and effective, 
and recommends that companies become member of the FWF. In contrast, institutions 
such as the Commission of the EU, The Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche 
Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung10 (BMZ) and the Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit11 (GTZ) have been supporting the BSCI. Companies in Europe can 
actually choose between becoming member of the BSCI or of the FWF, but only few 
choose the path recommended by ethical campaigns. So far, in Germany more than 150 
companies have become members of the BSCI, whereas only two are members of the 
FWF. 
The work empirically also focuses on the Clean Clothes Campaign, which is a global 
social movement. In 2009 it was made up of more than 200 labour rights organizations 
worldwide (Sluiter 2009). This network demands that brands and retailers selling clothes 
in European countries take responsibility for improving working conditions in the 
factories producing the garments they sell, and that they be accountable for negative 
labour practices in global supply chains. Today it has become one of the most influential 
global social movements, framing the meaning of ‘adequate’ regulation and corporate 
responsibility and therefore pushing European garment brands and retailers to improve 
working conditions in their global supply chains.  
My analysis is based on a combination of methods. More than 150 qualitative 
interviews were conducted with BSCI and FWF members, other companies and NGOs in 
Germany and Switzerland, and with suppliers, auditors, consultants, NGOs and 
international donors in India and Bangladesh. The two South Asian countries are two of 
the most important Asian garment producing countries for Europe. In addition to the 
interviews, main documents of the BSCI, the FWF, corporate responsibility reports and 
various documents of the CCC were analysed in order to identify the arguments given by 
different groups (! see chapter 5 for more details). 
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I develop my argument as follows: Chapter 2 explains the complexities of global supply 
chains, how brands and retailers outsource garment production and how theory has 
                                                      
10 German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
11 German Technichal Cooperation Organization  
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conceptualized the power relationships between brands/retailers and their suppliers. It 
illustrates how the corporate practices are embedded in global institutional contexts of 
trade liberalisation, competition and the fashion industry, which requires flexibility in the 
whole industry. It also shows how companies are confronted with the power of ethical 
campaigns that are calling for better working conditions and threatening to ruin the 
reputation of brands if these do not react by engaging in corporate responsibility 
practices. The chapter concludes with presenting Young’s theoretical approach to 
conceptualize ‘structural injustice’ in global value chains leading to poor working 
conditions, and how in this situation responsibility can be defined and dissolved by 
collective action.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the corporate responsibility practices of brands and retailers and 
presents different concepts of corporate responsibility. One focuses on business cases, 
whereas the alternative one regards companies as ‘political actors’, who should engage in 
public discussions to behave responsibly. Chapter 3.2 presents practices used to 
implement social standards into global supply chains, and how they are criticized. 
Chapter 3.3 points out effectiveness, credibility and legitimacy of standard 
implementation as key challenges for empirical research on corporate social 
responsibility in global production networks. 
Chapter 4 presents two analytical frameworks that are used to analyse the empirical 
data. The framework presented in chapter 4.1 is used to break down the complex CSR 
practices of implementing social standards into three parts and to organize the empirical 
research accordingly: legislative regulation (setting rules), judicial regulation (auditing 
standards), executive regulation (implementing standards). Chapter 4.2 presents the 
global production network framework. This framework allows viewing global trade 
relationships as complex structures in which actors are not only horizontally connected in 
chains, but also vertically in networks. It moves beyond a simple analysis of the 
governance structure of value chains and offers some conceptual categories for analysing 
relationships in the GPN, but also the power of different actors, their embeddedness into 
different places and networks, and the concept of value.  
Chapter 5 presents the empirical research method I applied, the data I used and how I 
evaluated the data. Chapters 6-10 present the empirical results. 
Chapter 6 briefly introduces the CCC and the focal areas of the German and Swiss 
network. The arguments of the CCC are mainly presented in chapters 8-10.  
Chapter 7 presents and compares the approaches (i.e. the rules) used in the two case 
studies – the two private standards initiatives BSCI and the FWF. It looks at how they 
define corporate responsibility and what rules they define for their members to put their 
responsibility into practice, i.e., how the members must implement social standards into 
their supply chains.  
Chapters 8-10 present and discuss the struggles regarding legislative, judicial, and 
executive regulation and the arguments used in these struggles. Chapter 8 examines 
arguments regarding legislative regulation. Chapter 8.1 discusses how different actors 
think that rules for global business must be set and who must participate in the setting. 
Legislative regulation mainly deals with the (democratic) legitimacy of a voluntary 
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regulation approach. Chapter 8.2 then examines the struggles about minimum and living 
wages in Bangladesh, which is one of the central issues to the often poorly paid garment 
workers. These struggles illustrate well the arguments referring to the efficiency of 
voluntary regulation approaches.  
Chapter 9 examines arguments regarding judicial regulation (mainly social auditing). 
Auditing is very much connected with the credibility and the legitimacy of a voluntary 
approach. Main struggles concern issues like the independence of auditors (! CH 9.1) 
and the quality of audits, i.e., whether social audits can identify worker problems inside 
factories (! CH 9.2). It discusses the inclusion of stakeholders (! CH 9.3) and the 
efficiency of auditing (! CH 9.4)  
Chapter 10 then discusses arguments regarding the executive regulation of standards. 
This chapter mostly deals with the question, how the implementation of standards can be 
made effective. It discusses purchasing practices and structural limitations that these set 
(! CH 10.1), improvements of management skills (! CH 10.2), and how stakeholders 
see that workers can best be empowered to raise their voices (! CH 10.3).  
Finally, chapter 11 sums up and discusses the core findings regarding the main 
questions.  
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In the 20th century the labour-intensive production of garments was outsourced from 
Europe and the US to developing countries, where wages were lower (Esbenshade 2004; 
Dicken 2007a). Protesting against the poor working conditions in outsourced garment 
production, a so-called ‘anti-sweatshop movement’12 became active in the 1990s in the 
US and in Europe. Since then labour rights and solidarity groups have drawn the public 
awareness to the poor ‘sweatshop’-like working conditions in developing countries and 
have connected these conditions with large brands and retailers in the US and Europe 
(Hale 2000; Klein 2000; Hale & Shaw 2001; Rosen 2002; Esbenshade 2004; Arnold & 
Bowie 2007). The movement has been blaming large brands for causing poor working 
conditions, arguing that large brands have the power and responsibility to improve the 
workers’ situation in their supply chains. The companies initially denied any 
responsibility for workers in factories far away, arguing that they did not cause the 
injustice. Rather the owners and managers of the factories in developing countries were to 
blame, because they deliberately minimized costs that lead to breaking national labour 
laws (Young 2004:367f). Later, however, many brands implemented voluntary corporate 
responsibility practices, as shown in chapter 3.   
With regard to my research aim, this chapter introduces the difficulties of ascribing 
responsibility in complex globalized production. Chapter 2.1 briefly deals with the 
globalized production of clothes13. It explains how the relationship between a company in 
Europe that is designing and marketing garments and the producers in a developing 
country is conceptualized. Chapter 2.2 shows power relationships between the buyers and 
the suppliers, and chapter 2.3 presents how the anti-sweatshop movement builds up 
counter-power against large companies and presses them to improve working conditions. 
In chapter 2.4, I present Iris Young’s theoretical perspective of ‘political’ or ‘shared’ 
responsibility. I argue that it can help ascribe responsibilities in the complex context of 
global garment production. 
 
                                                      
12 Sweatshop: Workplace in which workers are employed at low wages and under unhealthy or oppressive conditions. In 
England, the word sweater was used as early as 1850 to describe an employer who exacted monotonous work for very low 
wages. “Sweating” became widespread in the 1880s, when immigrants from eastern and southern Europe provided an 
influx of cheap labour in the United States and central Europe. An increase in industrialization in the 20th century saw 
sweatshops emerge in parts of Latin America and Asia, a trend that accelerated with increased demand for consumer goods 
in the West and a lowering of … Encyclopædia Britannica. 2010. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 15 Mar. 2010 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/576470/sweatshop. 
13 In this chapter I use the term ‘supply chain’ because I focus on the economic interactions, and the chain concept helps 
focussing on these. Later I introduce the framework ‘global production network’ as an analytical concept. I use the terms 
garments, clothes, apparel synonymously. 
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Most garments for the European market are imported from Asia and Eastern Europe (! 
Figure 1), where labour costs are relatively low (! Figure 2). In these countries the 
garment industry attracts start-up entrepreneurs, because it is little capital intensive. 
Labour is almost all an entrepreneur needs to invest in (Dicken & Hassler 2000).  
Largest textiles-importers to EU25 (2005) 
China  22.903 
Turkey 11.157 
India 5.591 
Romania  4.068 
Bangladesh 3.715 
Tunisia 2.697 
Morocco 2.398 
Pakistan 2.256 
Hong Kong 1.819 
Switzerland 1.506 
Sum  58.110 
Figure 1: Imports of textiles in Mio Euro 2005 including garments, fabrics, fibres (Source: Eurostat 2005) 
 
Figure 2: Hourly labour costs in the textile and clothing industry 2005 (Source: Dicken 2007:257 – taken 
from Werner International)  
The production chain of garments can roughly be divided into four parts: (1) the brand or 
retailer that designs and markets a product and sources the production according to the 
own design. This company is called the ‘lead firm’ and is usually situated in a developed 
country. The lead firm sells products directly or indirectly to the customers.  
The three main production processes are usually outsourced to developing countries: 
(2) garment production, (3) textile production, and (4) fibre production (! Figure 3). 
Each of these processes is embedded into a local context. The value addition in the design 
and marketing processes is usually much higher than in the other three production 
processes. My research focuses on the interaction between (1) and (2), i.e., the lead firm 
and the garment production. In the latter working conditions are said to be poor and the 
core labour rights of the International Labour Organization (ILO) are often violated. The 
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Figure 9.7 Hourly labour costs in the textile and clothing
industries 2005
Source: Werner International
origins have also seen the industry as a key point of entry, into the labour market.
The participation of Italians and Eastern Europeans in both the United States and
the United Kingdom has been followed more recently by the large-scale employ-
ment of blacks, Hispanics and Asians in the United States and by non-white
Commonwealth immigrants in the United Kingdom.
The history of these industries is one of appalling working conditions in sweat-
shop premises. At least in the clothing industries of the developed economies such
conditions are now relatively rare; factory and employment legislation have seen to
this. But the sweatshop has certainly not disappeared from the clothing industries of
the big cities of North America and Europe. The highly fragmented and often tran-
sitory nature of much of the industry makes the regulation of such establishments
extremely difficult. The result has been a major resurgence of clothing sweatshops
in some big Western cities."
A survey of clothing manufacturing establishments in San Francisco and
Oakland, California, in the mid 1990s found 'more than half of them in violation of
minimum wage standards. Sewing jobs for Esprit, Liz Claiborne, Izumi and other
glittering names were being done by underpaid workers'." Similar problems were
uncovered in the United Kingdom in a series of investigations of garments work-
shops in the big cities: 'Workers earn less than £2 an hour for a 50-hour week.Yet
some of the UK's best-known high-street retail .chains buy from these manufactur-
ers, even though they appear to break their own guidelines'."
In the rapidly growing clothing industries of the developing countries the labour
force is similarly distinctive. Employment tends to be geographically concentrated
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voluntary social standards initiatives that I empirically analyse apply in the garment 
production.14  
Relevant to the implementation of social standards is the distinction between a direct 
and an indirect connection between the lead firm (1) and the factory that is mainly 
producing the garments (2). In the indirect connection, an agent (an importer or 
exporter) supplies the products to the lead firm. These agents often have offices in the 
market region (i.e. Europe or US) and in production countries. They take an order and 
then deal with the complete supply chain management according to their buyers’ 
demands. In the direct connection, a lead firm’s supplier is the garment factory that 
produces the clothes. The difference is relevant, because in a direct connection the buyer 
and the garment producer sign a contract, and the lead firm has a better control over 
producer.  
Figure 3: The garment supply chain   
The production of the clothes usually does not happen in only one factory. A garment 
supplier can either only focus on the garment production, or be vertically integrated and 
hence controlling garment and textile production. A garment producer may carry out all 
production processes that are needed to finish a piece of garment15. Sewing the cloth is 
usually the most labour intensive one. But the producer can also subcontract single 
production processes. Gereffi et al. (2005) suggest that the way production networks are 
organized depends to a large degree on the transaction costs it takes to control the 
suppliers. The variety of how garment supply chains are organized is therefore very 
diverse and usually differs for each single product and order (! Figure 5 provides a 
rough idea of the complexity of the H&M chains) (also see for instance: Gereffi & 
Korzeniewicz 1994; Korzeniewicz 1994; Gereffi & Memedovic 2003; Hassler 2003; 
Hassler 2004; Neidik & Gereffi 2006).  
                                                      
14 There are certainly also labour rights violations in the textiles and fibre production, but they are not analysed here. 
15 The “production” of a piece of garment usually takes the textile as an input and then includes more than 10 single steps. 
It is usually referred to cut-make-trim. Further processes are ironing, packing, embroidery, printing and the like.  
BRAND
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Sourcing is complex, as one brand does not only have one supply chain. Rather, many 
products of one brand have their own story, i.e., their own supply chain. The single 
production processes for one garment piece often take place in different factories in 
various cities and countries. The example of one Patagonia product (! compare Figure 4: 
Kamala scoop top) indicates how the story of one product can be told. The product is 
designed in the Patagonia headquarters in California. The cotton fibre comes from Turkey 
and the Tencel© fibre from Austria. The fibres are spun and then sewed in Thailand (for 
a more detailed examination of the travels of a T-shirt, see: Rivoli 2006). However, 
broken down into single production steps, already more than 10 or 20 workers are 
involved in the production of such a simple product.  
 
Figure 4: Screenshot of the ‘footprint chronicles’ of two different products, www.patagonia.com, 31.3.2010 
Usually the lead firm and its supplier (producer or agent) sign a buying contract, in which 
they fix the conditions for production and delivery of one or several products. These 
contracts usually fix (a) what product the supplier shall produce in what quality (b) the 
quantity of the product, (c) when the product needs to be delivered, and (d) what social 
and environmental standards need to be considered (! CH 2.2). The lead firm and iuts 
supplier agree on the price for a single order on this basis.  
Most lead firms have various direct suppliers. They might change suppliers from one 
order to the next or keep them for many years. Basically, a lead firm interacts with many 
different direct suppliers and these suppliers have many different supply chains behind 
them, which are often unknown to the lead firm. How many supply chains a company 
needs to manage depends on the diversity of its products, the company’s philosophy and 
other factors. Large brands like Disney have more than 30.000 direct suppliers, a brand 
like H&M manages about 800 direct suppliers with approximately 2.700 production 
units, and small brands with less than a $10 million turnover might have less than 20 
direct suppliers (Young 2006; H&M 2008).  
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Figure 5: A rough picture of what the supply chains for H&M may look like (Kogg 2009) 
Garment supply chains are influenced by various factors, such as the societal context of 
the lead firm, the fashion system, and the global regulatory framework (Hassler 2003). 
Between 1974 and 2005 the multi-fibre agreement (MFA) regulated the global trade in 
garments and allowed countries to negotiate textile and clothing quotas bilaterally for 
every product. Its principal aim was to “create ‘orderly’ development of trade in textiles 
and clothing that would benefit both developed and developing countries” (Dicken 
2007a:261). However, de facto, after four rounds of renegotiation, it helped to protect the 
garment industry in the US and EU with tight quota from competitors from developing 
countries and greatly restricted the rate of growth of exports in developing countries 
(Dicken 2007a:261). But the system also “provided many developing countries a way to 
establish a garment industry that had been a source of economic growth and foreign 
earnings, created jobs and reduced poverty to a certain extent”16. Some industries in 
developing countries were mere constructs of the MFA and regarded as uncompetitive 
without the quota system, particularly against China (Dicken 2007a:261).  
With the end of the MFA, countries like Bangladesh that dependeded on the export of 
ready-made garments feared that the increased competition would have serious negative 
consequences both economically and socially (World Bank 2006). In India, the MFA 
phase-out caused similar concern among some suppliers who felt they would find it hard 
to compete with China once the quota was abolished. Overall, there was a strong fear that 
the garment industry would shift once more to China, as the quota system of the MFA 
strongly supported the industry in some smaller countries like Bangladesh.  
The full effects of the MFA-phase out are not identified yet. Wick (2009) argues that 
worldwide prices have dropped as a consequence:  
With the end of the ATC and sharper international competition, export prices for textile and clothing 
products began to drop in 2005. The reasons for this were the end of the quota price and the cheap 
producers’ penetration of the liberalised world market, to which multinational importers then 
received unimpeded access. (Wick 2009:9) 
Whether a region can produce in a cost-effective way depends on many factors, such as 
the industry strategies, corporate strategies, and on how the national or local governments 
                                                      
16 http://www.mfa-forum.net/aboutMFAForum.aspx, 3.3.2010 
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would react to the liberalization. It also depends on the consumers, if a cost-effective 
production is the highest priority in sourcing or whether the highest priority of some 
brands might also be connected to social or environmental aspects of production. 
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The anti-sweatshop movement argues that brands and retailers have the power to 
implement social standards, which can be conceptualized theoretically with the global 
commodity chains (GCC) framework (Dicken, Kelly et al. 2001:97). Gereffi (1994) 
defines the GCC as follows:  
A GCC consists of sets of interorganizational networks clustered around one commodity or product, 
linking households, enterprises, and states to one another within the world-economy. These networks 
are situationally specific, socially constructed, and locally integrated, underscoring the social 
embeddedness of economic organization. … Specific processes or segments within a commodity chain 
can be represented as boxes or nodes, linked together in networks (Gereffi 1994:2) 
The GCC framework is used by researchers whose analysis focuses on the larger 
structural power relationships in global economic trade that support or limit the 
implementation of social standards (Gereffi 1994; Fichter & Sydow 2002; Gibbon & 
Ponte 2005; Gibbon, Bair et al. 2008; Bair 2009)17. Many see the power of brands and 
retailers as part of the structural background within which lead firms force their suppliers 
to implement standards (Kaplinsky & Morris 2001; Humphrey 2005; Smith & Barrientos 
2005:193,197). The central concept in the GCC framework is the governance structure of 
the chain. It conceptualizes how firms organize their cross-border production 
arrangements and is defined as:  
Power relationships between firms that determine how financial, material, and human resources are 
allocated and flow within a chain. (Gereffi 1994:97; Sturgeon 2009:114).  
Garment chains are called ‘buyer-driven’. Buyer-drivenness indicates that lead firms, 
who design and market the goods, have a great deal of power in the whole supply chain 
(Gibbon & Ponte 2005; Dicken 2007b; Gibbon, Bair et al. 2008:321; Sturgeon 2009:123). 
The lead firm is seen as playing the central role in setting up and coordinating 
decentralized production networks and as having the power to control the activities of 
other firms in the chain that it does not own (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2001:4; Coe, 
Dicken et al. 2008a:277). The GCC framework thus draws attention to the asymmetrical 
power relationships between buyers and suppliers. Scholars and practitioners have been 
using the GCC framework to stress that lead agents hold power in global supply chains 
and even use ‘aggressive models’ of retailer-led supply chain management – particularly 
transnational retailers based in Europe and North America such as Walmart, Tesco, Metro 
(Crewe 2000; Hale 2000; Dolan & Humphrey 2004; Gibbon & Ponte 2005; Wrigley, Coe 
et al. 2005; Hughes 2006a:638; Hughes, Buttle et al. 2007:493).  
Power is seen as resulting from the significance of design and marketing activities in 
global apparel production, the dependence of suppliers, and the asymmetries in value 
addition within the chain (see also Bair 2005; Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2005:82). Hughes 
                                                      
17 While Gary Gereffi developed the GCC framework into the global value chains (GVC) framework, many still claim that 
the new framework is not so useful for analysing power relations in global trade, and therefore stick with the GCC 
framework (Gibbon & Ponte 2005; Gibbon, Bair et al. 2008; Bair 2009). I follow this view. 
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et al. (2007:494) demonstrate that retailers can dictate pricing and payment terms to their 
suppliers and make strict demands on producers in terms of product specifications and 
delivery times. Accordingly, Fitter & Kaplinsky (2001:78f) define chain governance as 
“power to define who does and who does not participate in the chain, the setting of rules 
of inclusion, assisting chain participants to achieve these standards and monitoring their 
performance” – i.e., buyers have the power to prescribe social standards, because lead 
firms have the power to exclude producers (compare Humphrey & Schmitz 2001:22). 
However, developmental scholars criticize the sanctioning of suppliers that do not 
implement social standards because such sanctions lead to an exclusion of suppliers from 
markets and prevent them from developing (Nadvi 2008). 
Sturgeon (2009:129) notes that lead agents can and do use their purchasing power to 
limit supplier power. As lead firms keep switching suppliers, they thus exert power over 
suppliers who want to gain future orders:  
Although it is not always exercised, purchasing power allows a lead firm to explicitly coordinate the 
activities of its supply chain and to pressure suppliers to lower costs, increase quality, adopt specific 
equipment, employ specific business processes, purchase inputs from specific vendors, and invest in 
specific locations …  (Sturgeon 2009:129).  
Humphrey defines the lead firms’ power as the ability to determine the following four 
questions (Humphrey & Schmitz 2001:21f; Humphrey 2005:22):  
• What is to be produced?  
• How is it to be produced?  
• When is it to be produced?  
• How much is to be produced?  
He furthermore argues that many buyers can also determine the product price. While the 
implementation of social standards mainly deals with the question “How is it to be 
produced?” the discussion above suggests that the other production dimensions also 
influence the success of implementing standards. Basically, the other dimensions act as 
structural enabling or disabling conditions for implementing social standards. Research 
shows that they can worsen working conditions for overseas labourers, who already 
experience low wages, and restrict rights in the workplace (Hughes 2005:1148).  
How far down the chain does the power of lead agents reach? Gibbon & Ponte (2005) 
argue that different forms of chain co-ordination (market, network, hierarchy) may 
govern a supply chain, but that each single governance form can be limited to a segment 
of the chain. For instance, the form of co-ordination between the cotton farmers and the 
spinning mills might be market-related when cotton is sold and bought on the open 
market, whereas the relationship between the lead agent and the garment factory might 
happen in a network type. In contrast, the mode of chain governance that refers to the 
whole chain would still be buyer-driven in most cases (Hughes 2006a:639). For instance, 
the overall mode of governance is buyer-driven, as the lead agent determines what cotton 
quality the garment factory must use; and by doing this, the lead agent indirectly sets 
quality standards for the cotton and textile production.  
Various studies point out that the five dimensions of the lead agents’ purchasing 
practices are in contradiction with each other and can undermine the implementation of 
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social standards that the buyers want to promote (Hughes 1999; Hughes 2000; Hughes 
2004; Mamic 2004; Reimer & Leslie 2004; Hughes 2005; Raworth & Kidder 2009:166). 
Therefore some argue that changing purchasing practices as part of companies’ CSR 
policies could make a significant difference (Dhanarajan 2005). If suppliers do not 
manage to cope with the situation, it is suggested, they pass the pressure on to the 
workers:  
Brands and retailers are demanding faster, more flexible, and cheaper production from 
internationally outsourced suppliers … these are not geared up to deliver because they lack the 
managerial and technical tools needed to cope with the demands of lean production, and they have 
little power to negotiate with the buyer. As a result, suppliers transfer the pressures onto workers, 
who bear it in the form of precarious employment …  (Raworth & Kidder 2009:165).  
Hence, Raworth and Kidder (2009:166) argue that lead firms could not create low-cost 
and flexible supply chains, if workers would not accept poor working conditions: “the 
success of retailers and brands in creating low-cost flexible supply chains appears to rely 
on the availability of a pool of workers who are socially and economically obliged to 
accept work on such terms” (Raworth & Kidder 2009:165). Raworth (2009:174) derives 
three different kinds of pressure that buyers exert on suppliers: 
• Time and speed, such as pressures to deliver faster, reduce production lead times, 
and shorten design cycles – this is particularly problematic in the quick fashion 
industry, where companies like Zara have 12 seasons a year, which leads to shorter 
lead times.  
• Flexibility and seasonality, such as demands for quick changes in order size and the 
ability to switch rapidly between product designs.  
• Costs and risks, such as demands for higher quality at lower prices – suppliers in 
some studies complain that prices went down by 35% within 1,5 years, whereby 
quality demands concerning standards rather went up. 
Some of these pressures (time/speed/flexibility/seasonality) are seen as determined by the 
fashion system. Sally Weller (2003) termed fashion business as ‘time competition’. In 
her view the fashion system is “formed in the mysterious depths of social processes that 
are external to firms and beyond their scope of influence” (Weller 2003:147). Fashion 
garments that capture consumer interests are characterized by rapid growth and high 
market penetration. If the consumers’ mood changes ‘fashion garments’ marketability 
declines more rapidly than more ‘standardized’ (basic) goods. One of the central factors 
in fashion is the unpredictability of consumer behaviour (Weller 2003:146). This again 
means that while lead firms hold power over their suppliers, they themselves are situated 
in an insecure and unpredictable situation.  
Table 1 sums up the different forms of lead firms’ power presented here.  
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The concentration of market power in the hands of lead firms is seen as the main reason 
why civil society organizations started pushing retailers and brands in Europe or the US 
to assure responsibility for their supply chains in the 1990s, for instance by introducing 
ethical trading programs (Wrigley, Coe et al. 2005; Hughes, Wrigley et al. 2008). Ethical 
campaigns like the anti-sweatshop movement are seen as a counter-power to corporations 
in a globalized economy that influence the way corporations are perceived by the public 
(Hughes, Wrigley et al. 2008). 
The anti-sweatshop movement exerts pressure on brands and retailers by connecting 
working conditions in outsourced production with the companies in Europe and the US, 
and by making them public (Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson et al. 2001; Hale & Shaw 2001; 
Featherstone 2004; Barnett, Cloke et al. 2005; Wills & Hale 2005; Micheletti & Stolle 
2007:163f; Hughes, Wrigley et al. 2008). More than 100 organisations of the anti-
sweatshop movement tell stories of factory workers, about their working conditions and 
about the violations of their rights. They place their activities in the popular media and 
culture, using corporate vulnerabilities like logos and brand images (! Figure 6) 
(Micheletti & Stolle 2007:163f). The work of the anti-sweatshop movement is based on 
the hope that companies implement corporate responsibility practices because they fear 
being involved in scandals and losing their good reputation (Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson et 
al. 2001). Some empirical studies, however, indicate that the influence of NGOs, at least 
on corporate environmental management decisions, is limited (Gago & Antolin 2004; 
Braun & Starmanns 2009).  
Civil society groups link up with consumers to provide the movement with power 
against corporations, particularly if consumers use forms of protest against companies 
(Barnett, Cloke et al. 2005). Micheletti & Stolle (2007:166) present four different roles 
consumers can take in ethical campaigns.  
First, consumers can support a group for a broader cause. For unions “consumers are 
supporters that help them to solve sweatshops problems through increased unionization, 
which they argue will empower workers and give them a formal platform to negotiate 
with employers and sign collective agreements that guarantee decent wages and working 
conditions, thus making sweatshops history”  (Micheletti & Stolle 2007:166). 
Second, while most other anti-sweatshop activists support the union cause, they also 
want consumers to play a more dynamic and independent role by becoming a critical 
mass of fair trade shoppers: “For them, consumers – not unions – can become the 
countervailing power to corporations. … For them, when consumers better their 
consumer practice, they promote the development of a market for sweat-free goods and 
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indirectly influence corporate policy and practice. These organizations believe that 
critical mass shopping is an important step toward a more equitable world” (Micheletti & 
Stolle 2007:166).  
Third, stirring up consumer culture by e.g. Adbusting, is regarded as the most 
independent consumer role (! Figure 6) (Micheletti & Stolle 2007:167f). Here, 
consumers are seen as ontological agents for social change. In this understanding a 
change in the worldview of consumer culture and corporations will facilitate ‘grand social 
and political change’. Stehr (2007) similarly talked of a ‘moralising’ of markets. 
Finally, consumers can be a spearhead force for corporate change, which is seen as 
the most important fundament of the CCC identifying itself as: “a European consumers 
pressure group and consumer campaign whose strength comes from consumer power and 
people becoming a ‘community of consumers’ rather than just ‘autonomous shoppers’” 
(Micheletti & Stolle 2007:167). In this sense “corporate vulnerabilities like the brand are 
very consciously and explicitly used to hit corporations where it hits most, because 
‘brand name companies compete intensely for consumer loyalty, and therefore consumers 
can influence how these companies operate’”.  
  
 
Figure 6: Examples of anti-Nike cultural jamming18 
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While anti-sweatshop campaigns hold lead firms responsible for poor working conditions 
in their suppliers’ factories in developing countries, the lead firms often deny their 
responsibility, claiming that the factory managers or the national governments are 
responsible. I claim that the theoretical concepts of liability, structural injustice and 
political responsibility help to better understand arguments regarding corporate social 
responsibility in global supply chains.  
According to the so-called liability model, the managers of factories are responsible for 
labour right violations that happen inside a factory and that violate legislation.  
The most common model of assigning responsibility derives from legal reasoning to find guilt or fault 
for a harm. Under the fault model, one assigns responsibility to particular agents whose actions can 
be shown as causally connected to the circumstances for which responsibility is sought. (Young 
2004:368) 
                                                      
18 A:http://shirtspotting.files.wordpress.com/2007/08/sweatshop.jpg, B: 
http://www.irtfcleveland.org/economicjustice/sweatshops/nike.gif, C: 
http://thegreatredression.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/nike-sweatshops.jpg 
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The liability model makes factory managers morally and legally responsible for the 
effects their actions have on workers (Young 2004, 2006; Tullberg 2006). National 
governments have to ensure that companies operating within their territory act according 
to national laws, which are guided by United Nations’ (UN) conventions and particularly 
the core conventions of the ILO.  
Although national labour laws are often quite strict and correspond to the core 
conventions of the ILO, governments are often unable to maintain working standards 
(Scherer & Palazzo 2008). The administration might not have enough staff to monitor 
working conditions in factories, their staff may be corrupt, or the government of the 
developing country may evaluate the gains from export and foreign direct investment as 
being higher than the gains from maintaining high labour standards in the industry. 
Governments thus try to create ‘favourable’ conditions in their own country in order to 
attract investment. Some multinational corporations use this situation to their advantage, 
choosing a location where the institutional and legal setting corresponds to their aims 
(Scherer & Palazzo 2007:1101). Doing this, they reconstitute the prevailing structures. 
Some cosmopolitans have therefore questioned whether nation states of developing 
countries are the right body to create justice in a globalized world (see for example Kuper 
2005; Scherer & Palazzo 2007; Palazzo & Scherer 2008; Scherer & Palazzo 2008).  
Iris Young (2004, 2006) argues that it might not be morally correct to point fingers at 
single actors, such as governments in developing countries, corporations or consumers, 
and blame them as the only ones morally responsible for rectifying injustices in complex 
supply chains. In her view, injustice in supply chains without clear-cut causality might 
rather be the mediated result of complex global structures, such as global competition, 
into which nation states and corporations are embedded. Consumers also drive these 
structures. Young suggests that injustice in global garment supply chains shall be seen as 
‘structural’ injustice. She defines structure as “a multidimensional space of differentiated 
social positions among which a population is distributed” (Young 2006:111). Structures 
“constitute the historical givens in relation to which individuals act, and which are 
relatively stable over time” (Young 2006:112). Social structures are relevant in our 
context because they serve as the background condition for individual action. Structures 
present actors with options and provide ‘channels’ that both enable and constrain action 
(Young 2006:112). Single actors in global value chains are therefore enabled or 
constrained by structures, and their actions permanently reproduce and change structures, 
as Giddens explains in his ‘structuration theory’ (Young 2006:113). However, the 
channels that enable and constrain actors are unevenly distributed: some have minimal 
opportunities with little benefits (e.g. workers in the sewing factories), whereas others 
have wider opportunities with greater benefits (e.g. shareholders of a European garment 
company).  
Young suggests applying the structural background conditions to the situation of 
sweatshops. These are embedded into spatially distributed actions on local, national and 
global levels that permanently produce and reproduce social structures in global supply 
chains – and everyone is involved in these (Massey 2006). For instance, national 
politicians liberalise trade in garments through global trade agreements, thus increasing 
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the competition that requires factory managers to work more cost effectively. Consumers 
in Europe want to be stylish, and regularly need new and cheap clothes. Clothing retailers 
both follow these demands and try to manipulate them. Frequently changing fashion 
drives order sizes and order frequency, and these constrain buyers and manufacturers’ 
freedoms. As a result of these structures, factory managers, for instance, make their 
labourers work overtime. But mangers are influenced by consumers, lead firms, lifestyle 
magazines and others, and they all permanently reproduce these structures (e.g. by 
producing and propagating new fashion styles and thus demands). Young therefore 
argues that social structure is the product of aggregated historical actions and decisions, 
but in ongoing process, and thus in a constant flux and open to change. Young sums up 
structural injustice as (Young 2006:114):  
a kind of moral wrong in contrast to the wrongful action of an individual agent or the wilfully 
repressive policies of a state. … Structural injustice occurs as a consequence of many individuals and 
institutions acting in pursuit of their particular goals and interests, within given institutional rules 
and accepted norms.  
She argues that assigning responsibilities is very difficult in a situation of structural 
injustice, where people just follow their ordinary roles in society. The result is that 
myriads of individuals and institutions cause structural injustice that cannot be solved 
through one actor alone: “We live in a world seemingly organised by no one, which cause 
harm to others in a systematic manner to distant others” (Cloke 2002). Problems arise, 
while everyone acts in accordance with prevailing institutional rules and norms: The 
consumer in Europe buys his or her clothes absolutely legally, and without bigger efforts 
he or she will not find out whether the purchase is directly connected to child labour or 
different problems that he would reject morally. Similarly, corporations in Europe buy 
the clothes from exporters abroad. They normally settle their contracts within the legal 
frames of the European Union. Some of them put social or environmental clauses into the 
contracts. Factory owners try to place responsibility on aspects outside the factory, e.g., 
competition and unemployment: “it is better to have a job than to have none” (Young 
2004:369). And the fact that local states are either inept or corrupt derives, as states will 
argue, from being under severe competitive pressures that prevent them from improving 
working conditions (Young 2004:369ff). The owners, managers, and local states claim 
that they operate under constraints beyond their control (structural economic and social 
processes) that give them few options. No one would call consumers and corporations 
criminals, yet, together all actors create conditions that reproduce injustice in factories. 
How then to define responsibility in globally connected supply chains where corporations 
cannot be seen as responsible according to a liability model?  
Young suggests a social connection model, which she terms ‘political responsibility’ 
(Young 2004; Young 2006). In this view, actors are responsible because they belong to a 
structure and participate in processes through which they seek benefits, but through 
which they produce unjust outcomes. Young argues that actors are responsible for what 
they have not done, because no isolatable perpetrator can be allocated to be responsible in 
complex situations. Therefore all actors causing structural injustices must engage in 
public discourses that help rectify the problems.  
All the persons who participate by their actions in the ongoing schemes of cooperation that constitute 
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these structures are responsible for them, in the sense that they are part of the process that causes 
them. (Young 2006:114) 
As an alternative to the liability model, Young proposes a model that shall help 
conceptualise responsibility for producing and rectifying structural injustice in complex 
situations like global supply chains (Young 2006:115). This model has five criteria that 
groups involved in structural injustices can use in order to discharge political 
responsibility:  
• A. No actor isolation: Single actors should not be isolated responsibility-wise. 
Isolating concepts of responsibility are inadequate when harms result from 
participation of thousands of people. 
• B. Judging background conditions: Political responsibility “brings into question 
precisely those background conditions that ascriptions of blame or fault assume as 
normal”. One produces and reproduce structural injustice by following the accepted 
and expected rules and conventions, often in a habitual way, acting in accordance 
with one’s aims – e.g. fashion system, devoting more money to advertising than to 
production (Young 2004; Massey 2006:94; Young 2006:120). These background 
conditions must be challenged, i.e., we need openness to plurality and to 
problematize what we take as given, necessary, ordinary or ordered. 
• C. Political responsibility is forward-looking, not backward-looking: It tries not to 
reckon debts, but to bring about results – thus it depends on everyone who is in a 
position to contribute to results: “Having understood that structural processes cause 
some injustices, those participating in the production and reproduction of the 
structures should recognize that their actions contribute along with those of others to 
this injustice, and take responsibility for altering the processes to avoid or reduce 
injustice.” (Young 2004:378) 
• D. Shared responsibility: All who are producing or reproducing the structural 
conditions causing structural injustice share a responsibility for this injustice.  
• E. Discharged only through collective action: Responsibility can be discharged 
only by joining with others in collective action. 
Finally, four parameters define how much responsibility single actors should take: power, 
privilege, interest, and collective ability (Young 2006:127ff).  
• First, power indicates that in the situation of shared responsibility those actors that 
are in a powerful position to act or change things have a greater responsibility for 
action. Young argues that a large brand such as Calvin Klein has a greater power 
than a smaller one and supports the focus of the anti-sweatshop movement on large 
brands (Young 2006: 127).  
• Second, referring to privilege she argues that people who benefit relatively from 
structural injustices “have special moral responsibilities to contribute to organized 
efforts to correct them, not because they are to blame, but because they are able to 
adapt to changed circumstances without suffering serious deprivation“ (Young 2006: 
127f). Accordingly, rich people are seen as apt to spend more money on clothing in 
order to ensure that the workers are treated fairly.  
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• Third, she argues that different actors have divergent interests in the transformation 
of structures that produce injustice (Young 2006:128). As workers have more interest 
in changing the situation and also a better insight into their own situation, they have 
“a responsibility to work together to improve their situation“. But she adds that they 
are unlikely to succeed without the support of less vulnerable actors, like NGOs.  She 
criticizes approaches irgnoring workers as being paternalistic. 
• Fourth, as there are many injustices that need remedy, she regards „the relative ease 
with which people can organize collective action to address an injustice“ (collective 
ability) as a principle to decide where to engage.  
In sum, Young argues that all actors share a responsibility to collectively engage in 
solving problems like poor working conditions in factories, and she provides some 
parameters to assess one’s own responsibility.  
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I suggest from chapter 2 that the following questions have to be analysed closer in this 
research:  
• Which voluntary practices do companies use to discharge their share of 
responsibility?  
• How do ethical campaigns pressurize companies? How do companies realize the 
power of ethical campaigns?  
• What role do background conditions (e.g. power) play in corporate responsibility 
practices?  
• How can responsibility, power etc. be analysed empirically?  
The next chapter examines more concrete practices of how corporate responsibility is put 
into practice. 
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In recent years the regulation of global business activities has shifted from the public to 
the private sphere, where it is referred to as private regulation or corporate responsibility19 
(Fuchs 2007; Hughes, Buttle et al. 2007:494). Compared to mandatory state or public 
regulation, corporate responsibility and private regulation are voluntary (‘soft law’20) – in 
other words, companies applying corporate responsibility practices are not legally obliged 
to do so, as in ‘hard law’, and cannot be sanctioned by governments (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2002; United Nations 2007:14).  
I argue in this chapter that many companies voluntarily share responsibility for workers 
in their supply chains, as Young demands, but that there are tremendous differences in the 
practices used. This is relevant in so far, as voluntary regulation often de facto replaces 
mandatory and democratically legitimized state regulation. In voluntary regulation private 
actors, defining corporate responsibility are not democratically legitimized. By 
consequence, the credibility of private regulation and its legitimacy from a democratic 
point of view is often low.  
In chapter 3.1, I define corporate social responsibility and distinguish two 
fundamentally different models, namely, ‘positivist’ CSR and ‘political’ CSR. In chapter 
3.2, I present private standards initiatives, the variety in the approaches to implement 
standards, and how they are criticized. In chapter 3.3, I discuss key challenges of CSR in 
supply chains from the literature, mainly referring to effectiveness, credibility and 
legitimacy.  
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The broad idea of CSR as a voluntary and not mandatory mechanism to regulate 
globalized business behaviour is winning support from policy-makers in national 
governments and intergovernmental organizations. It is underpinned by the assumption 
that firms are capable of governing themselves in the absence of effective international 
and national laws (Blowfield & Frynas 2005:502).  
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The term ‘corporate responsibility’ (CR21) is an umbrella term that deals with the role of 
                                                      
19 Some refer to the private regulation of social or environmental standards in supply chains as ‘ethical trade’. Private 
regulation and corporate social responsibility can also be subsumed under ‘voluntary regulation’.  
20 The following terms can all be summed up as soft regulation: global governance, private regulation, voluntary regulation, 
network governance, private governance, business-self regulation, civil regulation, civil governance, co-governance, co-
regulation, corporate social responsibility, ethical trade, fair trade, multi-stakeholder regulation, non-state market-driven 
mechanisms, etc. – the list could continue. 
21 The well-known abbreviation CSR refers to ‘corporate social responsibility’. Some suggested to replace it by CR, since 
the latter also includes environmental aspects. I will refer to it as CSR, as I focus on social issues.  
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business in society. It refers to the voluntary activities a company undertakes in order to 
behave responsibly and includes a variety of issues and practices: environmental 
management, health and safety, human rights, community capacity building, 
philanthropic activities, and the like. The broadness of the concept has been criticized, as 
it “can be anything you want it to be” (Newell & Frynas 2007:673). Blowfield & Frynas 
(2005:503) define CR as an umbrella term that includes the following features: 
• Companies have a responsibility for their impact on society and the natural 
environment, sometimes beyond legal compliance and the liability of individuals;  
• Companies have a responsibility for the behaviour of others with whom they do 
business (e.g. within supply chains);  
• Business needs to manage its relationship with wider society, whether for reasons of 
commercial viability or to add value to society.  
In this research ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR) mainly refers to rules and 
practices used to implement social standards into supply chains. These rules and practices 
usually include the setting and monitoring of social standards, interacting with 
stakeholders, training suppliers, reporting, and modifying purchasing policies – the exact 
content of CSR action by a company, however, depends on its particular approach (! 
CH 3.2) (Blowfield & Frynas 2005:507; Phillips & Caldwell 2005; Utting 2005b:2; 
Hughes 2006b).  
Many politicians like to see voluntary CSR practices as a part of the solution to the 
problem of world poverty and, partially, as a substitute to state-regulation (European 
Commission 2001; Prahalad 2006). Proponents of CSR argue that it can mitigate social or 
environmental problems caused by economic action. In theory its voluntarism and 
flexibility allow companies to induce cost-efficient improvements (compare Newell & 
Frynas 2007:673; Blowfield & Murray 2008). Another advantage of CSR is seen in its 
consensual outcomes, i.e. that it captures and presents “the moral dimensions of 
capitalism in ways that resonate with investors and consumers, and are actionable by 
managers“ (Blowfield 2005:523).  
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The engagement with stakeholders and with CSR issues that go beyond what is legally 
required has often been legitimated by the financial benefits a company can gain from it. 
If CSR generates tangible or intangible financial benefits it is usually referred to as a 
‘business case’ (Waddock & Graves 1997; Margolis & Walsh 2001; Blowfield & Murray 
2008:130ff; Kurucz, Colbert et al. 2008; Orlitzky 2008). Kurucz et. al (2008:85ff) 
differentiate four types of business case value creation: 
• Cost and risk reduction: Engaging in CSR to reduce costs and risks to the firm  
• Competitive advantage: A strategic approach to CSR to build relative competitive 
advantage 
• Reputation and legitimacy: Exploiting CSR activities to build value through gains in 
firm reputation and legitimacy 
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• Synergistic value creation (win-win): Integrating stakeholder interests to create value 
on multiple fronts 
The business case for CSR has particularly gained prominence with regard to 
environmental issues, where calculable cost reductions are a driver for engaging in CSR 
(Porter & van der Linde 1996; Braun 2003; Blowfield & Murray 2008:130ff). However, 
the degree to which a company profits from CSR varies from case to case and cannot be 
generalized. It is influenced by factors relating to the company, the particular CSR 
practice, the socio-institutional context into which the company is embedded, and the like 
(Doh & Guay 2006; Blowfield & Murray 2008:131ff). Hence, due to the difficulties to 
pinpoint effects in financial terms and the uncertainties of these effects many companies 
still do not engage in business case practices. These difficulties make issues of corporate 
responsibility a somewhat vague concept that is very much dependent on the single case.  
Instrumental stakeholder theory suggests that for practical, business-related reasons, 
companies should manage their important stakeholders (Freeman 1984; Freeman 1994). 
One problem is to identify the (salient) stakeholders so that managers can manage them 
efficiently (Mitchell, Agle et al. 1997). Others claim that firms should not only manage 
stakeholders that are instrumentally relevant, but also those that have a normative claim 
(Donaldson & Preston 1995). However, this theory does not say how stakeholders shall 
be managed once they are identified. There are many forms of stakeholder interaction, 
reaching from passive informing to active engagement (regarding environmental 
communication, see Braun 2003:107).  
Geographers have recently argued that consumers are salient stakeholders because their 
purchasing practices are increasingly shaped “by considerations of companies’ ethical 
reputations” (Barnett, Cloke et al. 2005; Barnett & Land 2007; Clarke, Barnett et al. 
2007a; Clarke, Barnett et al. 2007b; Hughes, Wrigley et al. 2008:349f). Consumers’ 
decisions are seen as influenced by intermediaries like NGOs, advocacy groups, social 
movements or the media (Hughes, Wrigley et al. 2008:350 quoting Clarke 2007). These 
are said to provide stories and images that encourage consumers to buy responsibly and 
“assemble the disparate practices of anonymous consumers into coherent indices of 
‘ethical’ preferences in the effort to exert normative force over state agencies and 
corporations” (Hughes, Wrigley et al. 2008:351 quoting Clarke 2007:241). In this view, 
the way NGOs and social movements frame their critique against companies in the media 
influences how consumers consume and how companies engage in corporate 
responsibility activities. Companies manage such stakeholder pressure in business-case 
CSR strategies – but the reactions are manifold (Blowfield & Murray 2008:158f).  
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The national-institutional contexts in which retailers and brands are based play a key role 
in shaping corporate approaches to applying labour codes in their global supply chains 
(Christopherson & Lillie 2005; Hughes, Buttle et al. 2007; Newell & Frynas 2007:675). 
In a case study Hughes et al. (2007) compare different PSI that originate in the UK (ETI) 
and the US (FLA, WRC), arguing that the national context has an influence on the way 
the initiatives are institutionalized. Their study shows that in contrast to the UK approach, 
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the US initiatives demand strict transparency and have a significant legal dimension. The 
transparency “reflects the notion of consumer sovereignty lying at the heart of the US 
anti-sweatshop movement, and in effect enrols consumers into the auditing process as a 
critical audience in a way that is absent from organised ethical trading programmes in the 
UK” (Hughes, Buttle et al. 2007:504). The stronger legal dimension of the US-
approaches are understood as being caused by the work of US-based labour rights groups 
like Human Rights First and the International Labor Rights Fund, both of which are run 
by lawyers and experiment with legal frameworks such as the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(which holds corporations accountable for actions affecting foreign workers). This is seen 
as a reason why the FLA approach is more rule-based and monitoring focused, whereas 
the approach by the ETI that is based on ‘third-way’ policy focuses more on learning and 
best practices and is more principle-based (Hughes, Buttle et al. 2007:496ff,508). 
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Palazzo & Scherer (Palazzo & Scherer 2006; Scherer & Palazzo 2007; Palazzo & Scherer 
2008; Scherer & Palazzo 2008) roughly differentiate between two concepts of CSR.  
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Palazzo and Scherer argue that the dominant ‘positivist’ CSR concept has its foundations 
in the liberal model of democracy. It strictly separates private economic activities and 
public political activities and makes corporations subjects of legitimacy rather than 
objects to it (Palazzo & Scherer 2008). The liberal model of democracy is sketched as 
follows (Palazzo & Scherer 2006:74ff; Scherer & Palazzo 2007:1106 referring to Elster, 
1986 & Friedman 1962): Corporations contribute to the welfare of society through their 
self-interested market transactions, and their decisions are legitimated by the results they 
produce. As a-political actors they are not subjected to immediate legitimacy demands, 
i.e., they do not have to expose their decisions to public scrutiny as long as they comply 
with laws and moral customs. Friedman’s (1970) famous description of profit as the only 
social responsibility of a corporation is a modern reflection of these deeply ingrained 
overarching concepts of liberal political legitimacy. In the liberal model the state 
establishes the conditions of the existence of the market, defines the ‘rules of the game’ 
and enforces them. It applies laws or enacts new regulations to protect the legitimate 
concerns of stakeholders. The state is seen as the only political actor who has to justify 
and democratically legitimate decisions. It only interferes in private affairs and constrains 
individual freedom if it is unavoidable. Economists suggest that states must take care of 
the concerns of citizens and regulate the economic system in such a way that private 
freedom is guaranteed and that the results of individual rational action will contribute to, 
or at least will not negatively influence, the well-being of society. 
Scherer & Palazzo believe that economic globalization has led to a so-called post-
national constellation in which the ‘rules of the game’ have changed (Palazzo & Scherer 
2008:774). National governments lose power over corporations, whereas companies gain 
power. Even if public and private actors get involved in multi-level regulation networks, 
these lack enforcement mechanisms and democratic control (Palazzo & Scherer 
2008:774; Scherer & Palazzo 2008:426). As the ‘positivist’ model of CSR is based on the 
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liberal model, they argue, it ignores the post-national constellation. They conclude: “the 
sole emphasis on economic rationality will not contribute to economic welfare, but rather 
may worsen the situation” (Scherer & Palazzo 2008). ‘Positivist’ CSR is therefore built 
on a view of organizational legitimacy that does not allow companies to maintain and 
reproduce legitimacy (Palazzo & Scherer 2006:78,81). 
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Palazzo & Scherer build their argument on the concept of organizational legitimacy that 
deals with the legitimate or normatively appropriate role of business in society and 
provides companies with guidelines on how to behave responsibly (Palazzo & Scherer 
2006:72). Referring to Berger & Luckmann (1966), Palazzo & Scherer assume that 
legitimacy is subjectively perceived and ascribed to actions or institutions by social 
construction. They claim that in the context of global supply chains the “legitimacy-
ascribing environment is not very homogeneous” and one can observe a multiplicity of 
conflicting legal and moral demands.  
In their view corporations are political actors that discursively manage their 
organizational legitimacy through reasoning, arguing and discussing in order to survive. 
Organizations with a fragile legitimacy run the risk of being perceived as irrational and 
unnecessary (Palazzo & Scherer 2006:71,74). Scherer and Palazzo build on a concept by 
Suchman, who defines organizational legitimacy as “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Palazzo & Scherer 
2006:71 quoting Suchman 1995:574). According to Suchman (1995) organizational 
legitimacy has three elements (! Box 1). 
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Organizational legitimacy can result from the organization’s cultural embeddedness that 
is displayed in its compliance with generally accepted norms, values and beliefs in 
society. In this perspective, organizational legitimacy is a continuous and often 
unconscious adaptation process in which the organization reacts to external expectations. 
A strategic approach to managing legitimacy, however, views legitimacy as an 
‘operational resource’ that can be managed and directly influenced by the corporation. In 
this perspective legitimacy is based on the corporation’s ability to “instrumentally 
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manipulate and deploy evocative symbols in order to garner societal support” (Suchman 
1995:572).  
In Palazzo & Scherer’s view the ‘positivist’ CSR model mainly rests upon cognitive 
legitimacy and tries to strategically manage the pragmatic concept of corporate 
legitimacy. It is only legitimate as long as it produces extra profits in the long term, 
though this may become problematic in a post-national constellation. Symbolic acts in 
terms of pragmatic legitimacy run the danger of being criticized as ‘green-washing’. They 
conclude that cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy are “not able to define a normative 
framework for the role of business in society that could help determine whether certain 
business activities are acceptable” (Scherer & Palazzo 2007:1098f). In their eyes “moral 
legitimacy has become the core source of societal acceptance” (Palazzo & Scherer 
2006:78).  
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Palazzo & Scherer demand a radical reformulation of how companies can generate and 
maintain legitimacy, suggesting that they must become ‘politicized’. Referring to Iris 
Young, they define ‘political’ as: “activities in which people organize collectively to 
regulate or transform some aspects of their shared social conditions, along with the 
communicative activities in which they try to persuade one another to join such collective 
actions or decide what direction they wish to take”. They call for adapting a 
discursive/communicative concept of organizational moral legitimacy that takes public 
discourse or ‘explicit public discussion’ as the basis for legitimacy (Palazzo & Scherer 
2006:79; Scherer & Palazzo 2007:1108; see also: Courville 2003; Fung 2003; Steffek 
2003). This system replaces implicit compliance with assumed societal norms and 
expectations with an explicit participation in public processes of political will-formation. 
By engaging in public discourses corporations construct moral legitimacy (Palazzo & 
Scherer 2006:81). From an ethical stance pragmatic legitimacy can also be seen as moral, 
therefore I rename ‘moral’ legitimacy to ‘discursive’ legitimacy22.  
Scherer & Palazzo (Palazzo & Scherer 2006; Scherer & Palazzo 2007) use the concept 
of deliberative discourse to outline of a new form of regulation that goes beyond the 
traditional forms of democratic nation state regulation. Processes of deliberation lead to 
better and broader accepted political decisions and a deeper mutual understanding of the 
involved stakeholders. They contribute to creating or sustaining moral legitimacy, 
particularly when there is no “shared background of values and traditions” in the context 
of global supply chains (Fung 2003:52; Palazzo & Scherer 2006:79f; Scherer & Palazzo 
2007:1111f). Corporations must remain open to critical deliberation as their primary 
source of societal acceptance. Deliberation is understood as a process through which 
participants address their conflicts, share information, exchange arguments and make 
decisions. Referring to Habermas, these scholars argue that it is the unforced “force of the 
better argument” (Habermas 1990:195) which produces in everybody’s perception a 
solution that was created jointly during the discourse (Scherer & Palazzo 2007:1105). 
Deliberation presupposes the willingness to expose one’s position to validity claims and 
                                                      
22 Thanks to Sonja Dänzer and Carsten Köllmann for this thought. 
Chapter 3: Corporate responsibility and social standards in global supply chains  28 
the motivation to strive for mutual understanding. In contrast to bargaining, participants 
are ready to change their opinions during discourse. As a precondition, a deliberative 
politics approach goes beyond narrow self-interested manipulations and includes a 
concern for the well-being of the whole, a concern that is reinforced by the process of 
deliberation itself. The challenge of communicative access to legitimacy is to engage in 
true dialogue, to convince others of the validity of one’s arguments but not to persuade or 
manipulate people (Palazzo & Scherer 2006:81f).  
The CSR-model Palazzo & Scherer propose rejects the reasoning of social contract 
theory, arguing that rules for society cannot be created on the desk, because every 
scientist is embedded into a certain historical and societal context (Scherer & Palazzo 
2007:1105). They stipulate that it is not necessary to achieve an ideal speech situation in 
order to have positive effects of deliberation because in real societies suboptimal 
circumstances are unavoidable and discourses are not free of power (Scherer & Palazzo 
2007:1109f,1114). They therefore suggest ’small steps’ of constant improvement and 
transformation for real democratic processes and institutions (Scherer & Palazzo 
2007:1107). 
Scherer & Palazzo assume that by engaging in discourses that aim at setting or 
redefining standards and expectations in a globalized and changing world, corporations 
assume an enlarged political co-responsibility (Scherer & Palazzo 2007:1109). 
Corporations must proactively engage in the public process of exchanging arguments 
with stakeholders, while being transparent and accountable. They suggest that the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) is one of the most advanced ‘political CSR’ concepts:  
The FSC is designed around deliberative criteria such as broad participation, the attempt to exclude 
corporate power as a decision criterion, and a constant process of improvement based on critical 
feedback about the council's performance or form of organization. The FSC does not represent a 
form of stakeholder dialogue, in which corporations invite stakeholders into their internal decision-
making processes. Rather it represents a corporate move into the political processes of public policy 
making through the creation of and collaboration with global institutions of political governance. 
X3,21,,3'*&
Some authors refute the use of deliberation in CSR as ‘romantic’ and as having “no place 
in the real world of globalized contexts” (Willke & Willke 2008). A more practical 
problem with both CSR concepts concerns the involvement of civil society groups: 
Which stakeholders should be involved in which way? Palazzo & Scherer (Scherer & 
Palazzo 2007:1109) argue that civil society actors suffer from the same legitimacy 
problems as corporations and suggest mitigating the problem to a certain degree through 
the multiplicity and diversity of civil society engagement. They also fear that NGO 
activists could be reluctant to engage in public discourses with corporations “because 
they fear the existing structural inequalities such as the power of a corporation on the 
outcome of such an discourse” (Palazzo & Scherer 2006:83). NGOs might therefore not 
be ready for shared solutions and would rather use resistance to create public awareness 
and corporate willingness to participate in public debates than cooperate with companies. 
Scherer & Palazzo view such resistance as similarly inappropriate as corporate lobbyism 
when trying to produce solutions based on moral/discursive legitimacy (! Table 2). 
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While CSR defines the corporate responsibility practices of single companies, private 
standards initiatives (PSI) harmonize and institutionalize rules for corporate responsibility 
behaviour. A PSI sets rules for the responsible behaviour of companies in their supply 
chains. A company that joins an initiative usually has to implement the initiatives’ Codes 
of Conduct in its supply chain according to the initiatives’ rules. This may include some 
kind of control to check whether the social standards are indeed implemented. Most 
initiatives somehow report the engagement of its members. Companies that are members 
in such an initiative usually can use the initiative’s label for public relations, and if 
members do not implement the codes, there are in some cases rules for sanctioning them.  
Private standards initiatives have been established to make the implementation of social 
and environmental standards more efficient, more effective and more credible. One 
positive effect of code and auditing harmonization is the creation of a level playing field 
amongst the members of the initiative, which can turn corporate responsibility into a non-
competitive issue for members. The initiatives also promise the reduction of audits and 
organizational learning effects. 
PSIs can very roughly be separated into business initiatives and multi-stakeholder 
initiatives, though there are major differences within each group (! Table 3) (also see: 
O'Rourke 2006).  
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3.2.1 M%++3*7&/1$%,&('/&7$'#"$&#1,3*%,,&&
Business initiatives (BI) represent the vast majority of private standards initiatives 
(Vogel 2008:269). In business initiatives companies make all the decisions. The Business 
Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI) that is discussed as a case study in chapters 7-10 is 
such an initiative.  
Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSI), in contrast, bring various stakeholders together in 
the sense proposed earlier (! CH 2.4 & 3.1.3). MSI are defined as institutions in which 
diverse stakeholders from a broad societal spectrum come together to jointly address and 
negotiate a common solution to dealing with a problem that affects them all, such as 
implementing social standards. MSI exist for almost every business sector and within 
each sector various MSI might co-exist with very different foci or rules (O'Rourke 2006; 
Brown 2007; Fransen & Kolk 2007; Nölke & Granz 2007).  
MSI in the garment industry bring together business actors and some of their 
stakeholders, who negotiate and mutually agree upon rules for global business operations 
(! Table 4). These rules set social standards and prescribe how to implement them. 
Garment brands and retailers can become a member in one of the four MSI: FLA, FWF, 
ETI or WRC (! Table 4). While Social Accountability International (SAI) is also a 
multi-stakeholder initiative, it sets the SA 8000 standard and rules for certifying factories 
according to this standard. Here, brands and retailers cannot become member, but they 
can ask their suppliers to become certified according to the SA 8000. The details of these 
five MSI have been compared elsewhere (O'Rourke 2006). 
!"#$%&AD&!=%&8',+&/%$%J"*+&81$+3;,+"C%='$0%/&3*3+3"+3J%,&3*&+=%&7"/8%*+&3*01,+/>&
! SX^! \:I! =GQ! S\S! M^Q!
! S(3*!X('&*!
^77&23(.3&-!
\&*D,*!:3)5.7!
I&-7&*.31+!
=.532(%!G*(03-)!
Q-3.3(.3J,!
S(3*!\,(*!
S&1-0(.3&-!
M&23(%!
^22&1-.('3%3.8!
Q-.,*-(.3&-(%!
I&1-.*8!&C!&*3)3-!! VM^!! VM^!! $Z! cX!! VM^!
U(3-!2&-2,/.7!! i,*3C32(.3&-!6!
%,(*-3-)!
^103.7!6!H&*D,*!
,+/&H,*+,-.!!
X,(*-3-)!! i,*3C32(.3&-! S(2.&*8!
2,*.3C32(.3&-!
$&J,*-(-2,#!
\5&!7,.7!.5,!
*1%,7b!
I&+/(-3,74!
1-3J,*73.3,74!!
23J3%!7&23,.8!!
V-3J,*73.8!7.(CC4!
%('&1*!,Y/,*.74!
V-3.,0!M.10,-.7!
^)(3-7.!
MH,(.75&/7!
*,/*,7,-.(.3J,7!!
I&+/(-3,7!6!
23J3%!7&23,.8!
I&+/(-3,74!
c$A74!!
.*(0,!1-3&-7!!
I&+/(-3,74!
c$A7!
^103.3-)! ^103.7!'8!
(103.&*7!
(22*,03.,0!'8!
SX^!!
\:I!&H-!(103.!
.,(+7!
^103.7!-&.!
+(-0(.&*8!
i,*3C32(.3&-!
(103.7!'8!S\S!
(103.!.,(+!
^103.7!'8!M^^MK
2,*.3C3,0!(103.&*7!
Multi-stakeholder initiatives were described as “one of the most innovative and startling 
institutional designs of the past 50 years” (Cashore, Auld et al. 2004:4; compare Vogel 
2008:269f). Similarly, so far, literature on multi-stakeholder initiatives suggests that they 
are more effective, credible and legitimate than business initiatives (Pattberg 2004; 
Fransen & Kolk 2007).  
MSI are said to be more effective mainly because of mutual learning processes. The 
interaction between stakeholders can lead to innovation and learning that does not occur 
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in business initiatives, where stakeholders do not interact in the same way (Bendell 
2005:363; Hughes 2006b; Fransen & Kolk 2007:670). Sharing of knowledge can create 
new assets in terms of skills, understanding, trust and consensus building, which can 
enhance the mechanisms’ effectiveness (compare Bendell 2005:363; Fransen & Kolk 
2007). Furthermore, problems are directly dealt with and rules are more specific and 
elaborate because of the high level of stakeholder interactions (Bernstein 2001; Fransen 
& Kolk 2007). The interaction between stakeholders can foster a better understanding of 
the other stakeholders’ motivations and positions, and of the problems’ complexity: 
“Through understanding others’ opinions and interpretations of the problem, the 
participants grasp the complexity of the problem and learn about inderdependencies that 
were not apparent before” (Roloff 2008:317). Such learning processes are seen as the 
basis for a mutual agreement that is demanded by the ‘political CSR’ concept (Roloff 
2008:318) (! CH 3.1.3). In addition, the stakeholder interaction can generate knowledge 
that companies would otherwise not have, like of the specific local situation in factories. 
Some scholars argue that it is therefore unlikely that companies capture the problems 
factory workers have and meet their needs in a culturally sensible way, if stakeholders do 
not participate in decisions (Nelson, Adrienne et al. 2005; for the coffee industry Neilson 
& Pritchard 2007).  
Many argue that MSI are more credible than business initiatives because it includes not 
only business actors, but also stakeholders from organizations that are critical of business 
(! compare CH 3.1).  
Dingwerth argues that the global making of rules has to be democratically legitimate 
(Dingwerth 2007). He distinguishes between a sociological (‘empirical’) and a normative 
(‘philosophical’) understanding of legitimacy. Legitimacy in the former is about the 
social ‘acceptance of authority’, whereas in the latter it is about the ‘acceptability of 
authority’ (Dingwerth 2007:14). Or in the words of Allan Buchanan and Robert O. 
Keohane: 
to say that an institution is legitimate in the normative sense is to assert that it has the right to rule”. 
In contrast, “an institution is legitimate in the sociological sense when it is widely believed to have 
the right to rule. (Beisheim & Dingwerth 2008:8 zitieren Buchanan/Keohane 2006: 405, emphasis in 
original) 
As Beisheim & Dingwerth (2008:8) explain the normative concept of legitimacy 
traditionally applies to the authority of the state, who takes authoritative and binding 
decisions on others, and who is therefore required to morally justify itself. Such a 
justification “may be based either on fair procedures (input and throughput legitimacy, 
usually associated with procedural norms derived from democratic theory) or on just 
outcomes (output legitimacy, usually associated with norms derived from theories of 
justice)”. Dingwerth argues that four criteria are relevant for input and throughput 
legitimacy: inclusiveness, transparency, accountability and deliberation (Beisheim & 
Dingwerth 2008:8). Elsewhere he distinguishes between legitimacy through participation, 
legitimacy through democratic control (transparency & accountability), and legitimacy 
through argumentative practice (deliberation) (Brown 2007; Dingwerth 2007:15f) (! 
compare CH 3.1 & 2.4).  
The need to integrate multiple stakeholders in the definition of global rules for business 
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is seen as important, as social and environmental standards are not facts but socially 
constructed norms that do not have one single valid interpretation. A sensitivity to other 
actors’ perspectives is seen as relevant for setting and implementing global norms (Ilo 
2003; World Bank 2003; Kolk & van Tulder 2005:17; Campbell 2007; Neilson & 
Pritchard 2007; United Nations 2007). 
Although many regard multi-stakeholder initiatives as more effective, credible and 
legitimate than business initiatives, I claim that this is not valid per se, but it depends on 
the way rules are set and monitored.  
3.2.2 `'*3+'/3*7&,'23"$&,+"*0"/0,&
Monitoring social standards (social auditing) controls the conformity with social 
standards and is said to represent “the means through which business responsibility is 
made practical” (Hughes 2001; Tallontire 2007:786). Social auditing shall generate 
accountability according to performance criteria that some agreed on and is connected to 
the rise of instruments in financial or managerial accountability.  
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Nadvi & Wältring (2002:8f) distinguish between three approaches to auditing which 
correspond to three different levels of legitimacy:  
• First-party certification relies solely on self-monitoring by companies, i.e., the brand 
or retailer audits whether the factory implements the standards. In terms of public 
legitimacy, this usually results in the least degree of credibility and institutional trust.  
• Second-party certification shifts monitoring to the user of the product or services, or 
alternatively to trade bodies who monitor on behalf of their members.  
• Third-party certification „transfers monitoring to auditors that are external of the 
companies. The credibility of the certification is directly linked to the credibility of 
the auditor. Auditors can include accredited firms who provide market-based 
certification services, or NGOs and civil society groups who uphold the values 
associated with the specific standard.“ Hughes (2005:1158) argues that if NGOs 
audit instead of large auditing companies, “workers receive a degree of 
representation through organisations that work more closely with them and that do 
not have corporate goals of profit-making at their heart”. 
Third-party certification is the most interesting form of social auditing. It is used by most 
private standards initiatives (! compare Table 5). O’Rourke (2006) distinguishes three 
forms of private regulation: SAI and WRAP (advanced form of privatized regulation) 
certify “that management systems are in place to guarantee acceptable performance in 
individual factories” (O’Rourke 2006). The certificates attract customers to select 
factories themselves. FLA, FWF and ETI (collaborative regulation) require top-level 
commitment of the brand that has to conduct internal and external audits of suppliers. 
Finally, the WRC approach (fire alarm regulation) aims at creating new mechanisms of 
accountability for firms and government agencies “by gathering information from 
workers and local organizations and then helping them to organize to win demands” 
(O’Rourke 2006). In terms of worker empowerment O’Rourke regards the fire alarm 
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system as the most advanced. But as Hughes suggests, the commitment of a company to 
incorporate responsibility influences how a company internalizes its approach to social 
auditing in the supply chain – which may lead to different ways of implementing the 
same rules (Hughes 2005:1153ff).  
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Four main issues are criticized in the literature with regard to audits in general and social 
audits in particular: (a) credibility, (b) neutrality, (c) audit techniques, and (d) 
paternalistic nature of audits.  
First, to increase the credibility of audits, these are usually delegated to third-party 
auditors. According to principal agent theory auditing is problematic because of the 
information asymmetries between the principal (the one demanding the audit) and the 
agent (the one conducting the audit), which creates mistrust between the two actors. This 
mistrust must somehow be solved, for instance, by controlling audits or by setting up 
systems that do not allow auditors to cheat (Watts & Zimmermann 1983). However, 
third-party audits are often criticized for not being credible, because the wrong auditors 
use the wrong methods (Nadvi & Wältring 2002; ETI 2006; O'Rourke 2006). O’Rourke 
(2000), for instance, questions the credibility of third-party audits conducted through 
commercial audit companies like PWC, that come from financial auditing, and asks: 
“Who monitors the monitors?” Others argue that third-party NGO auditors might be co-
opted from critical ‘watchdogs’ into uncritical ‘partners’ (Egels-Zandén & Wahlqvist 
2007). Again, others fear that social auditing could ‘crowd out’ governments and/or trade 
unions in their traditional roles, which might have a negative impact on the workers.  
It is further argued that the credibility of audits is low due to the lacking stakeholder 
participation, which could help identifying problems and finding solutions (Fung 2003; 
O'Rourke 2006:910). Others claim that the credibility of social audits can be improved by 
making audit results transparent and in this way allowing for a public discourse on how to 
improve factories (Courville 2003; Fung 2003; O'Rourke 2003; O'Rourke 2006). For 
instance, the WRC and the CCC have experimented in creating ‘deliberative arenas’ and 
systems through which remediation efforts are incorporated in collective bargaining 
processes (O'Rourke 2006:910). However, it is suggested that MSI have problems 
implementing stakeholders at a more concrete level of implementation instead of at just 
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an abstract policy level (Fransen & Kolk 2007:677).  
Second, social auditing is often portrayed as a neutral, independent activity that 
focuses on collecting facts (Hughes 2004). This neutrality and independence has its 
origins in financial accounting, which proclaims a status of “a neutral, technical exercise 
essentially concerned with keeping accurate accounts with using the tools of auditing, 
budgeting and accounting to track and report on the allocation, disbursement and 
utilization of financial resources” (Newell 2006:50f). In addition, the use of analogies to 
scientific practices and routines like ‘testing’ supports the image that the results are 
neutral, independent and objective. Pentland (2000) writes about financial audits: “Put 
simply, the analogy suggests that while scientists illuminate natural truths, auditors 
illuminate financial truths”. He criticizes the analogy to science, questions the 
epistemology of auditing and asks for the nature of the assurance given by audits. He 
claims that in audits there is never a control group, as in scientific experiments. Instead 
each audit is a kind of uncontrolled experiment. Finally, Power (1999) argues that 
auditing is far from an objective exercise and that samples, tests, and interpretations are 
highly contextualized. Jem Bendell pinpoints:  
All auditing decisions are discretionary, at every moment of the audit process, from choosing who to 
talk to, to what to ask, how to ask it, what to follow up on, and what to recommend. (Bendell 
2005:367)  
Third, others more concretely criticize the audit techniques used by larger auditing 
companies in social audits. For instance, auditors are ‘parachuted’ into the factory for a 
short time and thus only get a snapshot of the working situation and that voluntary 
inspection only works with producers allowing inspection (O'Rourke 2006). Other studies 
point out deficits of auditing, e.g. lack of autonomy of auditors, underreporting of 
violations, vague audit guidelines, lack of transparency, inadequate complaints 
mechanisms, inability to enforce freedom of association (Wells 2007:62). Further 
problems include audit coverage (particularly with a large number of suppliers), training 
and capacity of inspectors, corruption and negative effects on workers (O'Rourke 2003; 
O'Rourke 2006:907). Also, ‘audit fraud’, the deliberative faking of audits, increases in 
practice (Raworth & Kidder 2009:178): 
Perhaps most worryingly, members’ experience shows an alarming rise in ‘audit fraud’: suppliers in 
key sourcing countries are increasingly adopting a raft of fraudulent practices that are designed to 
hide the truth about labour practices from auditors’ eyes. Many corporate ethical trade teams 
recognise the problems, but face serious constraints to addressing them. (ETI 2006) 
Fourth, Hughes et al. (2007:1159) criticize social auditing as a paternalistic approach 
to ethical trade. They see the limits of even the most advanced audit approach as being 
deeply rooted in a neoliberal trading context in which retailers and brand manufacturers 
lead approaches to auditing. All rules and practices mirror Western models of 
development. Finally, partly because of these problems it is suggested that social auditing 
can only help identify issues, but by itself does not improve the situation of the workers 
in the factories. It has therefore been demanded that the approach be combined with other 
practices, such as changing purchasing practices (Locke, Qin et al. 2006; Barrientos & 
Smith 2007; Locke, Kochan et al. 2007).  
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The remainder of this chapter discusses – from a developmental perspective – key 
challenges to CSR approaches in supply chains that aim at implementing social standards. 
The main challenges refer to the effectiveness, credibility and legitimacy of CSR.  
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There is little scientific evidence about the impact CSR in general has in developing 
countries23. There is also little evidence whether the potential advantages of MSI turn into 
a higher impact on the ground level for the workers (Utting 2002; Nelson, Adrienne et al. 
2005; Prieto-Carrón, Lund-Thomsen et al. 2006; exception: Barrientos & Smith 2007; 
Blowfield 2007:685f,693; see also Newell & Frynas 2007:669-672).  
John Ruggie of the UN Human Rights Council argues that the biggest challenge of 
voluntary regulation is bringing such efforts to a scale where they become “truly systemic 
interventions” (United Nations 2007:24,85; Wells 2007:63). This particularly refers to 
more challenging multi-stakeholder initiatives in which not many companies participate, 
while many participate in voluntary initiatives whose demands are easy to fulfil. Utting 
for instance complains that of the 77.000 transnational corporations, 770.000 subsidiaries 
and millions of suppliers only a very small fraction is member of an MSI (Utting 
2005b:4; United Nations 2007)24.  
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The few studies analyzing the effectiveness of private standards initiatives in developing 
countries criticize that their impacts are low and can even be negative (Hughes 2004; 
Blowfield & Frynas 2005; Dhanarajan 2005; Jenkins 2005; Nelson, Adrienne et al. 2005; 
Utting 2005b:5; Barrientos & Smith 2006; Locke, Qin et al. 2006; Prieto-Carrón, Lund-
Thomsen et al. 2006:986; Barrientos & Smith 2007; Locke, Kochan et al. 2007; Neilson 
& Pritchard 2007; Newell & Frynas 2007; Wells 2007; Nadvi 2008). For instance, 
Barrientos and Smith (2007) empirically show that membership in the Ethical Trading 
Initiative (ETI) only had little impact on the workers. Their results indicate that the ETI 
has positive impacts regarding outcome standards (like health & safety), while the 
politically more relevant process standards that empower workers to fight for their rights 
themselves, such as collective bargaining or freedom of association, do not change 
through ETI membership. Other studies confirm these findings (Locke, Qin et al. 2006; 
Locke, Kochan et al. 2007; UN 2007b:5; Locke, Amengual et al. 2009).  
Others argue that the implementation of social auditing can even have negative effects, 
particularly if workers or factories are excluded from global production networks as a 
result of the standard implementation (Tallontire, Dolan et al. 2005:564; Prieto-Carrón 
2008). This has happened when workplaces (e.g. homeworkers) did not fulfil the 
                                                      
23 CSR initiatives “fail to address either the non-CSR poverty impacts of business practice nor acts of corporate 
irresponsibility. …  They fail to address difficult questions about treatment of suppliers and workers’ rights or about 
community reinvestment and obligations to invest over the long term or to provide job security. The range of development 
issues they address, while important, is limited. (Newell & Frynas 2007:679) CSR emerged among leading firms and 
business schools as a public relations tool, away to deflect criticism, engage critics and potentially capitalise one merging 
business opportunities associated with doing, and being seen to be doing, good. (Newell & Frynas 2007:670) 
24 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2006) ! UNCTAD 2004) 
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demanded standards, and it was easier for the buyer to change than to develop his 
producer. It has also happened when buyers consolidated their supply chains for 
efficiency reasons but did not consider the workers who lose their jobs (Nadvi 2008).  
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The low impact of CSR is derived from its voluntarism, the neglect of the local context 
and of root causes. First, as a consequence of the voluntarism some say that most 
companies only engage in issues where a business-case can be made because they need to 
think economically and increase their profits (Blowfield & Frynas 2005; compare Newell 
& Frynas 2007:670,677; Blowfield & Murray 2008:130ff). This way, voluntarism can 
lead to ‘eye washing’ CSR activities with reputational benefits for the company, but with 
little impact on the workers. For instance, Blowfield (2005:512) argues that “labour codes 
of practice are far more likely to outlaw slavery and child labour (practices where there is 
little direct financial motivation to continue, especially compared to the potential 
consequences of a consumer backlash) than to recognize the right to a living wage or 
freedom of association (both of which many companies fear might work to their 
commercial disadvantage)”. Voluntarism is further connected to the problem of scaling-
up, as described above. Scaling-up, particularly of CSR that goes beyond the business 
case, is seen as difficult because many economists and CEOs still question the legitimacy 
of CSR, and rather believe in shareholder than stakeholder values (! CH 3.1) 
(Economist 2004). Rights-based developmental issues are seen as incompatible with 
voluntary thinking, because goals like helping the poorest and most marginalized are 
often not economically feasible and thus will not lead to business cases (Blowfield & 
Frynas 2005; compare Newell & Frynas 2007). Therefore some argue that CSR should 
not be regarded and framed as an instrument for development that is reaching the poorest, 
but only as an additive instrument for achieving business cases. They say it is necessary 
to overcome the dichotomy between voluntary and mandatory regulation. Thus, business 
regulation is able to combine both, the voluntary and legalistic approaches in a 
complimentary, re-enforcing and synergistic way (Blowfield & Frynas 2005; Utting 
2005b; Vogel 2009:16).  
Second, business seeks to find efficient ‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions that can be easily 
implemented top-down without recognizing the local context (Bendell 2005; Tallontire, 
Dolan et al. 2005; Prieto-Carrón, Lund-Thomsen et al. 2006). Newell criticizes that top-
down approaches “assume a set of conditions that do not exist in most of the world” 
(Newell 2005:556). It is suggested that voluntary regulation should be sensitive to scale 
and adapt to local contexts (! compare 3.1.3) (Blowfield & Frynas 2005; Neilson & 
Pritchard 2007:322; Newell & Frynas 2007):  
One-size-fits-all tools for the measurement of their social and environmental performance wherever 
they operate, … are unable to address the key issues by which a company’s social and environmental 
obligations come to be determined, enforced and made locally relevant. (Newell 2005:556)  
Third, most CSR and private regulation practices do not address the root causes of low 
working conditions in global production networks attributed to power relations in the 
global economy (Prieto-Carrón, Lund-Thomsen et al. 2006; Fuchs 2007). Some argue 
that voluntary regulation reproduces the (power) structures that cause the main problems 
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in global value chains, and thus make it even more difficult to solve problems in the long 
run. In this context, it is criticized that buyers often do not take responsibility themselves, 
but pass it on the producers. For instance, buyers take the reputational benefits of CSR 
while not changing their purchasing policies, which some see as major root causes for 
low working conditions (Mahmud & Kabeer 2006). Bendell (2005:368) similarly 
mentions that WRAP, the FLA, and the ETI all identify the problem of poor working 
conditions as something that is dealt with ‘over there’, in the factories and plantations 
across the global South. He claims that they should be dealt with ‘over here’, in the 
offices of large corporations that monopolise access to markets, drive down prices, 
require higher quality, and place short-notice ‘just-in-time’ orders for products. Here a 
contrast is pointed out between the ethical trade initiatives and the fair trade movement 
where fair trade sees changing buyer–supplier relations as key to any process of 
improving workers’ conditions.  
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Lacking evidence about the positive impacts of social auditing on the workers has shifted 
the research on the credibility and legitimacy of voluntary regulation practices (Nelson, 
Adrienne et al. 2005; Barrientos & Smith 2007). When talking about credibility and 
legitimacy many refer to criteria derived from democratic theory, like participation and 
inclusiveness of stakeholders, accountability, transparency and deliberation (! CH 3.2.1 
& 3.2.2) (compare Steffek 2003; Dingwerth 2005; Matten & Crane 2005; Pattberg 2005; 
Utting 2005b; Pattberg 2006; Dingwerth 2007; Fuchs & Kalfagianni 2007; Nölke & 
Granz 2007; UN 2007b; Scherer & Palazzo 2008:426).  
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Chapters 2.4 & 3.1.3 both propose deliberative solutions where different actors come 
together to agree on CSR policies in order to achieve a higher legitimacy and credibility. 
Scherer & Palazzo claim that corporations become morally legitimized by engaging in 
discussions with others, whether or not all actors participate (! CH 2.4 & 3.1.3). 
However, others show that this view is too simplified and suggest that the inclusion of 
stakeholders needs to be differentiated into: (a) the scope of participation (Who 
participates?) and (b) the quality of participation (How do they participate?) (Dingwerth 
2007:38ff). 
Regarding the scope of participation, many claim that the ‘right’ stakeholders need to 
participate. But who are they in global production networks? Voluntary regulation 
activities are criticized in so far that ‘northern’ stakeholder dominate the processes while 
key ‘southern’ stakeholders (i.e. the intended beneficiaries) are poorly represented in the 
consultation and decision-making processes, and sometimes even fully ignored (Utting 
2002; Bendell 2005; Utting 2005b:5; Fransen & Kolk 2007:676 referring to Freidberg 
2003; Hughes, Buttle et al. 2007:495). This problem particularly refers to the most 
marginalized, e.g., women homeworkers (Campbell 2005; Matten & Crane 2005:9; 
MacDonald 2007). As Newell puts it:  
(The CSR debate might) become a conversation between managers of global capital North and South, 
and, on occasion, some elite NGOs and unions, many of which maintain only the most tenuous of 
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connections with poorer groups that are either ignored in this process or considered only as passive 
recipients. (Newell 2005:557)  
This ignorance is partly connected to the belief that NGOs or trade unions are 
representing the voices of the poor, though this may not necessarily be the case (Newell 
2005:543f). Civil society groups might have their own agendas and interests that are not 
always compatible with promoting the priorities of the most marginalized or the ones 
most affected by the business practices, often the women (Newell 2005:552). Similarly, 
those who are totally excluded from the supply chain due to ‘practical’ reasons (like 
increasing the efficiency of audits), such as scattered homeworkers, non-permanent 
workers or small-scale producers, are also neglected from representation (Blowfield & 
Frynas 2005:507; Nelson, Adrienne et al. 2005; Tallontire, Dolan et al. 2005): “some 
major sporting goods companies, have reduced the amount of outsourcing to smaller 
producers in part because it is difficult to monitor those facilities” (Blowfield & Frynas 
2005:508).  
In regard to the quality of participation, it is also relevant how stakeholders are 
involved and whether they have the capacity to negotiate (e.g. whether weaker 
stakeholders have a voice or whether power relations are asymmetric) etc. (Bendell 2005; 
Newell 2005; Utting 2007). There are different modes of participation, from more passive 
(like receiving information via mass media or consulting), to more active ones like 
raising one’s voice in a public debate or voting (Dingwerth 2007). Fransen and van Kolk 
(2007:679) suggest that MSI can be differentiated between those with a broad and a 
narrow level of inclusiveness. Whereas broad inclusiveness would ‘truly’ include 
stakeholders from North and South as members who take part in the decisions, in the 
narrow inclusiveness stakeholders would rather consult than participate by deciding. 
Some further suggest that ‘true’ participation of stakeholders could mean that they are 
empowered, which often does not happen (UN 2007b). This can lead to failures when 
identifying root causes, to unequal power relations in decision-making bodies or to co-
option of NGOs (Bendell 2005:370; Blowfield & Frynas 2005:508; Prieto-Carrón, Lund-
Thomsen et al. 2006:984f; Egels-Zandén & Wahlqvist 2007). Finally, Fransen & van 
Kolk (2007:675) criticize that most MSI do not reveal why they involve certain 
stakeholders. Doing this might be helpful in terms of including the ‘right’ ones based on 
true arguments. 
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Similarly important for the input legitimacy are criteria of democratic control that refer 
to the initiatives’ transparency and the accountability (Dingwerth 2007). Democratic 
control asks who is able to exert control over decision-makers (Dingwerth 2007:30). 
Transparency can help to make corporate responsibility practices more legitimate, 
credible and more effective (Sabel, O'Rourke et al. 2000; Fung 2003). The degree of 
transparency can be conceptualized as “the extent to which individuals who may be 
significantly affected by a decision are able to learn about the decision-making process, 
including its existence, subject matter, structure and current status” (Dingwerth 2007). 
Stakeholders have to be able to understand why a decision was taken, and then check and 
discuss whether the ‘right’ stakeholders are included. Some claim that audit results would 
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also have to be made transparent for the single factories, if they shall be a matter of 
deliberation (Sabel, O'Rourke et al. 2000; Fung 2003). Transparency can help to uncover 
power relation processes in decision-making mechanisms (Brown 2007:18ff). Some 
propose that public authorities could enhance the quality of public deliberation on CSR 
(Fung 2003). They could, for instance, guarantee the transparency of discourses, the 
monitoring and enforcement of corporate compliance, the comparability of information 
and standards, and the access of less powerful actors (such as workers) to deliberation. 
Two main questions concerning transparency are highlighted in the literature: What shall 
be reported? How shall the contents of reporting be controlled/certified?  
Some authors say that even if stakeholders can participate in regulation mechanisms 
and if their participation is rightly balanced, the regulation mechanism must further be 
accountable to the intended beneficiaries. Accountability involves the element of 
answerability: “the right to make claims and demand responses”. It also involves 
enforceability, i.e., “the mechanisms for ensuring that answers are backed by actions and 
for sanctioning non-responsiveness” (Mahmud & Kabeer 2006:224; Newell 2006). 
Accountability empowers workers and allows them to voice complaints through a direct 
path. Researchers and practitioners demand that voluntary regulation includes 
accountability mechanisms (Bendell 2005:364; Utting 2005a:4; Brown 2007:18; UN 
2007b). This can happen in the form of a voluntary complaints mechanism through which 
workers and other stakeholders are able to directly hold companies accountable for their 
actions (Bendell 2005:363).  
A more radical demand is that corporate responsibility should be replaced by ‘corporate 
accountability’. The so-called ‘corporate accountability’ movement demands that 
companies must be legally accountable to adversely affected stakeholders (Bendell 2004; 
Campbell 2005:420; Utting 2005a:1-6; BUND 2007; United Nations 2007)25. In the 
corporate accountability movement national governments play an important role, which 
are seen as the only democratically legitimized bodies to regulate the economy. They 
should therefore provide a legal, mandatory framework that includes duties for 
corporations, and that enables and encourages global business to follow its legal 
obligations, e.g., by sanctioning non-compliance. One main argument presented in favour 
of mandatory rules is that a global framework with legally binding rules creates a level 
playing field in which every company producing for the world market sticks to the same 
rules. This would reduce distortions of competition, and stop the race to the bottom in 
social and environmental standards (Zervas 2008).  
However, the corporate accountability movement has so far been little successful in 
pushing governments to implement any mandatory regulation mechanisms for social 
standards on the global level (compare for more examples Bendell 2004; Utting 2005b; 
Fuchs 2007:87; Newell & Frynas 2007:671). Bendell (2004) suggests that one problem of 
mandatory regulation has been the lobbying practices of powerful corporations against 
any attempt to establish mandatory global rules for business. Examples are the failed 
attempts of the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC)26 to establish hard 
                                                      
25 The main German civil society network campaigning for corporate accountability is: www.cora-netz.de 
26 http://benchpost.com/unctc/ (accessed on 1.8.2008) 
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rules on a global level, or the failed attempt of NGOs to bring the UN Corporate 
Accountability Convention into effect during the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development 2002 in Johannesburg (compare for more examples Bendell 2004; Utting 
2005b; Fuchs 2007:87; Newell & Frynas 2007:671). Utting (2005b:15ff) argues that in 
both cases corporations used the discourse on voluntary regulation and CSR to fend off 
demands. They claimed that their involvement in voluntary responsibility practices 
obviated the need for mandatory regulatory action, since voluntary mechanisms were 
sufficient to improve the social and environmental performance of business. Company 
duties were dismissed as polarizing and an obstacle to achieving the type of broad-based 
consensus needed to move forward.  
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Voluntary CSR practices are legitimized – to a different degree – by referring to three 
aspects: (a) effectiveness/impacts, (b) credibility/legitimacy, and (c) efficiency. These 
aspects can be analysed and specified with help of the following questions:  
• What is seen as the root causes for work-related problems? What role do the root 
causes play in the legitimization? How are they addressed? 
• How do the actors try to construct organizational legitimacy (pragmatic, cognitive, 
moral/discursive)? Does an actor rather argue based on a ‘positivist’ or a ‘political’ 
concept of CSR?  
• What role do the four aspects of democratic legitimacy – stakeholder 
inclusion/participation, transparency, accountability, and discursive quality – play in 
the arguments? How are they contested? 
• What role does the local context play in the legitimization? How is it addressed?  
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This chapter lays out the analytical framework I use to understand the main struggles and 
arguments in my case studies regarding corporate responsibility in global garment 
production. The framework conceptualizes the economic processes that connect various 
actors in supply chains, their power relationships, and the CSR practices needed to 
implement social standards and the actors involved in them. Finally, it frames the 
background conditions before which these processes occur, and it specifies questions for 
the empirical research. 
My conceptual framework combines the work of Tallontire (2007) on private standards 
initiatives with the global production network (GPN). Tallontire’s framework helps to 
structure CSR practices, in particular the regulation practices that corporations use to 
implement social standards, namely legislative, judicial and executive regulation. Chapter 
7 presents the two empirical case studies along these lines, and also the empirical 
chapters (8-10) are organized according to the framework.  
The GPN framework helps to connect the different actors involved in producing the 
clothes with those involved in the voluntary regulation practices27. It helps in 
understanding how brands/retailers govern their supply chain, but also the broader 
economic and political context around the struggles regarding corporate responsibility 
and the regulation of social standards. In particular, the categories and dimensions of the 
GPN help to conceptualize power relations between different actors involved, their 
embeddedness into local and global contexts, and aspects regarding value creation that 
may help to enable or limit corporate responsibility practices. 
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Tallontire (2007) helps structuring CSR and private regulation practices. She criticizes 
that most analyses of private standards initiatives (PSI) only look at specific aspects of 
private regulation, which might be derived from disciplinary boundaries. For example, 
many political scientists have focused on the setting of standards and aspects of 
democratic legitimacy without considering power relations in the supply chains that are 
relevant for a successful implementation of standards. Tallontire presents an enhanced 
framework for critical analysis of private standards initiatives in agri-food chains, 
                                                      
27 When referring to the implementation of social standards I use the terms private or voluntary ‘regulation’ and not 
‘governance’, even if governance might express better the interplay between different actors. The term ‘regulation’, 
however, confuses less with the governance in the production network.  
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focusing on regulation and potential institutional impacts and aims “to facilitate 
conceptual analysis of private standards initiatives that includes both 
institutional/normative issues and structural/material factors” (2007:788).  
Her framework uses the lens of civic regulation and the separation of powers “to 
unpack the activities and implications of these new (private standards) institutions and the 
standards that they are developing and implementing” (Tallontire 2007:785). This helps 
to look into the different aspects of rule making and rule keeping, what she calls 
legislative regulation, judicial regulation and executive regulation (compare Nadvi & 
Wältring 2002; Tallontire 2007). Tallontire (2007) suggests that a comprehensive 
analysis of private regulation practices must analyse all of the following three aspects or 
is incomplete.  
• Legislative regulation (setting rules): From Tallontires’ view (2007:786) analysis 
under the heading of legislative regulation “would be concerned with the origin of 
the standard exploring the links it has with other standards, both in the public and 
private domain.” This includes questions like: How much does the standard draw on 
national or international standards? Who is involved in the setting of rules and who 
may be excluded? Is it industry-only or is it multi-stakeholder? What is the basis for 
participation?  
• Judicial regulation (monitoring standards): Under judicial regulation the focus is on 
how compliance with standards is monitored and assessed. Who conducts the audits? 
How does the auditing relate to other forms of control (e.g. by the state)?  
• Executive regulation (enable participants to meet standards): Executive regulation is 
about “the processes of standard implementation and the different tools that are used 
by the private standards initiatives to ensure that standards are met” (Tallontire 
2007:786). As chapters 2 & 3 indicate, three main aspects need to be considered: The 
power of the lead agents (i.e. the purchasing practices), the management skills, and 
the abilities of the workers to demand their own rights.  
Tallontire (2007:786) argues that it is important to map out who is involved in each of 
these processes, “particularly focussing on the extent and modalities of participation and 
representation of key stakeholders”. Hence, not only is the question of stakeholder 
inclusion and participation important, but also what kind of democratic control exists 
(political accountability and transparency) and how can the discursive quality be 
evaluated, i.e., whether it is a sincere exchange of arguments on the same level (! CH 
3). 
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In a critique of global chain approaches28 Henderson, Dicken et al. developed the 
network-based framework ‘global production networks’ (GPN) (Dicken, Kelly et al. 
2001; Henderson, Dicken et al. 2002). This framework shall help to “reveal the multi-
actor and multi-scalar characteristics of transnational production systems through 
                                                      
28 global commodity chains, global value chains or supply chains 
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intersecting notions of power, value and embeddedness” (Coe, Dicken et al. 2008b:267).  
They criticize that chain approaches do not reflect reality properly, that they are too 
linear and idealistically stylized, and that they wrongly place emphasis on the ‘intra-firm’ 
governance in the chain, neglecting ‘extra-firm’ networks and institutional contexts on 
various scales (Henderson, Dicken et al. 2002; Hess & Yeung 2006; Coe, Dicken et al. 
2008a; Coe, Dicken et al. 2008b; Gibbon, Bair et al. 2008:324; Nadvi 2008:324; 
Palpacuer 2008:413). The main advantages of the GPN in the context of this research are:  
• conceptual inclusion of all major stakeholders participating in the regulation of 
standards, 
• conceptual flexibility in terms of geographical scale,  
• recognizing that actors are embedded in certain contexts (root causes, local contexts, 
ethical campaigning), 
• allowing a more differentiated analysis and articulation of power than in the chain 
approaches,  
• finally, it raises the possibility of identifying potential points of intervention or 
resistance within the network. 
More recently, the GPN framework was also used for analysing CSR and how it is 
contested between different actors in global relationships, as it allows for conceptualizing 
different actors and their local backgrounds and their power configurations (Levy & 
Kaplan 2007; Coe, Dicken et al. 2008a:288; Levy 2008). It was shown that most actors 
involved in contested fields recognize conflict and cooperation (Coe, Dicken et al. 
2008a:288). Similarly, although various organizations cooperate in social movements, the 
aims of the single actors might not always be compatible. The metaphor ‘friction’ was 
used to capture the contested, shifting and uncertain nature of the various relationships 
that constitute GPN (Coe, Dicken et al. 2008a:288). 
Simultaneously economic and political phenomena … resemble contested organizational fields in 
which actors struggle over the construction of economic relationships, governance structures, 
institutional rules and norms, and discursive frames … GPNs thus exist within the ‘transnational 
space’ that is constituted and structured by transnational elites, institutions, and ideologies. (Levy 
2008) 
In the context of this research, two ‘conceptual dimensions’ from the framework are 
helpful. They constitute the framework and bring life to it, i.e., power is exercised and 
value is created through them (Henderson, Dicken et al. 2002:453ff). The firm dimension 
stresses that there are firm-specific differences within certain sectors. These differences 
are likely to influence the way GPN are constructed. The most powerful firm is usually 
the ‘lead firm’ of garment production networks, conceptualized earlier as driving the 
chain. Further, in the context of this research, direct suppliers and subcontractors are 
relevant. Important aspects in the input-output relations between firms are logistics and 
particularly logistical strategies, such as lean production and just-in-time production and 
certainly the buying contracts (Coe, Dicken et al. 2008a:276f). So far, the GPN and also 
chain approaches have been criticised for treating firms like black boxes, even though the 
strategies within firms differ widely (Coe, Dicken et al. 2008a:277). This is very evident 
for issues like corporate responsibility and it has been suggested that the corporate 
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responsibility strategies strongly vary between firms (Hughes 2005).  
Networks reflect the flexibility regarding particular forms of regulation that apply to 
firms and stakeholders involved in the implementation of private standards. The 
dimension networks set out to examine trust relationships in the interactions of the 
different actors.  
The framework for GPN analysis is raised on three underlying conceptual categories: 
value, power and embeddedness. 
4.2.1 c"$1%&
Value refers to the Marxian notions of surplus value and to more orthodox ones 
associated with economic rent (Henderson, Dicken et al. 2002:448f). The creation of 
value within firms in GPN includes the “conditions under which labour power is 
converted into actual labour through the labour process”. Issues of employment are 
relevant, like skill, working conditions, technology, and the circumstances under which 
they are produced (technological rents, organizational rents, relational rents, brand rents, 
trade-policy rents) (Henderson, Dicken et al. 2002:448f). The creation of value also 
includes the transaction costs that are caused by interactions between actors and limit 
their actions.  
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Corporate power refers to the capacity of the lead firm in the GPN to influence 
decisions and resource allocations in its own interests, vis-à-vis other firms in the 
network. The GPN framework does not ascribe a monopoly on corporate power to lead 
firms, but suppliers have sufficient autonomy to develop and exercise their own 
strategies. Small firms can improve their situation in GPN by allying with others. My 
framework also draws from the global commodity chain regarding corporate power (! 
CH 2).  
Collective power refers to “the actions of collective agents who seek to influence 
companies at particular locations in GPNs” such as ethical campaigns, NGOs concerned 
with human rights, trade unions, workers, consumers, business interest groups etc. In this 
research, the collective power of NGOs and ethical campaigns on brands and retailers 
play a central role. Coe et al. (Coe, Dicken et al. 2008a:280f,286) recently demanded that 
non-firm actors have to be integrated into GPN research in a ‘serious’ way. For example, 
consumers influence CSR, but they have so far been neglected in GPN research. 
Regarding the improvement of working standards, they also demand there is a need to 
open up analytical space for the agency of workers and worker groups “to shape the 
geographies of capitalism” (Coe, Dicken et al. 2008a:284).   
4.2.3 V8#%00%0*%,,&
The GPN framework uses Karl Polanyi’s concept of embeddedness. It helps 
understanding how global production networks and particularly single firms and other 
groups acting in it are shaped by local or national contexts and social and political 
relations with stakeholders (Taylor 2005; Hughes 2006a:636f). Geographers and other 
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researchers have analysed how the concept of embeddedness enriches GPN research, and 
they claim that it helps to understand firm-level chain governance and the development of 
standards.   
At the firm level, routines of interaction between suppliers and lead firms can be deeply rooted in 
domestic and even local institutions and culture, and often structure (enable or limit) firm-level GVC 
governance in an ongoing manner. (Sturgeon 2009:131f) 
It is these nationally embedded philosophies and organizational approaches that are shaping specific 
pathways of transnational code development. (Hughes, Buttle et al. 2007:508) 
Embeddedness connects “aspects of the social and spatial arrangements in which those 
firms are embedded and which influence their strategies and the values, priorities and 
expectations of managers, workers and communities” (Henderson, Dicken et al. 
2002:451f). The GPN distinguishes between three kinds of embeddedness:  
• Institutional embeddedness refers to how activities are embedded in institutions, 
locally and globally. Institutions can be industry groups, advocacy groups, or rules 
that govern the society (either bureaucratically, as codified in legal canons and 
regulatory systems, or in the realm of societal norms and expectations). “The rules 
set by institutions are derived, to a greater or lesser degree, by the beliefs, values, 
meanings, and priorities embedded in the societies that create them, fund them, and 
staff them.” The negotiation of these rules is innately geographical, because it 
happens on multiple scales between actors situated in different places. Institutions 
are particularly relevant in the context of private regulation because they can limit or 
enable actions. Firms or managers that surpass those limits run the risks of sanction, 
creating pressure for firms to operate according to the norms and expectations of the 
societies in which they operate (Sturgeon 2009:131).  
• Network embeddedness refers to the formal and informal connections and relations 
between network members, the stability of these relations, and the importance of the 
network for the participants, the network structure, and the degree of connectivity 
within a GPN (Henderson, Dicken et al. 2002:453). This embeddedness is a product 
of trust building between network agents. The embeddedness allows analysing more 
micro level relationships between the actors in the GPN.  
• Territorial embeddedness refers to the ‘anchoring’ of firms in GPN in different 
places. For instance, firms might become constrained by the economic activities or 
social dynamics that exist in certain places or government policies might embed 
particular parts of the GPN in particular regions.  
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Figure 7: The embeddedness of a global production network. Source: (Coe, Dicken et al. 2008a:273) 
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From chapters 2-4, I now derive a framework including some questions for the empirical 
research on corporate social responsibility in global production networks.  
1. What practices are used to implement social standards? I analyse the practices along 
the lines of the framework presented in chapter 4.1, i.e., legislative, judicial, and 
executive regulation (! Table 6). 
2. How is the credibility/legitimacy of practices to implement standards framed and 
contested? What role do the aspects stakeholder participation/inclusion, transparency, 
accountability, and deliberation play in the arguments (! Table 6)?  
3. What limitations to the effectiveness of the CSR practices are contested (! Table 6)? 
4. What causes of poor working conditions do actors assume? I use the lens of the GPN 
(embeddedness, power, value) to identify the arguments different actors use to 
explain poor working conditions (! Table 6). The causes are important to know 
because the CSR strategies used are to a large extent legitimized by referring to the 
assumed causes.  
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5. Under which theoretical concepts of CSR can the two case studies (FWF and BSCI) 
be subsumed? This question tries to apply the theoretical concepts that are presented 
in chapters 2.4 & 3.1.3 (shared responsibility, political CSR, positivist CSR) to the 
regulation practices of the two case studies (! Table 6). 
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This chapter first presents the methodology on which the research is based. Then it 
explains how the empirical research was conducted.  
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In this research I use a qualitative research design that follows the ‘interpretative 
paradigma’ that is directed towards subjects. In contrast to quantitative social research 
that tries to explain social phenomena and to derive general laws, this approach tries to 
understand social phenomena by interpreting them (interpretativ-verstehendes 
Paradigma). It is based on the assumption that human actions and the resulting artefacts 
(e.g. documents) are the result of processes of interpretation and subjective attribution of 
meaning, and are not objectively given. Actors interpret and therefore construct social 
reality (Bläser 2005).  
This does not mean that I view the whole world as socially constructed. I believe that 
there is also a concrete reality, e.g., that some workers in developing countries suffer 
from poor working conditions. However, I try to understand the struggles about working 
conditions through the subjective interpretations of particular actors, who construct a 
picture of issues like justice, responsibility etc.  
Discourses play an important role in my research. Hence I analyse the question how 
social responsibility is defined and socially constructed by companies and private 
standards initiatives, and how NGOs contest these constructs (see for example: Hajer 
2003).  
E45 F%,%"/2=&0%,37*&
The empirical research undertaken between 2006 and 2010 aimed at understanding the 
broader context of private regulation in global production networks and focuses on social 
standards.  
5.2.1 I/'2%,,&'(&+=%&%893/32"$&/%,%"/2=&
Empirical research was conducted in a very open and explorative way, and the data was 
evaluated in a circular, hermeneutic process by enhancing the pre-understanding of the 
research context (Flick 2000). There was no theoretical and empirical pre-determination; 
the main starting point of the empirical research was that there are conflicts between 
companies and NGOs regarding social and environmental issues in GPNs. Empirically, I 
mainly conducted expert interviews and collected organization reports and newspaper 
articles. I also had email and telephone contact with some key actors. I had three field 
Chapter 5: Research methodology and methods 49 
phases in India and Bangladesh, during which I conducted interviews and collected 
documents. Before and after these field-trips actors in Europe were interviewed:  
• 2006 (1 month, India / Bangladesh): Broad approach in which the industrial sector to 
be researched was identified. At the beginning the focus sector was not fixed, and I 
discussed issues with actors in different industry sectors (shrimps, tea, clothing, 
leather)  
• 2006-2007: Interviews in Germany / Netherlands 
• 2007 (1 month, India / Bangladesh): Focus on the textile sector; interviews with 
various actors in New Delhi, Bangalore, Tirupur, Kolkata, Mumbai, Dhaka 
• 2007 (5 months, India / Bangladesh): In-depth interviews with partly the same actors 
and partly other actors; I also had the opportunity to work from the office of a local 
NGO for 3 weeks  
• 2007-2010: Interviews in Switzerland / Netherlands 
5.2.2 X"+"&2'$$%2+3'*&
The main data I used are interviews and written documents.  
.*+%/J3%<,&&
148 expert interviews with key actors in Europe (Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland), 
Bangladesh (Dhaka) and India (New Delhi, Bangalore, Tirupur) were conducted for this 
research (! Table 7). They helped to gain an overview and an overall understanding of 
my general research topic and to identify a broad spectrum of relevant issues and 
arguments. However, in order to analyse the way issues are presented, I only transcribed 
some of the interviews. I tried to select those that covered a broad spectrum of arguments. 
Additionally, not all interviews were taped. I took notes, which then could be used for the 
broader understanding.  
Additionally, some of the interviewees I either interviewed twice or continued 
discussing their perspective on certain issues over the years. This way I got a deeper 
insight into their perspective instead of conducting an interview with another person that 
would yield similar issues.  
!"#"$%&'()'*)&(%"+,&"-)./+%("+0)
After the first field trip I decided that I focus on social standards in the garment sector, 
and I selected my case studies, the BSCI and the FWF. I selected mainly well-known 
brands in Europe that are member either of the BSCI, the FLA or the FWF and 
interviewed them. Additionally, I selected some main actors representing the workers in 
Europe.  
On my first visit to India and Bangladesh I identified some contacts that were well 
linked in the country. They recommended, whom I should speak to. Additionally, I used 
grey literature to identify and contact actors locally. I also applied the snowball principle. 
For contacts to the local civil society in India and Bangladesh, I additionally asked the 
CCC in Europe. Only few brands provided me with contacts to their suppliers. I further 
contacted about 50 suppliers that participated in an FLA meeting in New Delhi, of which 
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also only few answered. Most of the other suppliers were given to me by some 
interviewee.   
1(%"+,&"-0)-&%2)$'3./(&"0)
Most brands in Europe that I requested an interview from also granted an interview. 
Triumph International declined an interview with one MA student, saying they felt 
wrongly quoted by others. From the BSCI members, Esprit, Aldi, Lidl and various 
importers for Aldi and Lidl did not grant an interview. From the FWF, Mexx and some 
other companies never replied my requests, and the FWF did not provide me with 
contacts of their member companies, arguing that this was confidential business 
information. For confidentiality reasons, I only use abbreviations that refer to the general 
group of actors. These are set together by a letter and a number, e.g., B2, A5.29  
!"#$%&HD&.*+%/J3%<,&2'*012+%0&#%+<%%*&5UUG&"*0&5U-U&
! ! ^%%! $,*+(-8!dI[!dcX! Q-03(! Z(-)%(0,75!
Z18,*7!!
e2&+/(-3,7!&*!(),-.7f!!
eZf! <L! Fd"<! O! O!
P*&012,*7!! eMf! 9O! ! 99! E!
I3J3%!7&23,.8!&*)(-3B(.3&-7! ecf! @9! 9d<d<! 99! "9!
^103.&*7!d!2&-71%.(-.7!! e^f! "E! "! "R! E!
$&J,*-+,-.!(),-23,7!d!
0&-&*7!!
e$f! "<! "! E! O!
A.5,*7! ! "E! ! ! !
X'218%*+,&
Documents were used because they portray the official arguments. The following 
documents were analysed in addition to the interviews: 
• For the analysis of the arguments by BSCI and FWF, I used policy documents, 
annual reports, newsletters and the websites.  
• For the analysis of the arguments by companies, I used CSR reports and websites of 
the companies and the organizations.  
• For the analysis of the arguments by the CCC, I used policy and campaign material of 
the more recent campaigns, urgent actions, press documents, newsletters and 
websites. 
• For the analysis of the struggles on the wages in Bangladesh, I analysed around 100 
online newspaper articles from the largest English daily newspaper in Bangladesh, 
‘The Daily Star’ (abbreviated as TDS)30. They document and comment the situation 
in Bangladesh mainly between May and October 2006. 
The documents are quoted like normal publications and websites are usually quoted in 
                                                      
29 The number refers to my internal numbering system. 
30 ‘The Daily Star’ is the largest circulating daily English newspaper in Bangladesh. The following issues were analysed: 
TDS713, 717, 724, 729, 758, 764, 806, 807, 815, 817, 818, 819, 820, 834 
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footnotes.  
5.2.3 X"+"&%J"$1"+3'*&
I experimented with various ways of coding the data, some with very detailed codes and 
others with less detailed codes. Eventually, it was best to first deductively code the data 
according to the three regulation practices (legislative, judicial, executive regulation) plus 
a category ‘other’.  
• Legislative regulation includes everything regarding the setting of the standards, but 
also the standards themselves, for instance: What are the most relevant problems of 
the workers? Which standards shall be set? Which standards are set? Why are 
particular standards set and not others? How are standards and rules for implementing 
and controlling the standards set? Who participates? How transparent is the setting? 
Is it credible? How could it be made more legitimate?  
• Judicial regulation includes everything regarding the control of the standards, for 
instance: How do we know that a factory follows the standard? Who controls this? 
Who should do this? How should it be done? Is the control credible and legitimate? Is 
the control effective? Who should pay? How far should a brand control standards?  
• Executive regulation includes questions regarding the implementation of standards, 
such as: What are the main problems regarding the implementation? What is needed 
to make implementation more effective? How to empower workers? How is the 
supply chain governed? 
This way of coding helped me break down and reduce my material. It made sense as most 
information regarding the corporate responsibility for working conditions in the value 
chains usually touches at least one of the three issues. My interviews were very open, but 
usually structured along the line of the three practices. Furthermore, the discussion about 
corporate responsibility can hardly be done in a very abstract sense, but needs to be 
connected with concrete practices.  
Regarding each of the three topics, I then inductively coded the material into storylines 
and arguments. Doing this, I was led by theoretical concepts from the analytical 
framework, i.e. power, embeddedness (trust), value, participation, and by concepts 
referring to the legitimacy/credibility of private regulation, such as participation, 
accountability, transparency (! compare chapters 2, 3, 4). I was also led by the more 
general knowledge that I had gained during the research. I successively used the 
empirical material to enhance the arguments.  
5.2.4 X"+"&1,%&3*&+=%&%893/32"$&2="9+%/,&
As the main aim of this research is to analyse what position different actors have on 
corporate responsibility and what arguments they use to legitimize or delegitimize it, I 
use documents published by the actors in the same way as I use interviews. Both are 
referred to as evidence to show how actors argue, and to illustrate in their own words how 
they see issues. Interviews remain in the original language, since they have an illustrative 
function and would often lose their meaning in a translation. It should also be possible to 
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understand the text without reading the quotes, as the main arguments are subsumed in 
the text.  When I use ‘..’ in quotes, this means that the interviewee stopped, ‘…’ means 
that I dropped lines from the quote.  
5.2.5 !/3"*71$"+3'*&
I triangulated (Flick 2000:38f) my data by using interviews and documents and by 
connecting different methods. In addition, in some of the interviews I used an approach 
Korf (2004:40) calls a “Habermasian concept of inquiry”. This approach is based on an 
ideal speech situation as a regulative notion, as Korf explains:  
We are making claims of validity and are also expected to meet such claims when they are 
questioned. The participants of a discourse use their shared experiences (made in their life-world or 
specific field of study) as background and reservoir to test the validity of arguments. I would argue 
for a kind of empirical inquiry where researchers normatively aspire to come close to an ideal speech 
situation where both, researchers and practitioners, share knowledge and sort out more appropriate 
explanations from less appropriate ones through discourse. Through intensive, ‘ideal’ (non-
hierarchical) discourse, teams of researchers and practitioners may be able to develop common 
understandings and distinguish what is from what seems to be and from what ought to be. (Korf 
2004:40) 
To triangulate I combined my own interpretation of interviews and documents with the 
following approaches to inquiry:   
• Starting in 2008, I worked on an action-oriented research project with the CCC in 
Switzerland (Erklärung von Bern). The aim of the project was to conduct a ranking of 
companies including company profiles. Based on questionnaires that were sent out to 
different firms the year before, we developed a standardized questionnaire that was 
sent to 30 outdoor brands. The results were entered into a database, which (according 
to some pre-determined rules that were discussed in the CCC network) generated 
company profiles evaluating the company from the CCC perspective. In the project 
we intensely discussed criteria of the ranking, which allowed me to substantiate and 
triangulate my interpretation of the view on corporate responsibility that I had gained 
from interviews and documents. However, due to confidentiality reasons I did not 
integrate any statements from the company answers.  
• In 2008, I compared the BSCI and the FWF on request of the FWF for internal use, 
but it was a very concise summary of chapter 7. This provided me with feedback 
from their perspective.  
• In 2009, I participated in a workshop by the International Secretariat of the CCC in 
Amsterdam, where I presented some results of my analysis and participated in the 
discussion about the CCC strategy regarding the BSCI and FWF.  
• In 2009 and 2010, I consulted a Swiss fashion company regarding their CSR 
approach to social standards that allowed an in-depth insight into one particular 
company. This consultation was combined with an MA research on the companies’ 
CSR strategy. 
• In 2008 and 2009, I conducted a research project with students in which we analysed 
the CSR strategies of Small and Medium Swiss fashion labels (Starmanns 2009). We 
interviewed 12 companies and conducted a workshop. 
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• I shared some empirical chapters with the FWF, the BSCI, the CCC and local NGOs 
in India and Bangladesh in order to get their feedback. 
• In 2010, I participated in a multi-stakeholder meeting in Utrecht hosted by the Fair 
Labelling Organization (FLA) that aimed at developing a fair trade standard for 
textiles. This two-day meeting aimed at identifying strategies to best assure social 
standards.  
• I supervised one MA thesis that analysed CSR in the context of the 2008 ‘fair 
fashion’ ranking of the EvB.  
The feedback I got from practitioners allowed me to better understand their arguments 
and to revise my own arguments. This method of inquiry helped me to critically reflect 
the complex issues of the research, to substantiate my arguments and to triangulate my 
findings.  
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This work is not looking for something like ‘truth’ or ‘facts’ in CSR or private regulation, 
even if I present some recommendations. The research does not reflect actual CSR 
practices, but only the way how different actors talk about them and what arguments they 
provide – what I here understand as ‘discourses’. I also understand the rules of private 
standards initiatives as a (codified) element of the discourse about CSR. However, the 
rules do not allow me to know whether they are really followed upon in practice. But also 
what companies, NGOs or other actors say does not allow me to understand whether rules 
reflect the actual practices.  
The research has some limitations:  
• Very generally, the research rather represents the views of more progressive 
companies, who care more about standards than many others. This produces 
somehow biased results. However, whereas less progressive companies do not 
disclose information and were not available for an interview, many of the more pro-
active BSCI and FWF members were open for an interview.   
• The producers I interviewed in India and Bangladesh were usually not supplying 
companies that I interviewed in Germany and Switzerland. In general, it was hardly 
possible to identify factories that supplied to a BSCI or FWF member. The reason 
behind this is that membership in the BSCI/FWF in the years 2006 and 2007 was still 
quite low, and since the brands did not disclose their producers it was rather 
coincidental if a producer I interviewed was supplying a member.  
• In India and Bangladesh it was rather difficult to get information about the FWF or 
the BSCI approach and how it was implemented on the ground, because only few 
interviewees distinguished between different private standards initiatives, whereas 
most talked more generally about the problems. Many suppliers and civil society 
actors in India and Bangladesh were not really aware of the differences regarding the 
initiatives; some even described the facts totally wrong. This, however, still allowed 
me to identify the more general discourses and arguments. 
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• I did not conduct any interviews with workers, mainly because my interest is how 
NGOs (as self-declared worker representatives) frame the issues. In addition, gender 
and power relation between me and the mostly female workers in a South Asian 
culture would have been problematic and I lacked the financial means to employ 
research assistants. One factory manager allowed me to interview workers from his 
factory, and the situation was obvious that the workers only told what the manager 
wanted to hear.  
• The research focuses on English speaking actors and so it might neglect those not 
speaking English, e.g., local trade unions. Important struggles with regard to my 
question are conducted on the international level between actors that can engage 
internationally. However, this way my research may neglect the voice of some 
poorest of the poorest that do not speak English.  
• To reduce complexity and to focus on the struggles between worker representative 
and company representatives (where I did differentiate), I regard the CCC as a 
relatively homogenous bloc. Even though the interaction particularly with the Swiss 
representative of the CCC showed me that there are naturally quite different opinions 
within the network of the CCC, the CCC agrees on one position to be represented in 
the public discourses. Analysing the differences in opinions in the CCC, however, 
would be a different research. Similarly, I regard BSCI members and FWF and 
members as rather homogeneous blocs, even though this reduces the complexity of 
reality. 
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The Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) is the most influential ethical anti-sweatshop 
campaign in Europe. The empirical material in chapters 8-10 focuses on the arguments by 
organizations from this network. To better understand in what strategies the arguments 
are embedded, I present the CCC network including its aims and principles (! CH 6.1), 
its strategies (! CH 6.2), and some more recent ethical campaigning examples of the 
CCC national platforms in Germany and Switzerland (! CH 6.3).  
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The CCC is a network that aims at improving working conditions in the global garment 
and sportswear industry and at ending ‘exploitative’ work. It tries to move companies and 
governments to respect minimum standards derived from various ILO conventions and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Sluiter 2009)31. The CCC defines its aims 
the following way:  
The Clean Clothes Campaign is dedicated to improving working conditions and supporting the 
empowerment of workers in the global garment and sportswear industries. Since 1989, the CCC has 
worked to help ensure that the fundamental rights of workers are respected. We educate and mobilise 
consumers, lobby companies and governments, and offer direct solidarity support to workers as they 
fight for their rights and demand better working conditions. 32 
The International Secretariat of the CCC in Amsterdam coordinates international 
activities and campaigns, facilitates the development of strategy and policy, facilitates the 
international campaign structures and communication, publishes relevant information, 
and trains the network. Strategies are drafted within the network. Furthermore, there is 
frequent bilateral consultation with international partners on the basis of concrete cases 
(urgent appeals and joint campaigns). The Secretariat is relatively small. It has around 8 
full times equivalents working on the three issues: (1) Urgent Appeals, (2) Campaigns,  
(3) The CCC-network. Table 8 shows that press releases in the last decade focused on 
larger discounters, brands and sports companies. 
The International Secretariat is connected to the European CCC coalitions in 14 
countries with more than 250 organizations, and additionally more than 200 organizations 
from the partner network in the production countries. 2008 it was financed 54% by the 
Dutch government, 23% by the EU and 21% private funds. The budget was around 
550.000 Euro (CCC 2009a).  
Instead of listing violations against working conditions criticized by the CCC, I rather 
present the principles of the CCC, which indicate what the network regards as important. 
It also mirrors what labour rights violations are regarded as most problematic. The most 
fundamental principle of the CCC is the following:  
                                                      
31 www.cleanclothes.org (31.3.2010) 
32 www.cleanclothes.org (31.3.2010) 
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All workers … have a right to good and safe working conditions, where they can exercise their 
fundamental rights to associate freely and bargain collectively, and earn a living wage, which allows 
them to live in dignity.  
In summary, the other principles (! compare Box 2) address that workers have a right to 
a good and safe working standard and to know their rights. They should also be consulted 
and empowered and take the lead regarding empowerment. Gender issues are seen as 
relevant. Furthermore, the public has a right to know where products are made, and 
should take action, but not through boycotts. Finally, national governments have a duty to 
make legislation binding and implement it. Based on these principles and the ILO core 
norms the CCC developed a model code. 
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Central to the CCC is that it operates as a network in which the single members believe in 
the same fundamental principles and follow the same aims regarding the workers (! Box 
2) (Hale 2000; Hale & Shaw 2001; Micheletti & Stolle 2007). However, each single 
member of the network is situated in a different national context and develops its own 
strategies. The European CCC coalitions mainly work on raising the awareness of 
consumers, governments, brands/retailers and moving the different actors to take 
responsibility mainly through campaigns and media work.  
The groups that form the partner network in the production countries are in contact with 
workers and conduct research on the local situation, i.e., they mainly inform the European 
network about labour rights abuses in factories supplying European or US American 
brands and retailers. The work of both parts of the network is connected: the European 
groups use the information collected by the organizations in the production countries as 
an input for the work of the campaigns against the brands and retailers in their own 
countries. Thus, most studies the CCC network publishes are based on research by the 
local partner groups. They are usually written and/or edited by one group from the 
European network, sometimes together with partner groups from the production country. 
For instance, the lawsuit against Lidl is based on the research of a local partner 
organization in Bangladesh and its contacts with the workers, but the editor is a member 
of the German CCC network (Burckhardt 2010).   
The CCC network follows four main strategies (CCC 2009a): 
• Pressing companies to assume responsibility and to ensure that garments are 
produced under good labour conditions. 
• Supporting workers, labour unions and corporate organisations in the producing 
countries. 
• Urging citizens to use their power as consumers. This is done through increasing 
consumer awareness by providing accurate information about working conditions in 
the garment and sporting goods industry. 
• Making use of existing legal opportunities to improve labour conditions and to 
lobby for additional legislation that contributes to good labour conditions. The 
government is addressed in its role as legislator and in its role as consumer. CCC 
advocates ethical procurements policies for governments. 
G4@ )))&3*&V1/'9%D&!<'&2'1*+/>&%W"89$%,&
As the national context in Germany and in Switzerland is very different, I briefly show 
what the two national networks in Germany and Switzerland were focusing on in the last 
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few years. This is exemplary and shall only give a rough impression. 
6.3.1 6%/8"*>&&&
The CCC in Germany is a network of 20 organizations. It has one secretariat, where one 
person is working. The German national CCC network focuses on the following issues: 
campaigns during large sports events, large German brands (e.g. Adidas, Puma), retailers 
(e.g. KarstadtQuelle, Tchibo), discounters (e.g. Lidl, KiK, Aldi), public procurement, 
research about working conditions in supply factories, urgent actions, training of trade 
unions and womens’ organizations in Asia and Eastern Europe. In 2010 the CCC in 
Germany has working groups on discounters, sport companies and public procurement. In 
2005, it conducted a pilot project with Hess Natur, which eventually led to Hess Natur 
becoming a member in the Fair Wear Foundation.  
One recent example of the work of the German CCC is the lawsuit against Lidl, which 
is based on the work on discounters that the CCC has been undertaking for a long time. In 
2010 the CCC in Germany supported the Verbraucherzentrale Hamburg e.V. to file a 
lawsuit against the German discounter Lidl. The company was sued for “unfair 
competition” due to misleading advertising and deceiving customers (! CH 1 & Box 3).  
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6.3.2 M<3+]%/$"*0&
The CCC in Switzerland is supported by 19 organizations, and its main coordinating staff 
is one person at the NGO Erklärung von Bern (EvB). In contrast to the network in 
Germany, only one person working at the EvB is active, whereas the other organizations 
mainly support the work with their name. The CCC in Switzerland puts pressure on 
companies mainly by informing the consumers about working conditions in the 
producing countries. Between 2007 and 2010 it focused very much on the following 
issues:  
- Pressing companies to assume responsibility by publishing firm rankings and 
collecting consumer signatures; 
- Supporting Triumph employees to confront the company, e.g., by issuing a case 
against Triumph at the OECD (! Box 4). 
- Urging citizens to use their power as consumers by publishing firm rankings, 
collecting consumer signatures and producing a ‘fair’ organic cotton T-Shirt and 
telling the story of the whole production. 
Another focus has been to inform consumers about the different approaches companies in 
Switzerland take and to provide them with a platform they can use to protest against 
certain companies, for instance, by writing protest emails. In addition, it demands that 
companies sign and implement a code of conduct and have it controlled independently. It 
clearly states that it wants companies to become member in the Fair Wear Foundation 
(FWF):  
Unabhängige Kontrolle: Gemeinsam mit Nicht- Regierungsorganisationen (NGO) und 
Gewerkschaften wird die Einhaltung des Kodex überprüft. Dadurch sollen die Beteiligung der 
Beschäftigten, die Transparenz über die erfolgten Massnahmen und die erzielten Resultate 
gewährleistet werden. Die Fair Wear Foundation wird von der CCC als Verifizierungsstelle 
favorisiert, das diese den Verifizierungsansatz heute am umfassendsten betreibt.34 
In the years 2004, 2006, and 2008, the CCC published rankings of Swiss and 
international fashion companies, and in 2009 of outdoor companies. The main demands 
towards the companies were to set up a Code of Conduct and implement it, to join a 
multi-stakeholder initiative and interact with civil society, to promote freedom of 
association and the right to collective bargaining in supply chains, and to promote small 
farmers by buying organic or fair trade cotton.35 As a reaction to the outdoor ranking the 
European Outdoor Group set up a social standards group in its ‘sustainability working 
group’ and various companies that participated in the survey have shown their interest in 
                                                      
33 http://www.cleanclothes.org/media-inquiries/press-releases/german-retailer-lidl-retracts-false-claims-of-fair-working-
conditions, 2.5.2010 
34 http://www.evb.ch/p13939.html, 3.4.2010 
35 http://www.evb.ch/p16034.html, 3.4.2010 
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joining the FWF.36  
 
 
Figure 8: Evaluation of Swiss and international outdoor companies by the EvB in 2009 (www.evb.ch, 
2.3.2010) 
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This chapter presents two different private standard initiatives (PSI), which represent the 
two case studies of this research, namely the Fair Wear Foundation (FWF) and the 
Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI). Both initiatives aim at helping companies 
to implement social standards into their supply chains, and in a larger context both aim to 
improve working conditions in factories worldwide. And both say that their members 
take responsibility and that their approach is credible and legitimate. However, the two 
initiatives follow very different approaches, and these differences are the focal points in 
the struggles for defining and discharging corporate responsibility.  
Each initiative has elaborated a different set of rules that define the members’ 
responsibility for implementing social standards into their supply chains and their 
required practices. According to the analytic framework (! CH 4) the rules define the 
following aspects:  
• Rules for legislative regulation – i.e., who sets the rules, particularly the social 
standards and rules regarding the members’ responsibility and the initiatives’ 
transparency (! CH 7.2); 
• Rules for judicial regulation – i.e., how the implementation of the social standards are 
audited (! CH 7.3); 
• Rules for executive regulation – i.e., how are standards implemented and which tools 
does the PSI use to ensure that standards are met (e.g. incentives / sanctions) (! CH 
7.4). 
In this chapter I first briefly present some backgrounds of both initiatives (! CH 7.1) and 
then the rules regarding legislative, judicial and executive regulation of the two case 
studies BSCI and FWF in order to highlight similarities and the major differences of 
these rules. Later, in chapters 8-10, I analyse how the major differences in the rules are 
contested between various actors along the global production network, i.e. how different 
approaches to private regulation are legitimized and criticized.  
H4- L"2C7/'1*0D&e3,+'/>:&8%8#%/,=39:&(3*"*23*7&&
7.1.1 e3,+'/>&
One of the founding pillars of the corporate-driven Business Social Compliance 
Initiative (BSCI) is the ‘AVE-Sektorenmodell Sozialverantwortung’, which is an 
initiative by the Foreign Trade Association of German Retailers (AVE)37. The ‘AVE-
                                                      
37 Aussenhandelsvereinigung des Deutschen Einzelhandels e.V. (AVE) 
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Sektorenmodell’ was implemented through a public-private partnership project between 
the AVE and the GTZ between 2003 and 2006 (Koeppe 2007) and developed to 
harmonize various corporate responsibility approaches.38 The Brussels-based Foreign 
Trade Association (FTA)39 established a common platform for the various European 
codes of conduct and monitoring approaches, and developed the BSCI as a common 
monitoring system for social compliance of European companies (BSCI 2009:1). The aim 
was to harmonize corporate social responsibility approaches at a European level, to 
increase the overall impacts and to be more efficient. The BSCI was founded in 2003 and 
operates from the FTA offices in Brussels. In 2009 the BSCI established representatives 
in China and in India to increase its presence on these important markets.  
The Fair Wear Foundation (FWF) was initiated in the Netherlands by the CCC, and a 
confederation of Dutch trade unions (FNV) in cooperation with a Dutch Business 
Association in the 1990s as a more positive approach to change corporate responsibility 
behaviour in contrast to the ‘naming and shaming’ done by labour rights campaigns 
(FWF 2008e):  
The idea was after campaigning, more or less, naming and shaming kind of campaigns in the 
beginning against the corporate culprits. So a more positive approach was needed. And there seemed 
to be room also to organise something more in cooperation with companies. So we started this 
negotiation process, with employers associations and trade unions and NGOs in a quite open way, 
actually. That must have been 1994, something, so it was still at the very beginning - the whole word 
multi-stakeholder had not yet been invented, I guess, at the time - it took a very very long time to 
negotiate this, because what they started was to really negotiate on the charter. And it turned out to 
become an organization. (FWF 2008d:1) 
In addition, the CCC and FNV both criticise the bad working situations in supply 
factories in producing countries, and regard the FWF as a more credible and effective 
approach than the one of the BSCI. The Foundation became operational in 2001, starting 
with a pilot study and finally presented itself to the public in 2003, when it started 
recruiting new members (FWF 2008e). Based in Amsterdam, the FWF started to focus on 
the Dutch market. Today, it has members in seven European countries and regards itself 
as a European initiative. In 2007 it established an office in Switzerland and merged with 
the initiative ISCOM (International Social Compliance Verification), which is run by 
three Swiss NGOs, namely Brot für alle, Fastenopfer and Max Havelaar-Stiftung 
(Schweiz) (FWF 2008d:27)40.  
7.1.2 `%8#%/,&"*0&8%8#%/,=39&&
Many German or Swiss companies that are sourcing garments from a so-called ‘risk-
                                                      
38 http://www.ave-koeln.de/csr/ave_sektorenmodell_1.htm (1.2.2010); Monitoring von Sozialstandards – AVE-
Sektorenmodell auf Konsolidierungskurs, without date, www.ave-koeln.de/doc/doc/AVEMeinungenSozialstandards.pdf 
(1.2.2010) 
39 The FTA … is committed to achieving its goal of a true free trade environment and it focuses especially on trade policy, 
quantitative restrictions, tariffs, anti-dumping proceedings and other trade barriers. For 30 years, it has supported its 
members, consisting of national trade associations and companies from all over Europe, by providing expertise and up-to-
date information and by campaigning on their behalf against protectionist measures in the European and international 
arena. (BSCI 2007a:4) 
40 We have never tried to get foreign members. Now we are trying. Now we are setting up a structure where that could take 
place. There are a few German candiates, too. But for them, of course, the problem is that FWF is still very much a Dutch 
organisation. So we have to get more open to that. But at the beginning it was never our attempt to directly try to have 
international or foreign firms as a member.  
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country’41 become a member in one of the two initiatives. Garment brands and retailers 
can also join both initiatives, use the BSCI for monitoring purposes and the FWF for 
verification purposes. However, so far, only one of the BSCI members has additionally 
joined the FWF, and realistically seen, the two initiatives are competing for new 
members.  
New members increase the power an initiative has in the market. The more members an 
initiative has, the more attractive it becomes to companies that have not yet joined an 
initiative. With more suppliers following a single system there is greater chance of 
overlap in suppliers, which reduces audit costs. A relevant difference between the BSCI 
and the FWF is that the latter only accepts companies that import or sell sewed products 
(mainly garments), whereas the BSCI accepts companies that import or sell all kinds of 
consumer goods, including agricultural products42. 
There are vast differences in terms of the amount of workers that are under the 
regulation of each initiative. The BSCI focuses on retailers, and therefore automatically 
has members with a large turnover and many suppliers. The largest member in the BSCI 
is the Metro Group, which had a turnover of 68 Billion Euros in 2008. The BSCI 
members initiated almost 5.000 factory audits and re-audits in 2008. In contrast, the FWF 
focuses on small and medium sized companies, who usually have a much smaller number 
of suppliers than retailers. In 2009 the 51 FWF members sourced from about 1.153 
factories (which were not all audited) employing 275.000 people43, and in 2008 the 43 
members had a turnover of approximately 2 Billion Euros (FWF 2008a:44)44. The BSCI 
has therefore managed to scale up its potential impact, as compared to the FWF. 
However, how many members an initiative has and how many audits it conducts does 
not tell us anything about the actual impact an initiative has on workers, as the depth of 
the impact (i.e. how much the lives of single workers improve) also has to be taken into 
account. Whereas business initiatives are often criticized for lacking depth in impact, 
multi-stakeholder initiatives are criticised for their problem of scaling up their impacts: 
they do not achieve large impact because they only have few members (Utting 2005b; 
United Nations 2007; Wells 2007:63). 
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7.1.3 P3*"*23*7&&
The member companies in both initiatives pay an annual membership fee. In the FWF it 
                                                      
41 Each initiative defines what it regards as a ‘risk country’, basically these are countries in which the risk of labour rights 
violations is seen as high. There is a large overlap between the two initiatives. See www.bsci-eu.org, www.fairwear.org  
42 In 2007 agricultural products were added. 
43 Personal communication FWF 4/2010 
44 Until 2009 Mexx was the largest FWF member, which had approx. 1 billion Euro turnover.  
45 These figures refer to FWF affiliates and ambassadors, while the remainder of the chapter refers to affiliates, since the 
handbook for ambassadors was not finished at the time of analysis.  
Chapter 7: Private regulation initiatives: BSCI & FWF  65 
ranges from 2.500 to 78.000 Euro, depending on turnover, and that of the BSCI ranges 
from 3.000 to 30.000 Euro, depending on turnover and on membership in the FTA46. 
Membership in both initiatives can be terminated from both sides. 
There is little transparency regarding how the BSCI is financed. The office, the tools 
and capacity building activities like awareness raising workshops and advanced training 
workshops for suppliers are financed by the member fees, and the audits and qualification 
is paid either by the members or the suppliers. Additionally, every auditor pays a fee of 
100 Euro per initial audit. On a project basis, certain activities are co-financed by the 
European Commission. 
The FWF budget was 731.000 Euro in 2007. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
paid 42%, the members paid 27% with their fees, NGOs (ICCO47, Oxfam, ISCOM) 
contributed 23%, and other sources 8%. These resources make expansion difficult: “We 
would like to have many new members, but we have limited resources to control them” 
(FWF 2008c). 
H45 R%73,$"+3J%&/%71$"+3'*&3*&LM).&Z&PQP&
Legislative regulation asks who takes the decisions and who sets the rules of an initiative 
(! CH 7.2.1), and which rules result from it. The most important rules regarding 
legislative regulation refer to the Codes of Conduct and the scope of responsibility (! 
CH 7.2.2), and the rules defining the transparency of the initiative (! CH 7.2.3). Table 
10 sums up the main differences in the legislative regulation between BSCI and FWF that 
are explained in this chapter. 
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46 Personal communication BSCI, FWF 2010 
47 ICCO is an ‘inter church organisation for development cooperation’ 
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Whereas in the BSCI only companies formally define the rules, in the FWF organizations 
representing companies and workers together set the rules. In the Committees of the 
BSCI the member companies decide on issues related to their scope of responsibility 
(auditing, capacity building, communication system) and prepare proposals upon which 
the Members’ Assembly decides, if it relates to strategy matters (! Figure 9)48. The BSCI 
Stakeholder Board has a consulting function. It can initiate and advise on policy and 
systemic questions of the BSCI except issues related to the budget and internal 
organizational questions (BSCI 2007b:4). The power to make decisions remains with the 
member companies.  
 
PQP&L'"/0&
I5(3*+(-!
=+/%&8,*a7!&*)(-3B(.3&-!
C&*!)(*+,-.!71//%3,*!
2&+/(-3,7!
=+/%&8,*a7!&*)(-3B(.3&-!
C&*!)(*+,-.!*,.(3%!.*(0,!
G*(0,!1-3&-! c$A7!
 
Figure 9: The governance system of the BSCI & FWF  
In the FWF the Board is the highest decision-making body, and representatives from the 
four founding stakeholders have an equal vote: a business association for retailers and 
one for suppliers, NGOs and trade unions (FWF 2008a:34) (! Figure 9). The Board sets 
the general policy and is responsible for the work carried out by the Committee of Experts 
(CoE) and the FWF Staff (FWF 2009c)49. The fact that the CCC has been on the board 
since the beginning has led to the situation that the FWF policies come very close to what 
the CCC demands. The FWF also has National Stakeholder Platforms in the members’ 
                                                      
48 Companies in working committees prepare suggestions for decision. The BSCI Executive Office operates the initiative 
and makes sure that it runs efficiently. The Supervisory Council, into which BSCI members are elected, controls the 
Executive Office and the members’ commitments, and it accepts new members. 
49 The FWF Committee of Experts and the FWF Staff give policy advice to the board. The staff executes the policy that is 
set by the Board and reports back to the Board and the Committee of Experts (FWF 2008a:34). 
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FWF is an independent non-profit foundation. The Board is its highest decision-
making body. The Board consists of four categories of stakeholders, with 
equal voting rights per category. This ensures that all the stakeholder organi-
sations have a balanced influence. The four categories are as follows: the garment 
retailers’ sector organisation, the garment suppliers’ sector organisation, 
trade unions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
The Board sets general policy and is responsible for the work carried out by 
the Committee of Experts (CoE) and the staff. The CoE is composed of the 
same four categories as the Board. The representatives of these organisations 
are experts in the field of garment production and trade, labour law and 
social development. The CoE advises the Board. The staff implements the 
Board’s policy and reports to the Board and the CoE.
Since December 2006, FWF has representation in Switzerland. The activities 
of FWF’s Swiss co-worker concentrate primarily on recruiting Swiss garment 
companies and maintaining contact with Swiss stakeholders. 
FWF is een onafhankelijke  
stichting. NGOs, vakbonden en 
brancheorganisaties besturen 
samen FWF om zo te werken aan 
betere arbeidsomstandigheden in 
de confectie-industrie. Sinds 
2006 heeft FWF ook een 
vertegen woordiger in Zwitserland. 
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countries, e.g. in the Netherlands, in Switzerland, Germany. At these platforms members 
meet each other and stakeholders meet and exchange information and expertise.  
Both initiatives interact with stakeholders in the production countries. The BSCI initiates 
so-called round tables, where various stakeholders of the country engage in dialogue. 
According to one of its six principles the FWF also involves stakeholders in producing 
countries. These stakeholders give policy advice, suggest and qualify auditors that carry 
out FWF audits / verification, qualify producers, and are the local handler of the 
complaints mechanism, with whom workers can officially complain (FWF 2002:5-2f; 
FWF 2009c). Formally, stakeholders in the partner networks only have a consulting 
function to the FWF, and do not take the decisions. However, in practice they play a 
concrete role e.g. they formulate FWF country reports (see below) and they act as local 
complaints handlers.  
Differences in the decision-making structure have strongly influenced what rules are 
eventually defined, as the following chapters point out.  
7.2.2 )'0%,&'(&)'*012+&&
What ‘Codes of Conduct’ (CoC) are defined and where are they taken from? Both 
initiatives define a CoC, and the members’ suppliers are obliged to comply with these 
standards, which is controlled, i.e. audited. The BSCI and the FWF both include the core 
norms of the ILO into their CoC, which are the usual guidelines in the area of working 
conditions today. In addition, both argue that if national labour laws are higher than these 
norms, the standards defined in these laws become mandatory.  
However, there are some differences in the codes of the two initiatives. On the one 
hand, the BSCI has some codes beyond those of the FWF that refer to environmental 
issues, the implementation of a policy for social accountability, and the establishment of 
an anti-bribery and an anti-corruption policy. On the other hand, the most contested 
difference between the two initiatives, is that the BSCI demands the payment of national 
minimum or local industry wages, whereas the FWF demands the payment of a living 
wage (! below & CH 8.2).  
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Both, the BSCI and the FWF claim that their objective is to improve working conditions 
in the global garment industry and that they ask their members to ‘take responsibility’ to 
contribute to this objective. However, there are different understandings of ‘taking 
responsibility’. So what do the initiatives’ rules define as ‘taking responsibility’, and 
where does the members’ responsibility end? One basic responsibility or commitment of 
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BSCI and FWF members is that they have to make their direct suppliers sign the Code of 
Conduct.  
Beyond this, the BSCI member companies are responsible for ‘encouraging’ their 
suppliers to get involved in the audit process, i.e. ‘initiating’ improvements in their 
supply chains: “The ultimate goal of the BSCI is to initiate sustainable improvement in 
supplier countries” (BSCI 2007b:10). However, the responsibility for ‘action’, which is 
understood as implementing the codes and moving out of the ‘non compliant’ area, is 
with the stakeholders in the production countries:  
The responsibility for action will most likely50 be shared between suppliers and the governments of 
the supplier countries … Governments, trade and business associations, trade unions, NGOs and 
other civic groups should take the responsibility for improving social standards in their own 
countries. These groups should make strong commitments to improvement and thereby make the 
process their own. … The BSCI will encourage and promote any serious attempt made in the supplier 
countries toward these ends. (BSCI 2007b:2,10) 
In practice this is done as follows: A BSCI member commits to involve his direct 
suppliers into the BSCI system by obliging them to implement the CoC and by 
controlling that he is audited. Additionally, 2/3 of a members’ suppliers must have ‘good’ 
or ‘improvements needed’ audit results within 5,5 years. The member then has to control 
whether the supplier is making any progress in the implementation of the standards by 
comparing the results of the factory audits and re-audits (! CH 7.3 & 9). If a direct 
supplier to the BSCI member subcontracts production the BSCI member is not 
responsible for this subcontractor anymore. Instead, the supplier is responsible for 
obliging the subcontracted supplier to comply with the BSCI CoC and for auditing 
whether this happens.  
However, if the direct supplier is situated in a non-risk country, he can either disclose 
from where he sources; if he does not want to do that he can become a member of the 
BSCI, too. As many import agents regard their suppliers as a business secret, membership 
of BSCI has seen a massive rise since 2008 (! Table 9). For instance, the retailer Aldi 
sources most of its garments via suppliers in non-risk countries, and according to the 
BSCI system, it is not responsible for auditing or improving the producers that are 
situated, e.g. in Bangladesh. Furthermore, members can be active in a National Contact 
Group, which “serve to discuss social responsibility concerns in the respective countries 
and to exchange experiences and views of BSCI members”, and communicate about their 
BSCI engagement in order to increase their credibility (BSCI 2008:14)51. 
In the FWF members and their suppliers share the responsibility for implementing the 
standards: “the code can only be fulfilled when sourcing companies, as well as factory 
management, actively pursue practices that support good working conditions”52. Each 
member has to write up a standardized work plan in which it has to disclose his full 
supply register to the FWF, i.e “suppliers, sub-contracted suppliers, licensees, and sub-
contracted suppliers to licensees, who are engaged in cutting, sewing, embroidering, 
knitting, ironing, finishing, marking, packing, or other preparation of finished garments” 
                                                      
50 BSCI did not comment what “most likely” means in this context. 
51 information about how social compliance is improved in the supply chain, but also which concrete measures have been 
taken. (BSCI 2008:14) 
52 http://fairwear.org/about, 12.12.2009 
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(FWF 2002). Suppliers are seen as responsible for implementing the CoC, but the FWF 
member is responsible to support them doing this in two ways: First, they have to ensure 
that their purchasing policies do not prevent their suppliers from implementing the Codes 
they demand (! CH 7.4). Second, members are obliged to audit at least 90% of their 
suppliers of ‘own production’53 within three years (! CH 7.3). The FWF then conducts 
verification audits at 10% of the suppliers to control whether the members do enough that 
their suppliers can improve the standards (FWF 2008a:32). In addition, FWF members 
have to publish a social annual report.  
`3*3818&<"7%,&
By far most companies – like the BSCI members – demand in their Codes of Conduct 
that at least minimum wages54 must be paid, and similarly most factory managers argue 
that they pay according to the legal or industrial minimum wage scheme. Suppliers are 
asked to pay more, if the wages are too low to pay the daily living, however, this is not 
mandatory.  
Legal minimum wages widely vary between countries, and often also within a country. 
Different wage levels usually apply to different jobs within a factory and different grades 
(! compare Table 11). In some regions, like in Tirupur (India) and in Bangladesh, 
minimum wages are discussed and set by a tripartite body that includes business 
representatives, trade unions and the government. The purpose of setting up a tripartite 
body is to equally represent all relevant stakeholders and to finally lead to a fair result. In 
India, the state sets a basic wage that is topped by a ‘Variable Dearness Allowance’, 
which is set twice a year, based on the rate of inflation. In Bangladesh, the minimum 
wage was not adapted to inflation rates between 1994 and 2006, when it was finally 
increased from 930 Taka (Tk) to 1.662 Tk – and has since not been adapted to the 
inflation rate55.  
R3J3*7&<"7%,&
The FWF (like most NGOs, trade unions and workers) demands that so-called living 
wages56 (LW) are paid. Similarly, the multi-stakeholder initiatives SAI, WRC and ETI 
also demand that living wages are paid (! CH 2.2). In the BSCI system living wages are 
‘best practice’, i.e. factories are encouraged to pay a living wage, and those that certify 
according to SA 8000 would have to pay living wages.  
                                                      
53 ‘Own production’ is the production in all factories that manufacture products which are commissioned by the FWF 
affiliate, directly or through an agent or other intermediary, normally to the design of the FWF affiliate. 
54 Wages paid for regular working hours, overtime hours and overtime differentials shall meet or exceed legal minimums 
and/or industry standards. Illegal, unauthorised or disciplinary deductions from wages shall not be made. In situations in 
which the legal minimum wage and/or industry standards do not cover living expenses and provide some additional 
disposable income, supplier companies are further encouraged to provide their employees with adequate compensation to 
meet these needs. Deductions from wages as a disciplinary measure are forbidden. Supplier companies shall ensure that 
wage and benefits composition are detailed clearly and regularly for workers; the supplier company shall also ensure that 
wages and benefits are rendered in full compliance with all applicable laws and that remuneration is rendered in a manner 
convenient to workers. (In accordance with ILO conventions 26 and 131.) (BSCI Code of Conduct 2009) 
55 This, however, happened in August 2010, when minimum wages were raised to 3.000 Taka after massive protests by 
trade unions and workers. 
56 Wages and benefits paid for a standard working week shall meet at least legal or industry minimum standards and always 
be sufficient to meet basic needs of workers and their families and to provide some discretionary income. (ILO 
Conventions 26 and 131). Deductions from wages for disciplinary measures shall not be permitted nor shall any deductions 
from wages not provided for by national law be permitted. Deductions shall never constitute an amount that will lead the 
employee to receive less than the minimum wage. Employees shall be adequately and clearly informed about the 
specifications of their wages including wage rates and pay period.  
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Living wages usually go well beyond the legal minimum wages (! compare Table 11). 
However, there is no fixed definition of a living wage, and it is much disputed how high 
living wages should be in a certain area, and how to determine them. One difficulty of 
fixing living wages is that defining them through a basic needs approach, for instance, 
allows various interpretations, and therefore fixing is a matter of deliberation and finding 
an agreement with all relevant stakeholders. Due to the difficulties in defining and 
implementing living wages, the fact that the FWF demands a living wage in its CoC does 
not mean that these living wages are implemented in the short-term – but they remain a 
long-term aim: Regarding the short-term, the FWF wage policy requires that suppliers to 
FWF member companies pay “at least this best practice wage, or legal minimum wage 
whatever is higher” (FWF 2009f). However, in the long-term, according to its 
developmental approach, the FWF follows the strategy of a wage ladder to determine the 
living wages and aim to move the supplier up the ladder (! Box 6). The FWF does not 
indicate what progress companies have to make regarding the increase in living wages, 
but it obliges members to “publish their results at implementing a living wage” (FWF 
2009f). Some issues regarding wages are published in the management system audit 
reports. For instance, a report on Switcher states: “Wages (in a factory in Tirupur) were 
found to be above the legal minimum wage, but below the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement wage of the Tirupur Exports Association (TEA)” (FWF 2009g). 
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57 http://www.tn.gov.in/gorders/labour/labemp-e-74-2004-2D.htm 
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7.2.3 !/"*,9"/%*2>&
How transparent are the two initiatives about how decisions are taken and what rules are 
defined?58 Transparency is one of the six governing principles of the FWF: “For FWF this 
implies transparency about FWF’s policies, country strategies, activities and methods, the 
receipt of complaints and the key elements of their outcomes and about affiliates and 
ambassadors’ performance” (FWF 2009c). The BSCI also regards itself as a transparent 
initiative, but does not include transparency as a basic principle or objective. It states: 
“The system's remarkable transparency gives it the greatest possible internal and public 
credibility” (BSCI 2009c:2). The BSCI publishes the document “BSCI system: rules and 
functioning”, which explains the functioning of the system in 10 pages. The BSCI 
members, the members of the executive office and of the supervisory board and of the 
stakeholder board are published on the website. However, the BSCI does not disclose 
policy documents in as much detail as the FWF, e.g., describing the way auditing is 
conducted in detail (compare Table 12). 
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58 For an overview see Table 12; for more details on the transparency regarding the judicial and executive governance 
compare chapters 7.3 & 7.4 
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The FWF and the BSCI both publish annual reports, which present each initiative 
including their governance system, member companies and activities in the past year. In 
their report, the BSCI presents the aggregated results of the audits conducted so far as 
“our progress” (! CH 9.1.2). The FWF, in contrast, obliges its members to publish 
detailed social annual reports in a given format and to publish management system audit 
reports that both present details concerning the implementation at every member 
company. Having said this, in 2009 11 of 51 member companies published their reports. 
Whereas the FWF does not say what rules of the Global Reporting Initiative it respects, 
the BSCI report lists which of the GR3 rules it respects, claiming that it “cannot respect 
them all in detail” (BSCI 2007a:3).  
Regarding legislative regulation, the FWF and the BSCI both publish, who takes 
decisions; but they both do not say which stakeholders participate in the producing 
countries (in partner networks / at round tables), and why they were selected or why 
others were excluded.  
The country studies59 are quite particular to the FWF system and do not exist in the 
BSCI. In these documents the FWF defines how it interprets regional priorities regarding 
labour standards in its members’ sourcing countries. These studies are commissioned by 
the FWF and written by local partners in cooperation with verification staff. Country 
studies are an attempt to codify a local perspective on the labour rights situation, 
including the priorities from this perspective. These studies aim to facilitate the 
integration of this perspective into the evaluation of the situation in factories during 
audits. However, many studies have not been updated more than five years.   
The transparency of both systems is limited mainly by business confidentiality and the 
security of workers. They respect the confidentiality of business data such as the supplier 
register or audit reports, which are only visible to the staff members. No stakeholder and 
no representative in the governing bodies has access to this company specific 
information.  
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The rules for judicial regulation define the mechanisms and practices used to control that 
producers comply with standards. Both initiatives use factory audits, however, the FWF 
additionally uses verification audits in the members’ headquarters and their factories. 
Table 13 sums up the main differences in the rules concerning legislative regulation.  
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59 So far these are published for the following countries: Bangladesh, China, India, Turkey, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Poland, 
Ukraine, Romania 
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Figure 10: BSCI audit procedure 
Figure 10 presents the ‘BSCI process’. A supplier has to sign the Code of Conduct, and 
based on this do a self-assessment, which provides “initial information regarding the 
supply chain and the supplier's performance and defines the priority and urgency of 
further audit measures” (BSCI 2007b:9). Initial audits then have to be conducted 
according to the members’ commitment. The BSCI pre-selects certain audit companies 
that are accredited by Social Accountability Accreditation Services (SAAS), and in each 
audit team conducting an audit there must be a SA 8000 accredited lead auditor. An 
initial audit takes between 1,5 and 4,5 days, depending on the factory size. Re-audits take 
1-2 days. The audit team works according to the ‘BSCI Management Manual’, the ‘Audit 
Guidelines’, and the ‘BSCI Audit Questionnaire’, which are not disclosed publicly (BSCI 
2007b:9; BSCI 2008:20; BSCI 2009a). The audit rules ask auditors to examine various 
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documents, inspect the production site, interview the management and some workers60 
inside the factories. Auditors shall “cooperate with local non-governmental organisations 
and employee representatives” – but the cooperation is not specified in more detail (BSCI 
2007b:8). After an audit the factory is assessed, either as ‘good’, ‘improvements needed’ 
or ‘non-compliant’ (see Box 7). By far most of the suppliers audited for the first time will 
result as ‘non compliant’ or ‘improvements needed’. Members have to enter supplier 
profiles and auditors have to enter the overall audit results into an electronic supplier 
database (BSCI 2007a:10; BSCI 2007b:9). This database is shared in the BSCI. 
L'W&HD&LM).&B,,%,,8%*+D&VJ"$1"+3*7&"103+&/%,1$+,&
6''0>! gc&! 0,J3(.3&-! C*&+! ZMIQ! M&23(%! :,;13*,+,-.7h! &*! gU3-&*! 0,J3(.3&-7! C*&+! ZMIQ! M&23(%! :,;13*,+,-.74! '1.! C1%%!
/*&.,2.3&-!&C!,+/%&8,,7!37!&'7,*J,0h>!G5,*,!37!-&!73)-3C32(-.!0,J3(.3&-!C*&+!.5,!*,;13*,+,-.7#!G5,!(103.&*!2(-!(77,77!(-!
(103.! *,71%.! H3.5! F,,;4! 3C! .5,*,! (*,! -&.! +&*,! .5(-! .H&! 0,J3(.3&-7! 3-! -&-K2*123(%! /&3-.74! -&! 3++,03(.,! 0(-),*! .&!
,+/%&8,,7!(-0!-&!787.,+(.32!C(1%.7#!
.89/'J%8%*+,&h%%0%0>!g?,J3(.3&-7!3-!%,77!.5(-!5(%C!&C!.5,!*,;13*,+,-.7!(-0!3-!-&!2*123(%!/&3-.7h>!S1%C3%+,-.!&C!(.!%,(7.!
5(%C!.5,!(103.!/&3-.7#!!
)/3+32"$>!g?,J3(.3&-7!3-!.5,!+(N&*3.8!&C!*,;13*,+,-.7!(-0d&*!3-!2*123(%!/&3-.7>!G5,!*,;13*,+,-.7!(*,!-&.!C1%C3%%,0!3-!+&*,!
.5(-!5(%C!.5,!/&3-.74!(-0d&*!-&.!C1%C3%%,0!3-!2*123(%!/&3-.7#!!
hB>!:,;13*,+,-.7!0&!-&.!+(.5!.&!.5,!2&+/(-8!7.*12.1*,#!
E,7-+/@(6EKX(W7;)'(S7);/0)1/*(m(6EKX(#G"#8G!`G=[(."#=(
Additionally, the BSCI checks “if the audit guidelines are applied in a correct manner 
by the auditors” by so-called ‘surveillance audits’61. In these audits SAAS staff join BSCI 
auditors when they visit a factory in so-called surveillance audits (BSCI 2009a:7) (B16, 
B30):  
Gegenchecks, Kontrollchecks auch der Audits, ob auch der Auditor das so verstanden hat, richtig 
verstanden hat, dass wirklich das, was ein Knock-out Kriterium ist, auch als Knock-out drin ist, und 
nicht dass da drin steht, zahlt keine Mindestlöhne, hat aber bestanden oder so was. Also da gibt es 
Qualitätschecks. (B3) 
After an audit the auditor agrees with the factory management on a ‘corrective action 
plan’, which sets “necessary improvements and deadlines for every single corrective 
action” and which suppliers have to integrate within 12 months (BSCI 2007b:9). A re-
audit then controls what is implemented. The BSCI rules say that the BSCI member shall 
support his suppliers in the improvements, but they do not specify this support. The 
termination of the business relation must be considered as a ‘last resort’, only if the 
supplier does not comply with the obligations after a ‘reasonable period of time’ at all 
(BSCI 2007b:9). It is open to the members’ own interpretation and decision what this 
means. If a supplier is audited as ‘good’ the BSCI member shall encourage his supplier to 
become SA 8000 certified, which the latter can decide voluntarily and usually has to pay 
for by himself.  
Each BSCI member must involve 2/3 (67%) of its buying volume in defined ‘risk 
countries’ into the BSCI auditing process within 3! years after joining the initiative. This 
only refers to the direct suppliers in risk countries, who then have to ensure “that the 
Code of Conduct is also observed by all subcontractors involved in production processes 
of final manufacturing stages” (BSCI 2007b:7) – however, audits are not mandatory 
regarding subcontractors. BSCI demands that a member terminate the business 
relationship with a supplier, if that supplier has not managed to improve from ‘non 
                                                      
60 1-10 for factories up to 100 workers, 25-30 for factories of 750-1000 workers (Personal communication BSCI 4/2010) 
61 40 were conducted in 2009 (Personal communication BSCI 4/2010) 
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compliant’ within 5 ! years. 
The BSCI ‘Supervisory Board’ checks the members’ commitment by looking at a list 
that indicates how many suppliers a member wanted to involve in the BSCI process and 
how many it eventually involved (BSCI 2008:14). If the member is well behind his 
targets, the ‘Supervisory Board’ discusses what shall be done with the member, usually 
issuing a warning, but some members were also already excluded. In addition, each 
member shares audit results in the BSCI suppliers’ database (BSCI 2008:14), which shall 
help to reduce multiple audits.  
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By endorsing the ‘FWF Code of Labour practices’ (i.e. Code of Conduct) a FWF member 
agrees to monitor labour conditions in “all workplaces where they source their garments” 
and, where necessary, take steps to improve them, to have this verified by the FWF and to 
report about the improvements (FWF 2009a:3). The FWF distinguishes between audits 
carried out by affiliates and audits carried out by the FWF.  
The audits conducted or commissioned by the affiliate “determine the degree to which 
companies comply with the labour standards”. They are conducted and paid by the FWF 
member, who often commissions them to local FWF audit teams (! compare Box 8), if 
they do not have the adequate staff for conducting them or do not outsource it to third-
party auditors. As in a BSCI audit, auditors check documents, and talk with the managers 
and workers. However, a relevant difference to BSCI audits is that FWF auditors have to 
interview workers outside the factory premises. Members have to commit to audit at least 
90% of the ‘own suppliers’ within three years, but the rules do not prescribe how much 
the suppliers must improve. ‘Own suppliers’ refers to all producers sewing according to 
the design of the FWF member. Like in the BSCI, the auditing team leader has to write an 
audit report, recommend steps for improvement of non-compliances with the CoC in a 
corrective action plan (CAP), and discuss both with the factory management. The CAP 
shall include “realistic, effective and measurable plans for improvement” with a clear 
timeframe. The FWF member then discusses the outcome of the audit and the CAP with 
the supplier and agrees on a timeframe for corrective action (FWF 2009a:3).  
The main task of the FWF is to verify that members do everything to implement the 
CoC. One part of the verification process is a ‘factory verification audit’, by which the 
FWF aims to “assess working conditions at factories in order to check whether the 
(internal) monitoring activities are effective and whether corrective action plans are 
executed” (FWF 2009b). The FWF verification audits are commissioned and selected by 
the verification staff in Amsterdam, conducted by the local audit teams and reported to 
the initiative. Every three years 10% of each member company’s supplier facilities are 
verified.62  
Additionally, the FWF conducts ‘management system audits’ (MSA) once a year at 
each member company to assess the progress each member has made against fixed 
‘management system requirements’ (MSR) (! CH 9). The aim of an MSA is to assess 
                                                      
62 Verification audits are not conducted, if the FWF audit teams have already conducted internal audits. 
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whether members “adapt their management system in such a way that effective 
implementation of the Code of Labour practice is possible” (FWF 2009b:12). With help 
of the MSA the FWF wants to assess “the extent of meaningful improvements to internal 
systems and the results and achievements of these systems”63, and claims that fulfilling 
the MSR allows an effective implementation of social standards. The background studies 
set the benchmark for ‘meaningful’ improvements. During an MSA the FWF staff 
interviews various personnel in the member’s office, reviews internal company 
documentation on procurement policy and interaction with suppliers and tests company 
systems (FWF 2008a:47). Based on the management system audits the FWF writes a 
report that includes requirements and recommendations for improvement. These reports 
have been published on the website since 12/2009. There is no experience so far, when 
FWF members sanction suppliers.  
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According to the BSCI rules the member and its suppliers have to agree on who pays the 
audits and the corrective actions. Companies deal with this differently. Whereas some 
members pay for audits themselves, many ask the suppliers to pay for the audits, and this 
is similar for the corrective actions. BSCI audit costs are not publicly available and vary 
according to factory size, but the average audit price should be about the same as an audit 
by a FWF audit team. BSCI membership fees include the management of the factory 
database, but auditors must pay 100 Euros for each initial audit as a fee for using the 
BSCI audit guidelines64. 
FWF members pay for the internal audits themselves, and they agree with their 
suppliers on who pays for corrective actions. Verification audits are paid by the initiative, 
which explicitly uses the membership fees for this purpose. The costs for audits vary 
according to factory size, but if a FWF audit team of three local experts conducts an audit 
in a factory with around 500 workers it costs around 2.000 Euro. The membership fee of 
the FWF covers the costs for training of local audit teams, writing background studies, 
verification audits, management system audits, and the local complaints mechanism.  
                                                      
63 http://fairwear.org/page/verification, 12.12.2009 
64 “The objective of this fee is to retribute the BSCI as we offer auditing companies a business platform. It is also to cover 
the costs generated by the system such as the organisation of regular meetings with the CBs and updates and translations of 
management tools they use in their daily work.“ www.bsci-eu.org (1.2.2010) 
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The two initiatives follow very different approaches to support their members’ suppliers 
in improving their standards (! Table 14). Only the FWF claims that it adapts the 
members’ purchasing policies in such a way that suppliers can implement social 
standards (! CH 7.4.1). Both initiatives say that the skills of factory managers have to be 
improved and management systems need to be installed in the factories (! CH 7.4.2). 
Furthermore, both say they empower workers (! CH 7.4.3).  
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The FWF manual for members specifies that FWF members have to inform their own 
staff and suppliers about the FWF membership and the implications. Workers should be 
informed about the labour standards and the monitoring and remediation processes. 
Generally, companies should follow the recommendations of the corrective action plans 
and try to integrate them, but there are no fixed rules regarding what their duty is.   
The FWF argues that the buyers and the suppliers share a responsibility. Two of the 
five FWF principles65 are particularly relevant in this respect. The principle ‘supply chain 
responsibility’ commits the buyer to audit his suppliers and help implement corrective 
action plans (! CH 7.3). In addition, the principle claims that members must assure “that 
the terms of trade allow the manufacturer to implement the Code of Labour Practices” 
(FWF 2009c:3f), which is quite particular for the FWF, and not found in the BSCI or in 
other MSI in the garment industry. The ‘process approach’ defines that FWF members 
have to demonstrate that they make ‘sufficient effort’ and ‘work effectively’ to bring 
labour conditions up to the level of the CoC – but this is not further specified. The 
management system requirements and the recommendations of the management system 
audits verify the progress the members are making and their report specifies how the 
member must adapt their own policies and management system so “that effective 
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implementation of the Code of Labour Practice is possible” (FWF 2009c:12). Reasons for 
this include showing the sourcing policy, the monitoring programme and what is done to 
implement standards.  
The BSCI system rules very generally state that in their sourcing operations BSCI 
members shall “consider as a significant factor the extent to which they show steady 
improvement in their social compliance and a strong commitment to steadily advance 
toward full implementation” of the BSCI requirements (BSCI 2009c:7f). Rather recently 
the BSCI added a box on its website in which it explains the relevance of buyer training 
for sustainable sourcing practices.  
The BSCI also organises training sessions tailor-made for social compliance managers and buyers. 
Time and cost pressure can prevent suppliers from implementing the BSCI Code of Conduct. These 
seminars help to integrate the idea of the BSCI into daily business and decision-making processes, 
especially of those staff members who - like the buyers - have a close relationship with suppliers. The 
training sessions help buying organisations to avoid day to day friction and lead to a long term 
improvement of the quality and performance at competitive costs. (BSCI 2009a:10)66 
However, these considerations are not codified and specified anywhere in the BSCI 
system rules, as done with the management system requirements in the FWF. 
7.4.2 j1"$3(32"+3'*D&.89/'J3*7&8"*"7%8%*+&,C3$$,&&
The BSCI argues that the main problems of poor working conditions originate in the 
production countries, where factory managers are seen to have low management skills. 
Thus, the executive regulation in the BSCI system focuses on training and qualifying 
managers in the supply factories. Trainers and consultants offer different training courses, 
and the BSCI members and their suppliers agree on who pays the qualification courses, 
which is eventually not documented. The BSCI offers the following courses:  
• General awareness raising workshops are regularly and free of charge offered in the 
main markets to familiarize suppliers with the problems and the BSCI approach. 
They aim at suppliers who have not been audited.  
• Advanced training sessions that are often conducted after an audit free of charge. 
They aim to provide the suppliers’ management staff with skills that can be 
successfully used to fulfil the BSCI requirements, and they help to build a social 
management system.  
In the FWF the member and his suppliers have to agree on who pays for capacity 
building activities and other trainings.  
7.4.3 V89'<%/3*7&<'/C%/,&
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The BSCI and the FWF both say that workers have to be trained to know their rights. In 
the BSCI, worker trainings sessions aim to build the workers’ awareness about their 
social rights: 
The objective is to help them influence their own situation. These training sessions will focus on those 
issues where workers also have a responsibility to ensure good and safe working conditions. We will 
also pay particular attention to give recommendations on how to build a constructive dialogue within 
                                                      
66  http://www.bsci-eu.org/index.php?id=2027, 12.12.2009, 
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the company. (BSCI 2009a:10) 
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The BSCI rules of November 2009 claim for the first time that “a complaints mechanism 
is included in the BSCI monitoring system”67, as which the recently established BSCI 
representatives in India and China are regarded. But the rules do not determine in more 
detail how the mechanism functions.  
The FWF sets up a complaints mechanism in each country it operates, which “can be 
used by workers and their representatives to file complaints about their working 
conditions and the way the Code of Labour Practices is implemented in factories“, and 
which “offers additional opportunities for recourse and redress” (FWF 2009d; FWF 
2009b:12f). The mechanism works via local contact persons from the partner networks, 
who must have the trust of the workers, or better, of all parties involved (FWF 2008a:40). 
Complaints can be filed to the FWF directly or to the local complaints handler selected by 
the FWF, and if the complaint is justified, it will be followed up according to particular 
rules. The member company and the supplier will formulate a corrective action, in which 
the plaintiff will anonymously be involved. Finally, the outcomes of the proceedings are 
made public. 
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To sum up, the BSCI and the FWF define their members’ responsibilities very 
differently, and accordingly set different rules defining how the responsibility of their 
members is put into practice. I claim that these differences in rules emanate from the fact 
that the BSCI is a company-driven initiative, whereas various stakeholders, including the 
CCC, set the rules in the FWF.  
Chapters 8-10 examine the main contestations in more detail. From this analysis, the 
following issues have most potential for conflict:  
• Legislative regulation: Whereas in the BSCI business defines the rules, different 
stakeholders do this in the FWF. One result of this is that the BSCI demands 
members implement at least minimum wages in the factories, whereas the FWF 
demands living wages. Further, the BSCI regards the members as responsible only 
for their direct suppliers, whereas the FWF sets members’ responsibility throughout 
the whole garmenting chain. Finally, whereas the BSCI publishes aggregated 
information on audits, which cannot be used by the CCC to make single companies 
accountable, the FWF publishes detailed reports on single companies.  
• Judicial regulation: The main difference in the auditing approaches is that the BSCI 
uses third-party auditors to control the factories, whereas the FWF ‘verifies’ the 
audits conducted by the company or a third-party. The verification approach of the 
                                                      
67 Before the complaints mechanism was always announced. be set up within the BSCI monitoring system. Local round 
table discussions for interested parties will be established. These will serve as forums for discussion and the airing of any 
complaints arising from BSCI monitoring system activities. For complaints regarding certification to other standards (e.g. 
SA8000), the complaints mechanisms of the respective certification bodies are to be consulted. (BSCI 2007b:9) 
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FWF also audits the buyers to show whether they enable their suppliers to implement 
the standards.  
• Executive regulation: The FWF requires its members to modify purchasing policies, 
whereas the BSCI does not. Both demand that managers are qualified and that 
workers are empowered. The BSCI recently adapted a complaints mechanism.  
&
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Legislative regulation asks where the rules of a private regulation system come from and 
who is actually legitimized to decide upon rules in global production networks that 
connect many different actors who are embedded in various legal systems (! CH 3). The 
two types of private standard initiatives examined in the case studies – business-driven 
initiatives and multi-stakeholder initiatives – differ in the question ‘who sets the rules’ by 
definition. But how are these differences legitimized and contested?  
The CCC criticizes the BSCI for being company-driven without properly involving 
worker representatives and recommends that companies join a multi-stakeholder initiative 
in which companies and worker representatives share the decision-making power. 
Worker representation in legislative regulation is seen as relevant because this makes a 
private initiative more legitimate and credible. But who are these stakeholders and how 
should they participate? Chapter 8.1 analyses how these two questions are contested.  
In chapter 8.2, I show that the question of ‘who sets the rules for private regulation’ 
strongly influences which rules are set in the end, i.e., the defining differences between 
initiatives. To better understand how business actors and civil society actors legitimize 
differences regarding the setting of rules, this chapter examines, how one particular Code 
of Conduct is contested, namely wages. 
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The most contested questions between the BSCI and the FWF regarding the setting of 
rules are: Who sets the rules of a private standards initiative – and how? The main 
questions relate to how stakeholders are included in this process. 
8.1.1 Q='&81,+&0%(3*%&+=%&/1$%,&'(&9/3J"+%&3*3+3"+3J%,^&&
Principally, there is large consent that the participation of stakeholders in the setting of 
rules is important, and accordingly the BSCI and the FWF both argue that they engage 
stakeholders in these processes (! CH 7.2) (see also UN 2007b). The BSCI claims that it 
follows a ‘spirit of cooperation’, which includes dialogue and the ‘principle of fairness’68 
(BSCI 2007b:7). Similarly, the FWF argues that labour conditions can only be improved 
to the level of the ILO with the participation of stakeholders. The following quotes show 
that the BSCI, the FWF and the CCC all frame the participation of stakeholders as 
important:  
                                                      
68 The interests of those parties most affected by changes are kept in the foreground of any considerations and changes. 
(BSCI 2007b:7) 
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CCC: If the intended beneficiaries69 are not directly involved at all levels, including decision-making, 
real sustainable change will not be achieved. The recently published ETI impact assessment study 
also strongly supports the conclusion that NGOs and trade unions representing workers’ needs, need 
to be actively involved (not just ‘consulted’). (CCC 2007)  
FWF: FWF believes that labour conditions can only be brought up to the level of the ILO standards 
in cooperation with institutions and organisations that have a direct responsibility for, or impact and 
influence on the labour conditions and industrial relations in the respective country70. FWF therefore 
seeks to co-operate with these stakeholders in production countries and aims to strengthen the local 
legislative and institutional structures in the specific county.  
BSCI: The BSCI has conducted discussions with stakeholders since its launch in 2003. The exchange 
with governmental organizations, trade unions, business associations, NGOs, academia and others is 
important to include the experience and views from those who share our objective: the improvement 
of social compliance in supply chains. (BSCI 2009a:16) 
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It is argued that stakeholders provide credibility and legitimacy and the interaction with 
stakeholders can make legislative regulation more effective and more efficient.  
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The FWF creates its credibility, legitimacy and independence by stating that “all 
important organisations that are dealing with labour problems in low-wage countries” 
include stakeholders into the decision-making process. These are business associations, 
trade unions and NGOs, who are represented in the FWF Board – the decision-making 
body of the FWF – with equal voting power (! CH 7.2.1) (FWF 2008a:32; FWF 2009c).  
Together these organisations are framed to ‘guarantee independence’71 and “make sure 
that companies, who become member of FWF do not just do that to use the membership 
as a marketing tool” (FWF 2008a:34). A member supports this view on the FWF, arguing 
that the participation of NGOs provides credibility:  
Als Multistakeholder haben wir ja nun die NGOs mit im Boot. Also die unterliegen ja nun wirklich 
nicht der Gefahr der Käuflichkeit (B1).  
In addition, the FWF argues that the participation of stakeholders in the board when 
setting rules makes the whole initiative and its practice credible and legitimate:  
This broad participatory base in society gives FWF the credibility to perform its principal tasks, to 
verify whether affiliates and ambassadors effectively implement the Code of Labour Practices. (FWF 
2009c) 
This broad social base endows FWF with the legitimacy it requires to fulfill its tasks, making FWF a 
solid instrument by which members can undertake a socially responsible enterprise. (FWF 2008a:34) 
The FWF thus derives its legitimacy from the participation of company and worker 
representatives in its Board that many regard as representing the two opposing groups 
regarding labour-related issues. However, company representatives and NGOs from the 
production countries complain that they do not feel represented (! CH 8.1.3).  
                                                      
69 Workers and members of local communities, as the potential victims of human rights violations and as the intended 
beneficiaries of the whole process, are arguably the most important stakeholders and need to be involved at all levels and in 
all activities related to code implementation, if code implementation is to be successful and sustainable. (CCC 2007) 
70 These are: Business associations and manufacturers; Trade Unions and workers (company-level unions, union 
federations (sectoral unions) and confederations); NGOs that play important roles in civil society and can contribute to 
change in the field of labour, the position of women and communities; Governmental and semi-governmental organisations 
(labour inspectorate, ILO, chamber of commerce). 
71 ”Our independence is guaranteed by a board in which leading organisations have a seat. These are companies from the 
garment industry (Modint, Mitex), trade unions (FNV Bondgenoten, CNV) and NGOs (CSR Platform and Clean Clothes 
Campaign).” (FWF 2008e) 
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Although the BSCI argues that the involvement of stakeholders is important, the power of 
decision-making in the initiative clearly remains with the member companies. Some 
argue that the BSCI is clearly declared as a business initiative where companies take the 
decisions (B16), and one member admits that this could be seen as one-sided:  
Was sie auch von ... unseren Initiativen sagen, wir seien einseitig, was teilweise auch so ist, weil wir 
es auch ganz klar als ’business-driven’ deklarieren. (B23) 
Stakeholders are framed as useful for efficiency-oriented reasons, e.g., conducting 
dialogue, providing advice, highlighting another perspective on issues and starting 
projects. Members of the stakeholder board can make comments on the system, and these 
comments are taken into account (“finden Eingang”) in the discussions and decisions of 
the BSCI (Berzau 2008:161). Basically, instrumental benefits of stakeholder involvement 
are emphasized, and not the advantages from a more political or discursive perspective 
that aims at mutually agreeing on decisions:  
The efforts of the BSCI need the support of stakeholders to be efficient and sustainable (BSCI 
2009a:16) 
The BSCI takes the feedback of stakeholders into account in the various projects the system 
undertakes. (BSCI 2009a:16) 
Similarly the ‘constructive dialogue’ with civil society aims at anticipating criticism or 
winning ‘the support of societal groups’72. For instance, dialogue with politics is 
presented as successful in fending off mandatory rules in terms of corporate 
accountability:  
In order to demonstrate the engagement and motivation of European business, the BSCI invited – in 
cooperation with CSR Europe – Vladimir Spidla, European Commissioner for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Equal Opportunities to a meeting with senior representatives of BSCI members. During 
this occasion, Mr. Spidla pointed out that the Commission does not aim at new standards for social 
compliance. (BSCI 2009a:20) 
However, not only BSCI representatives but also other actors mention positive 
instrumental effects from including stakeholders. Both, the FWF and BSCI, emphasize 
that the interaction with stakeholders particularly in the production countries provides 
those who decide upon the rules with the local knowledge they need to effectively 
implement standards. This is seen as particularly important in the context of uncertainty 
and complexity in global supply chains: e.g. knowledge of the local context and taking 
into regard informal, flexible, and locally adapted solutions (FWF 2008d:22).  
Our experience teaches us that many social challenges can be better dealt with on the national level 
of a supplier country. Indeed local stakeholders have the necessary expertise about national laws and 
the respective political, cultural and economic environment to help finding concrete solutions. (BSCI 
2009a:16) 
Particularly tacit knowledge gained from the participation of stakeholders is seen as 
improving the efficiency of implementing standards. For instance, a representative of the 
FWF (2008d) argues that CSR departments in Europe cannot design activities ‘out of the 
blue’, but instead must work in the countries where the problems occur and include local 
stakeholders. For example, if rules are set, it is helpful to have good inside knowledge 
about what problems local groups and particularly workers interpret as relevant, what 
local laws already exist in the area to cover these problems, how cultural aspects could 
                                                      
72 http://csr-news.net/main/2009/10/20/bsci-stakeholder-meeting-auditierungsfreie-zukunft/, 1.2.2010 
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influence the implementation of the system etc. Local actors are seen as having a better 
knowledge on such issues than companies from Europe (FWF 2008a:32).  
In sum, whereas the FWF aims at achieving credibility and legitimacy by including 
stakeholders into the setting of the rules, the BSCI aims at credibility and legitimacy by 
having dialogue with stakeholders and by becoming more efficient.  
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Regarding legislative regulation, the CCC demands procedural transparency regarding the 
rules and the code (CCC-Merk 2008:5) and transparency regarding the companies’ 
supply chains. This transparency shall help make the companies accountable for the 
standards. However, transparency about how decisions in a standards initiative are taken 
– e.g. by publishing the meeting minutes to understand the arguments – is not seen as 
relevant, since minutes then might be formulated very softly (N22). According to the 
CCC, transparency shall rather be achieved by including the ‘relevant’ stakeholders.  
The BSCI argues “the system’s remarkable transparency” provides “the greatest 
possible internal and public credibility” (BSCI 2009c:2). The internal transparency refers 
to the supplier database, while the public transparency most likely refers to disclosure of 
general system rules and aggregated audit results (CH 7.2.4 & 9.1.2). However, since 
published information does not enable a verification of the system, the CCC criticizes the 
lack of transparency regarding the suppliers and audit results (! for audits: CH 9.1.2):  
BSCI ist nicht transparent: Die Namen der Lieferanten werden nicht genannt, Berichte über 
Auditergebnisse von einzelnen Fabriken werden nicht veröffentlicht (Burckhardt 2010) 
While the FWF focuses on making rules and procedures transparent, it also does not 
disclose information regarding the supply chain or audits. The FWF defends why more 
transparency is not regarded as necessary for reasons of legitimacy or credibility. First, 
the “balanced” composition of the FWF board “shall guarantee independent and objective 
verification” (FWF 2002: 3-2) (! CH 9.1.2). Second, too much transparency is regarded 
as problematic because the effectiveness is said to suffer from it, as, e.g., published 
reports are formulated more softly, and this way, the real problems might not be 
identified (FWF 2008b). The CCC criticizes the lacking transparency regarding supply 
chains, but not regarding audits in the FWF.  
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While BSCI and FWF both argue that it is important to involve stakeholders in legislative 
regulation and that they do so, the opinions strongly differ regarding the following 
questions: Which stakeholders should be involved in the setting of rules and how should 
they be involved? &
)/%03#$%&'/&$%73+38"2>&,+"C%='$0%/&9"/+3239"+3'*&&
The CCC and other NGOs particularly criticize that some business initiatives pay “lip 
service” to stakeholder involvement. In their view, few initiatives involve trade unions, 
NGOs or workers in “a meaningful way”, i.e., actively involving them and giving co-
responsibility instead of consulting (CCC 2007): &
The recently published ETI impact assessment study also strongly supports the conclusion that NGOs 
and trade unions representing workers’ needs, need to be actively involved (not just ‘consulted’). 
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There is a fundamental difference between being involved in an advisory capacity, or being 
consulted, and being co-responsible. (CCC 2007) 
What then is seen as meaningful participation? The CCC regards the FWF and other MSI 
as ‘credible’ because companies and stakeholders representing the workers work together 
and each group has an equal share of the votes in the setting of rules: ”Membership in a 
credible ‘multi-stakeholder initiative’ (MSIs) can also serve as a valuable step for 
companies in their efforts to improve their code compliance undertakings. These 
initiatives require that companies, unions, and NGOs work together to promote improved 
labour practices through codes and monitoring“ (Merk 2008:10).  
The CCC, in contrast, criticizes the BSCI for not involving ‘credible’ stakeholders in 
legislative regulation: “(The BSCI) has consciously decided against involving trade 
unions and credible NGOs, even at the project or advisory level” (CCC 2007)73, and 
criticizes that NGOs can merely consult companies in the BSCI. According to the CCC 
this neither provides credibility nor legitimacy, as the rules end up favouring companies 
(N22). The BSCI, in contrast, claims that the system is credible, because it is transparent 
and because it involves stakeholders in Europe and in the producing countries (BSCI 
2009c:2) (B16, B23).  
Vice versa, some BSCI members criticize that they do not feel represented in the FWF. 
Some argue geographically, saying that it is too much a Dutch initiative that does not 
represent their own (global) interests. Others claim that they do not trust the FWF. They 
fear that due to the proximity towards the CCC (arguing that both are situated in 
Amsterdam) the FWF could leak ‘secret’ business information to the CCC, which will 
then be used for campaigns against them (B4, B6). This again is vehemently denied by 
the FWF, who places a strong emphasis on their confidentiality (FWF 2008b). In 
addition, some companies fear that in multi-stakeholder initiatives they give away the 
decision-making power to some other party, whereas they themselves lose influence 
(B16). One BSCI member argues that companies should keep on deciding, because 
eventually they must take the responsibility for their decisions by implementing 
standards, while NGOs can have utopian or economically unrealistic demands, because 
they do not have to discharge responsibility: 
Wenn wir ein gemeinsames Ziel haben, dann müssen wir auch gemeinsam entscheiden und 
Verantwortung tragen können. Und das können wir in dem Fall (i.e. FWF) nicht. (B23) 
Wer übernimmt die Verantwortung? Das sind wir als Unternehmen. Die NGO als solche übernimmt 
jetzt zum Beispiel sehr wenig Verantwortung in einem solchen Prozess. (B23) 
Regarding the participation of the ‘right’ or ‘meaningful’ stakeholders, the BSCI argues 
that it has invited the CCC in 2004 to join the advisory board (today the stakeholder 
board), and in 2005 to take part in its annual stakeholder meeting. The CCC rejected both 
invitations to participate as a stakeholder, although it certainly would be a ‘right’ 
stakeholder to participate according to its own definition. Why did it reject participation 
as a stakeholder to the BSCI? It argues that it was not involved from the beginning and 
that its own participation in the stakeholder board might provide legitimacy to an 
organization that in overall it regards as inadequate: The CCC argues that the BSCI will 
                                                      
73 The critique applies to the beginning of the initiative, where NGOs were not integrated, but in 2007 the BSCI has 
constructed the stakeholder board on an advisory level. 
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never adequately contribute to ensuring respect for worker rights (Merk & Zeldenrust 
2005) (! CH 9 & 10). It questions the existence of the BSCI overall and suggests that 
BSCI members should rather join an existing MSI. A CCC representative says that there 
is no room for ‘real’ participation, e.g. workers are not participating and the members of 
the stakeholder board cannot make any changes to the BSCI system and rules, but can 
only give advice (N20). The CCC further questions whether the BSCI takes stakeholder 
participation seriously: Although the BSCI has been claiming that it wants to exchange 
ideas and receive feedback on the system through interaction with stakeholders, it did not 
provide any answer to a 20-pages feedback on the system by the CCC (CCC 2007). In a 
nutshell, the CCC indicates that the way the BSCI tries to set up its stakeholder 
participation is not backed with upright intentions, and as a campaigning organization it 
fears co-option. The following quote from a CCC letter to John Ruggie74 sums up this 
position:  
In our view, some type of formal representation for trade unions and NGOs in the governance 
structure of these initiatives is essential since the alternative, having corporations being solely 
responsible for the oversight, will ultimately mean that these initiatives will end as non-transparent, 
unaccountable, top-down structures. It will also mean that they can’t evolve in the same direction as 
the ‘soft law’ multi-stakeholder hybrids you describe in your report. (CCC 2007) 
In contrast to the CCC, two NGOs have joined the BSCI stakeholder board, namely the 
US-based Social Accountability International (SAI) and the Dutch Fair Trade NGO 
Solidaridad. Why do NGOs join the BSCI stakeholder board? SAI has been cooperating 
with the BSCI from the beginning, and its SA 8000 is BSCI ‘best practice’ and 
recommended to members. The other NGO argues that it is aware of criticism against the 
BSCI and its shortcomings. They want the initiative to implement a living wage and 
move towards multi-stakeholder cooperation. However, they emphasize that the BSCI 
also has positive impacts, and refer to the large amount of members and the fact that 
BSCI is conducting capacity building free of charge in the production countries (N23). 
The interviewee questions whether the approaches of the different private standard 
initiatives can be compared. He argues that while the FWF puts emphasis on the 
management systems of the brands, the BSCI focuses on the management systems on the 
supplier level. He regards both approaches as important and not as mutually exclusive. 
Also representatives of the FWF argue that the BSCI and the own initiative are not 
exclusive approaches. In contrast, the own audits could be conducted by the BSCI, 
whereas the FWF would verify the approaches of its member company. However, the 
CCC argues that in practice so far only one out of more than 500 companies has joined 
both initiatives, suggesting that this idea of combining is not practicable. BSCI members 
that were asked why they do not additionally join the FWF often replied that it was too 
costly and that they do not regard this as necessary as the BSCI did good work.75  
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Various NGOs claim that workers or their representatives from the producing countries 
should participate in private standards initiatives, also in the legislative regulation (CCC 
                                                      
74 At that time John Ruggie was the UN Special Representative for Human Rights & Business and conducted a 
comprehensive three-year study on how business can improve human rights.  
75 Telephone interviews with around 20 BSCI members (November 2009) 
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2007) (N5, N9a). However, so far local stakeholders from the production countries do not 
have decision-making power regarding the rules of the BSCI and the FWF, even though 
they are, on the one hand, the intended beneficiaries and, on the other hand, those that 
have to implement the standards. &
In the BSCI stakeholders from producing countries participate in a formalized way via 
dialogues at round tables (! CH 7.2). This way the BSCI claims to integrate ‘the right’ 
stakeholders, as various stakeholders “engage in a constructive dialogue on social issues 
while at the same time receiving input from the BSCI” (BSCI 2009a:17). According to 
BSCI members, the experience with the round tables supports BSCI’s overall argument 
that mainly local stakeholders in the production countries are responsible for taking 
‘action’ and implementing the standards (B16)76: 
Our experience teaches us that many social challenges can be better dealt with on the national level 
of a supplier country. Indeed local stakeholders have the necessary expertise about national laws and 
the respective political, cultural and economic environment to help finding concrete solutions. (BSCI 
2009a:16) 
Additionally, BSCI argues that the round tables motivate governments to look stricter 
into laws (BSCI 2009a:16f) and that the members of these round tables work on concrete 
projects to tackle supply chain problems directly. Projects inside factories are favoured, 
arguing that issues that are not directly connected to factories (e.g. supporting trade 
unions or pushing for higher minimum wages) should be done by local politics; the latter 
should be settled in a local dialogue between local stakeholders and the government. 
While the BSCI argues that the developing countries’ governments should deal with such 
issues, it partly engages in such discussions through the local round tables. However, 
when 12 large brands that are sourcing garments from Bangladesh wrote a letter to the 
Prime Minister urging her to set up a system that annually reviews wages, BSCI did not 
sign the letter.  
While the FWF claims to involve local stakeholders from the production countries in 
their partner networks in various activities, local stakeholders complain that they are not 
integrated properly. Stakeholders from the local partner networks are consulted regarding 
the FWF policies, they draft country reports, handle complaints and are involved in 
worker trainings. The networks are informal, which is regarded as advantageous. Due to 
the differences in the countries in which the FWF works there are no fixed rules by which 
FWF selects members for the partner networks. Instead, the verification staff talks to 
different international and local actors in each sourcing country in order to identify 
possible partners for the network (FWF 2008d:3f). When selecting these organisations a 
“guts-feeling” and a ‘trial-and-error process’ drive the selection. This way some projects 
were started with various potential local partners, whereas some partners were left 
disappointed. For instance, one local NGO claims that they want to start a campaign 
against some MSI like the FWF and the FLA, because they do not get anything in return 
for their efforts – neither gratitude nor projects (N5). In defence, the FWF argues that it 
has send a questionnaire to 15 partners in 10 countries in 2007, and most were not 
interested in participating: “Many partners from the South do not want to participate more 
strongly, because they do these tasks only alongside, and because they have limited 
                                                      
76 http://csr-news.net/main/2009/10/20/bsci-stakeholder-meeting-auditierungsfreie-zukunft/, 1.2.2010 
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resources – but there were also other answers” (FWF 2008b). Although the FWF claims 
that they do not exclude anyone, a selection of 15 partners in 10 countries certainly 
excludes many.  
In addition, the FWF argues that they need to work effectively with the local 
organisations, and says that they demand quite a lot from them. Commitment, flexibility, 
independence and particularly trust are seen as relevant in the networks: The FWF and 
the factory workers must be able to trust the local organizations that cooperate with the 
FWF (FWF 2002:5-2). For instance, they must be able “to do something for us before any 
formal contract is written” (FWF 2008d). The flexibility that is required in the business as 
issues may suddenly pop up and then quickly have to be managed, makes it more difficult 
to find partners that are willing to work with the FWF for a longer time on an ad hoc 
basis. As an interviewee illustrates: “You never know when the first complaint will arise, 
how many there will be, how long it will take to solve them” (FWF 2008d). The need for 
flexibility helps to select the partners that are ‘really committed’ and really interested in 
the issue and not just in funding. However, stakeholders are not allowed to be too 
committed, e.g. active in campaigning, because this would limit the FWF members’ trust 
(FWF 2008d). In summary, in line with the ‘developmental approach’ of the FWF, the 
process of finding local partners is not easy and regarded as a learning process of ‘mutual 
adaptation’, which rather takes place on the informal level in personal interaction and not 
in formal meetings between corporations and their stakeholders (FWF 2008d:20):  
Social dialogue doesn't happen at the formal negotiating table. It happens at the personal contacts 
and the negotiating table finalizes what has been done before. Is there no networking in which people 
interact, a formal negotiation will never get any results, which is the big difficulty in countries like 
India or Bangladesh that are so polarized that people will never informally deal with each other, 
unless they are trying to bribe each other. So these partner networks, we are still doing them, because 
I guess, we have to be very very patient. … they offer a possibility for groups to have a voice and to 
get into contact with others. (FWF 2008d:20) 
Having said this, the FWF has made the experience that local trade unions are little 
flexible in the cooperation (FWF 2008d):  
There are at least eight or nine recognised trade unions in Tirupur. And we told them, you always 
complain that the brands don't contact you, but you do not evolve. But you cannot expect them to 
contact eight or nine trade unions. So you should structure yourself and select at least three 
representatives that can then be the main contacts for the brands. And then you will see that brands 
will much easier be in contact with you. But they were never able to decide on that. They decided 
(laughs) there will be a representative committee with all of them. (FWF 2008d) 
Despite the efforts the FWF undertakes to look for the right local partners, some local 
NGOs criticize that they are not integrated properly, e.g. that they are not provided with 
important information (! also compare chapter 9.3). Accordingly, some NGOs from 
producing countries complain that they feel ‘used’ by the FWF because they have spent 
time on supporting the FWF, without seeing any impact or being included in projects 
(N5). However, due to the heterogeneity of opinions in the global context it is seen as 
difficult to find representatives of local communities that represent all workers in the 
legislative regulation of such an initiative and/or to agree on a common position, if the 
stakeholders are too diverse:  
Since the network will be a heterogeneous body, common positions may be difficult to define; 
moreover, since the network is not necessarily representative of local communities, common positions 
would have limited significance. (FWF 2002: 5-2f) 
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There is a large consensus regarding the claim that a private standards initiative can only 
be credible and effective if stakeholders are involved. However, particularly in the 
context of global production networks where stakeholders are embedded into totally 
different local contexts, it is by far not consensual which stakeholders are the right ones 
to involve into legislative regulation and how they should be involved meaningfully. I 
briefly sum up the most contested issues:  
• How do stakeholders participate in legislative regulation? Stakeholder 
participation in legislative regulation can be differentiated between formal 
participation in decision-making processes and informal participation in the form of 
consulting and networking. In both forms of participation trust plays an important 
role. The BSCI argues that informal participation of stakeholders makes the initiative 
more efficient and effective and that this creates credibility and legitimacy, while 
companies keep the decision-making power. The FWF formally includes 
stakeholders in the decisions, and argues that this form of participation creates 
credibility and legitimacy for the whole initiative.  
• Formal participation in decision-making can be seen as a more political concept of 
participation that can generate responsibility and accountability for implementing 
standards (! CH 3.1.4). Only in the FWF stakeholders from Europe participate 
formally in the decision-making process. The BSCI does not want to give 
stakeholders too much power, fearing this might generate too high demands from the 
member companies that are not compatible with the ‘economic reality’. A formal 
participation of stakeholders from production countries is seen as going too far for 
both initiatives.  
• Informal participation is more effectiveness- and efficiency-oriented 
‘consulting’/’giving advice’. It takes place in the FWF and the BSCI in Europe and in 
the production countries. In the eyes of most stakeholders it does not generate 
accountability. Informal participation aims at learning and generating knowledge 
regarding an efficient and successful implementation of standards. It is argued that 
this is useful to gain the locally available knowledge in order to more successfully 
implement standards – but without giving away the ‘steering wheel’ (! CH 3.1). 
Informal participation is partly formalized through a stakeholder board with concrete 
members or by round tables or local partner networks (e.g. BSCI). Even though this 
kind of stakeholder participation mainly aims at efficiency and effectiveness of 
standard implementation (BSCI & FWF), the BSCI also claims that it provides 
credibility and legitimacy – which is doubted by the CCC. Formalized informal 
participation can provide pragmatic or cognitive credibility – whereas it does not 
create a more political legitimacy. Interaction at ‘Round Tables’ is a very informal 
way of identifying relevant issues, the stakeholders from the FWF partner networks 
are also involved in formulating country studies, which are a benchmark for the 
audits that also involve local groups (! CH 9). Having said this, some stakeholders 
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from producing countries complain that they are not involved sufficiently in private 
standard initiatives (! CH 8.1.3).  
• Limitations: One main problem regarding the participation of stakeholders is seen in 
the heterogeneity and diversity of stakeholder viewpoints and in lacking trust. The 
business side, on the one hand, is sceptical to involve stakeholders representing the 
workers too much, fearing that they misuse the information or define rules that are 
seen as too idealistic and unrealistic from a company perspective. The FWF, 
however, also does not involve local NGOs that are too close to campaigns. Sceptical 
NGOs, on the other hand, want to decide upon the rules, fearing that companies alone 
decide on rules that only benefit the companies. Whereas the BSCI believes in a one-
size-fits-all approach to managing the problems, the FWF is rather conscious about 
the differences between firms and NGOs.  
• Transparency: Processes and rules are made transparent by both initiatives. The 
CCC demands that companies make their supply chains and their audit reports 
transparent, what neither the FWF nor the BSCI do for the public. However, the FWF 
argues that due to being a multi-stakeholder initiative these issues need not be 
transparent, because business and stakeholders agree on policy decisions regarding 
the rules. While the BSCI argues to be very transparent, it speaks of a different 
transparency than the CCC; one that is unlikely to generate accountability.  
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There is a larger discourse regarding the payment of wages in global supply chains. Two 
suggestions reflect the main opposing viewpoints: Most companies (including BSCI) 
argue that factories in developing countries should pay national legal minimum wages77 
(MW), whereas most civil society actors (including the CCC and FWF) claim that 
producers must pay living wages (LW) and that lead firms must take the responsibility to 
demand these (! CH 7.2.2). The following chapter presents the main arguments of both 
sides and points out why and how the wage issue is contested.  
8.2.1 h"+3'*"$&83*3818&<"7%,&J%/,1,&K$3J3*7&<"7%,N&&
Governments in producing countries set national minimum wages. The BSCI, its 
members and many suppliers argue that by paying these minimum wages they act 
according to the national laws that were set by democratically legitimized governments. 
Why should they be responsible for paying more, buyers and suppliers ask (S5, B18). 
One auditor explains how producers argue: “The government has decided this, it has 
decided everything. So, who are you to tell me that minimum wages is low?” (A1).  
Whereas many suppliers claim that the workers are happy with their wages, the BSCI 
(2009b) acknowledges that “in some developing countries, workers do not receive the 
minimum legal wage”, that the “minimum wage is often not enough to cover basic needs 
                                                      
77 Minimum wages are settled by the government, sometimes in a tripartite body with the participation of government, 
worker and industry representatives. In some areas the industry sets wages that are higher than the legal minimum wages. 
Some CoC demand that MW or industry wages shall be paid, whatever is higher.   
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of workers and their family”, and that this can have negative effects on the workers, e.g. 
cause overtime and child labour. However, the BSCI says that the national governments 
should deal with this problem and not the buying companies: “As a consequence, it 
(minimum wages) should be regularly revised by local governments to reflect the 
increase of cost of basic consumption products“ (BSCI 2009b). Similarly, a Tchibo 
representative argues in an open letter that national governments must adapt: 
Wie sollen einzelne Handelsunternehmen bei der Vielzahl ihrer Lieferanten sicherstellen, dass die – 
ohne gesetzliche Verpflichtung – auf ein Existenz sicherndes Niveau angehobenen Löhne auch 
tatsächlich an die Beschäftigten ausgezahlt werden … Die Lösung kann nach alldem nur darin 
liegen, dass die Mindestlöhne in Entwicklungsländern durch die nationalen Gesetzgeber auf eine 
Höhe festgelegt und regelmässig angepasst würden, die unter der Brücksichtigung örtlicher 
Verhältisse Existenz sichernd wären. (Tchibo 2008:5)  
The BSCI Code ”encourages” producers to adequately compensate the workers to meet 
their needs, and the BSCI recommends that suppliers with good compliance results shall 
get SA 8000 certified, which includes paying a living wage. In a nutshell, the BSCI and 
its members take responsibility by asking governments to settle the minimum wages high 
enough and asking suppliers to pay workers adequately.  
In Bangladesh in January 2010, 12 large brands and retailers (HM, Tesco, Walmart, 
Ikea, Nike etc.) urged the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheik Hasina, in a letter to 
urgently adapt the minimum wages to the increased costs of living. While two BSCI 
members signed the letter, the BSCI as a group did not sign it. The BSCI argues that it 
did not know about the letter78, despite its involvement through the round table.  
In contrast, the FWF, the CCC and other civil society groups and local consultants 
argue that legal minimum wages are too low and make it impossible for workers to live a 
decent life. They therefore demand that lead firms require so-called ‘living wages’ (A1, 
A3, TDS711)79. The Asian Floor Wage proposal sums the problem up as follows: “While 
most Asian governments set minimum wages, these typically fail to provide enough 
income to maintain a family of four above the nationally defined poverty level” (Merk 
2009:14). The CCC estimates that the legal or industrial minimum wages in most 
garment-producing countries are around half of a ‘typical’ estimate of a living wage and 
often do not suffice to nourish even one person (! CH 7.2)80. Not paying a living wage 
“amounts to a serious violation of basic human rights” (Labour Behind the Label 2006; 
Merk 2009)81: 
Unfortunately, many companies still refuse to seriously address the issue of a living wage, even if it is 
included in their code. This is unacceptable precisely because a living wage is a human right (Article 
23, paragraph 3 of Declaration of Human Rights) and production can never be ethical if workers 
cannot meet their most basic needs. (Merk 2008:8) 
Similarly, an auditor complains that minimum wages do not reflect the socio-economic 
reality into which the factories are embedded, as they do not consider that usually two or 
more people in one family have to live of one wage (A3). For example, women in many 
areas in South-Asia are not employed in a factory anymore once they are married or when 
                                                      
78 Personal communication with BSCI (April 2010)  
79 Interviewees in India argued this way, but particularly those in Bangladesh, where wages belong to the lowest worldwide 
(! CH 2.1) 
80 CCC 2009:30, http://www.labourbehindthelabel.org/campaigns/urgent/archive/41-bangladesh/128-how-low-can-you-go-
support-minimimum-wage-increase-in-bangladesh?start=1 
81 http://www.labourbehindthelabel.org/campaigns/urgent/archive/41-bangladesh/128-how-low-can-you-go-support-
minimimum-wage-increase-in-bangladesh?start=1 
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they become older than 30. Considering this, common calculations of a living wage 
should be based on a household of four people, the auditor argues. The problems of 
working women and families with low wages are often illustrated by presenting stories of 
particular workers. For instance, the textbox “Meet Neelam from India” (Merk 2009:17) 
in a publication by the Asian Floor Wage Campaign explains the financial situation of 
these women. 
Some claim that low minimum wages are a structural condition that results in further 
labour rights violations, which is similar to what Young presented as structural injustice 
(! CH 2.4). For instance, most local interviewees argue that workers will not work in a 
factory that does not allow them to work overtime (A2, A3, S4, S5, B20). If the wages 
would suffice, they claim, workers would voluntarily reduce overtime (A3, N2, N9): 
“The workforce wants overtime, because what you pay them for normal wages is not 
enough. It is as simple as that” (N2). Vice versa, producers who employ workers only for 
the regular eight working hours a day have experienced that the workers will continue 
working at a different factory after their regular shift; and they might not even come back 
if they prefer the working climate in the other factory, factory managers complain (A6, 
S6, S8, B20). Suppliers also present overtime as a bad option for their business, because 
overtime requires the payment of overtime wages, which are 100% higher than the 
normal pay in India. They therefore argue that they try to prevent overtime, but are 
confronted not only with the workers’ demands, but also with those of the buyers, who 
are often not willing to pay more, if the suppliers implemented living wages (S4). NGOs 
and auditors agree that workers want to work overtime, but stress that they do not do it 
voluntarily, but that the structures force them to do so.  
One major problem connected to living wages is who shall define it and how high shall 
they be. Stakeholders and members criticize that six years after the launch of the FWF, a 
wage ladder has not been published for India or Bangladesh (B26). Additionally, it is 
criticized that the FWF communicates that they aim at implementing living wages, 
whereas the practice of implementation is still far from the objective (N23): So far few 
members have implemented a living wage, and one FWF member argues quite modestly 
that the first step is to achieve the minimum wages, only then they try to implement a 
living wage82. So if hardly any FWF member is implementing living wages in its 
factories, what is the difference to codifying minimum wages as requirement into the 
Code of Conduct? The FWF claims that including a living wage in the Code of Conduct 
“means that buyers can (be made to) take responsibility for the consequences of their 
pricing policy and some counter pressure can be executed to the continuous pressures on 
suppliers to decrease prices“ (FWF 2009f). Furthermore it claims that the “FWF is in the 
process of substantiating its approach on payment of living wages. After further guidance 
has been developed for affiliates to move forward on this issue FWF will formulate 
additional recommendations with regard to this labour standard” (FWF 2009g). 
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82 Personal communication (FWF member 6.4.2009) 
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This chapter presents the struggles about the legal minimum wages in Bangladesh in 
2006 to highlight some backgrounds from the country and the arguments connected with 
nationally fixed minimum wages. Bangladesh is an interesting case because the countries’ 
economy is highly dependent on the export of cheap garments; therefore the local 
industry and the government prevent wages from being raised too much, usually referring 
to the need to be competitive.  
In 1994 the legal minimum wage in Bangladesh was set at 930 Tk ($14)83, and has not 
been increased until workers began striking at large scale in 2006. Mainly between May 
and October 2006 massive and partly violent struggles were fought about the national 
minimum wages. On the one hand were workers and their representatives, such as 
workers’ organizations (WO), trade unions (TU) and international organizations. On the 
other hand were factory owners, mainly represented by the Bangladesh Garment 
Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) and by some other industry 
associations in Bangladesh84 (TDS724)85. The demands of the two opposing groups 
strongly varied. According to The Daily Star the events and demands were as follows: 
Most of the time between May and October 2006 the workers and their representatives 
demand an increase of the legal minimum wages from 930 Tk to 3.000 Tk. Many threaten 
with strikes, if this is not fulfilled – whereas the factory owners offer 1.300 Tk at most86. 
The following examples illustrate the main arguments of worker representatives at the 
time of the struggles in 2006. Most arguments refer to the discrepancies between the poor 
workers and the rich factory owners:    
• Local trade unions and workers argue that the minimum wages are far too low to be 
able to survive, while factory owners are making enormous profits. 
• Labour behind the Label (LbL) says that whereas factory owners and international 
buyers have been profiting from the Ready Made Garments (RMG) industry, 
workers “subsidize” the growth of the industry and the profits of the owners. They 
conclude that minimum wages should rise (Labour Behind the Label 2006).  
• At a meeting of the communist party an invited economist says that owners enjoy the 
lion’s share of the profit from the RMG sector87, which has grown enormously since 
1994, when the minimum wage was set to 930 Tk (from US$ 1,5 Billion to US$ 7.04 
Billion).  
• Neil Kearney (General Secretary of the International Textile, Garment and Leather 
Workers' Federation at that time) argues that there is an enormous mismatch between 
the workers in poverty and the factory owners in wealth: “While local factory owners 
are living in palatial-style mansions and being driven around in the biggest and most 
                                                      
83 www.wechselkurs24.de calculated for the 1.4.2006 
84 For instance: BKMEA= Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association,  FBCCI= Federation of 
Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industries, BCI=Bangladesh Chamber of Industries  
85 TDS = The Daily Star, the main English speaking newspaper in Bangladesh. The number refers to the issue. The 
following issues were analysed for this chapter: TDS713, 717, 724, 729, 758, 764, 806, 807, 815, 817, 818, 819, 820, 834 
86  Tk 3000 will add up to 4.850 with house rent and other allowances according to TDS764.  
87  Prof. M M Akash, see: TDS731 
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stylish vehicles, the workers who produce the source of this wealth are living in 
poverty and are often denied the legal minimum wage of US$25”88.  
Between May and October 2006, the struggles about working standards and especially 
the MW in the RMG sector in Bangladesh continue with varying intensity. Some days the 
situation escalates and the police arrests demonstrators, e.g. when fire is set to factories, 
road blocks are set up, or cars and shops are violated.89 The Daily Star reports: “Black 
Tuesday for industry. RMG labour violence spreads to Dhaka; 1 killed; over 250 factories 
vandalized, scores torched; 200 vehicles ransacked; 100 injured”90. On May, 31st 2006 a 
tripartite Minimum Wage Board (MWB) is formed to recommend a new wages scale 
within 90 days. On October, 22nd the tripartite group agrees on a minimum wage of Tk 
1.662. This includes basic salary, house rent and other allowances for entry-level 
workers, and local worker representatives say that it accounts for Tk 1.110 only for the 
basic salary without benefits (TDS 850). The two workers’ representative on the MWB 
comment this agreement the following way (TDS 850): Nazma Akhter of the NAJAW 
Foundation91, who had rejected an earlier proposal in September and kept demanding Tk 
3.000, declares that 40 workers’ organizations behind her support the demand of Tk 
1650-1800. She concludes not to have any option but to accept the offer. Zafrul Hasan 
argues that the interests of the workers are not protected by the agreement, but that he 
finally accepts it, as otherwise there would be more uncertainty for the workers. Workers’ 
organizations that are not involved in the Minimum wages board reject the agreement. 
They still demand Tk 3000 and continue protesting without success92.  
In 2008, when Bangladesh was ruled by a military-backed regime, worker organizations 
again claim that the labour law has still not been implemented properly. Now they 
demand Tk 4.500 and criticize the total ban on trade union activities in the last 18 
months. In September 2008 RMG international buyers on the MFA Forum Bangladesh 
urge the government to “urgently convene the Minimum Wage Board for the RMG 
workers and introduce an annual review of their wage levels”. They “also called for 
lifting the restrictions on trade union activities invoked by the emergency power 
ordinance and implementing a framework for mature industrial relations based on 
tripartite agreements, ILO conventions and national labour laws”93. However, until May 
2010 wages have not been increased. In 2010 the labour wage committee was again 
called together to discuss the issue, and there were various demands from outside to raise 
the wages.  
8.2.3 e'<&$3J3*7&<"7%,&"/%&2'*+%,+%0&&
The following statements reflect a few central arguments by the different actors involved 
                                                      
88 F2F04082008 
89 Spiegel ONLINE, 23.05.2006, PROTESTE IN BANGLADESCH. Textilarbeiter zünden Fabriken an 
(http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,417813,00.html) 
90 TDS705; In the following I will more often refer to the Newpaper “The Daily Star Bangladesh” as TDS. The number 
expresses the number of the issue. See www.thedailystar.net 
91 NAJAW Foundation is a trade union in Bangladesh 
92 TDS832, 841, 842, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 853, 858 
93 http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=43306 (2008-06-29) (TDS2008-09-17) 
http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=55145 
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about why living wages are not demanded or implemented:  
• So far most factories do not pay minimum wages – once this level is achieved, living 
wages can be demanded; 
• Buyers have no power to demand the payment of living wages; 
• There is no accepted definition of living wages; 
• The global competition does not allow implementing living wages.  
These arguments and how they are criticized are presented below.  
Q%&(3/,+&*%%0&+'&"2=3%J%&83*3818&<"7%,&#%('/%&<%&,+/3J%&('/&$3J3*7&<"7%,&
Many argue that it is already difficult to assure that suppliers pay legal minimum wages, 
and some conclude that this makes living wages too high a target.  
There are many examples that workers are underpaid. One auditor, for instance, 
complains that employers subtract money from the wages if targets are not met, even 
though this is illegal (A3). Another auditor criticizes that apprentices get less money than 
learned employers, and often this is lower than the minimum wage94. One auditor 
mentions that the whole concept of a minimum wage doesn’t make much sense if 
companies employ an ‘apprentice’ and pay him 70% of the minimum wage, or if 
employers extend training periods longer than they should – he suggests that factory 
owners are looking for ways to reduce costs (A5). So the local implementation of 
minimum rules is often to fulfil this rule. Before this background, a BSCI member argues 
that a lot is achieved if all suppliers paid minimum wages, and therefore obliging them to 
implement living wages is striving for too much (B16). The situation of migrant workers 
aggravates the wage-related problems, because they often accept very low wages or other 
ways of payment (compare Box 9).  
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Companies that do not pay living wages also justify their practices by referring to the fact 
that there is so far no agreement on the height of living wages. One month after the Asian 
Floor Wage campaign was launched, the BSCI stated a ‘BSCI position on wages’ (BSCI 
2009b) in which it writes that so far no “universally-accepted definition of living wages” 
has been accepted: “Things become more complicated when trying to define how a living 
wage should be calculated, what the size of an average family is, and how much 
discretionary income is needed. Many definitions, approaches and methodologies have 
emerged over the last decade but none is accepted with unanimity” (BSCI 2009b). 
Similarly the FLA claims that they refrain from using living wages because they are 
concerned about definition, measurement and monitoring of living wages (MSN April 
2008:5f).  
Indeed, the question, what is a living wage, is heavily contested, and this is why many 
actors that support a definition of living wages agree on the wage ladder approach. But 
even with this wage ladder approach it seems difficult to define what constitutes a 
minimum wage, as in the case of the FWF (! CH 7). Due to these problems the British 
NGO Labour behind the Label (2006)95 urges that companies shall not take such 
problems as an excuse not to implement a living wage. Also, the argument by the BSCI 
that no living wage is accepted with unanimity seems like an excuse, considering that it 
also recommends ‘good’ suppliers to get SA 8000 certified, in which a definition of a 
living wage is used. The FWF argues that due to the lack of a generally acknowledged 
definition of living wages, this standard “can only be an aim which we try to achieve with 
our members” (FWF 2008c).  
The CCC proposes two different ways of how decent wages should be fixed. One is 
“good faith negotiations and collective bargaining between workers and employers within 
a mature system of industrial relations” (Hearson 2009) – i.e., a form of input legitimacy. 
The second is to base the wages on the basic needs (Merk 2009). In the ideal form both 
systems are combined. However, the CCC does not specify how this ‘mature system of 
industrial relations’ and the ‘good faith negotiations’ should look like. For instance in 
Bangladesh, a tripartite body of government, worker representatives, and employer 
representatives negotiated the legal minimum wages. Formally the constellation should 
be a basis for ‘good faith negotiations’. However, the CCC member Labour behind the 
Label (2006) criticized the resulting wages for being below 1$ a day, i.e. workers are in 
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http://www.labourbehindthelabel.org/background/rights/living-wages (10.3.2010) 
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absolute poverty. This problem seems to be particularly large in Bangladesh, since some 
worker representatives complain that the government cannot be the legitimate body to set 
minimum wages96, some worker organizations demand a reform of the minimum wage 
board, since it did not manage to bring about the ‘necessary’ changes.  
M%++3*7&+=/'17=&$3J3*7&<"7%,&/%[13/%,&9'<%/&3*&+=%&,199$>&2="3*&
Some buyers in Europe, who are proponents of minimum wages, argue that they alone 
have no or only little influence on the wages in a producing country, and thus cannot 
demand other wages (B18, B22, B24) (Tchibo 2008). Similarly, the ETI argues that 
“retailers cannot improve the wages of workers in far-off countries on their own”.97 This 
is maybe reflected in the practice – although the ETI, FWF and the WRC follow a living 
wage approach, many argue that it is difficult to implement it and that so far there has not 
been much progress.  
Realizing these difficulties, some local NGOs do not understand why buyers do not 
come together and put pressure on the local industry association to raise the minimum 
wages, what they see is possible, if the buyers wanted it (N2, N3). They criticize that 
buyers say they have little power in the supply chain as a tactical argument, knowing that 
no one would make the first step, because they fear the costs.  
Having said this, a typical argument of the CCC is that introducing living wages does 
not cost much, because the labour costs are only a small part of garment production (see 
below). The FWF proposes that individual solutions need to be found with each company 
when paying living wages – for instance, a buyer could transfer the differential to a living 
wage for each T-Shirt to a bank account from which the workers are paid directly (FWF 
2009e).  
!=%&7$'#"$&2'89%+3+3'*&8"C%,&3+&389',,3#$%&+'&3*2/%",%&<"7%,&
Buyers, producers and governments argue that the global competition and the flexibility 
in sourcing makes it impossible to set or pay living wages – particularly because various 
actors fear the ‘threat of capital relocation’: “The persistent threat of relocation has 
become a powerful tool to prevent workers from organising unions and demanding 
decent wages“ (Merk 2009:30) (! CH 10.1). Governments fear that buyers might source 
from another country, if the wages in the country are too high – thus the CCC argues that 
they set the wages according to the needs of the companies instead of the needs of the 
workers (Hearson 2009): “As a result, governments seek to lure business by offering tax 
reductions, exemptions from national labour laws, or freezes in the legal minimum wage” 
(Merk 2009:30). Similarly producers fear that they cannot meet the buyers’ price 
demands, if they pay living wages, and that buyers might relocate their orders to a 
cheaper factory, if they demand a higher price. And finally brands fear that customers 
might move to other shops and brands, if they get too expensive, e.g. because they 
introduce living wages (B22, B23b).  
The problem can be regarded as a collective action problem in a situation of ‘shared 
responsibility’ between suppliers/producers, buyers/retailers and customers in the supply 
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97 http://www.ethicaltrade.org/Z/lib/2007/09/living-wage-eti/index.shtml 
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chain (! CH 2.4). Basically, if workers shall receive higher salaries, this money has to 
come from somewhere, i.e. customers, buyers or producers. In a competitive situation no 
one is willing to pay more. The BSCI uses this dilemma – what it calls “no clear 
responsibility to pay the living wage” – in a strategy to justify their agreement on 
minimum wages. Below, I examine the arguments of buyers and producers in more 
detail.  
BSCI members and some other companies argue that it is impossible to pay increasing 
wages in a tough competition, when competitors do not pay living wages, as it would 
endanger their international competitiveness. The quote by Tchibo can be seen as 
representative for many other companies:  
In einem knallharten Wettbewerb um die besten Preise lassen sich diese Kalkulationsmehrkosten 
auch nicht einfach an die Endverbraucherinnen und Endverbraucher weitergeben, jedenfalls dann 
nicht, wenn Wettbewerber ein vergleichbares Produkt ohne entsprechende Mehrkosten im 
Wareneinstand und schon allein deshalb günstiger anbieten können. (Tchibo 2008:5) 
The FLA supports this argument, and its president argues that wages cannot be 
calculated, but that the ‘business realities’ – i.e. competition – have to be taken into 
account:  
I am personally opposed to a ‘living wage level’ arrived at through research, since it completely 
ignores the factors that collective bargaining takes into account such as the ability to pay based on 
prevailing business conditions. (MSN quoting FLA’s president van Heerden 2008) 
The consequence of this claim is that human rights have to be adapted to the prevailing 
business conditions, which runs counter the original idea of human rights. The CCC 
argues that the producers’ ability to pay workers also depends on how much buyers pay 
for their products, whereas others refer to the productivity of the factory (! CH 10).  
How do producers argue? To understand the producers’ perspective, it is necessary to 
note that the wages are often by far the highest running costs a factory has to pay. A 
factory in Bangladesh with 1.000 workers paying a low 2.500 Tk per worker/month that 
wants to implement a living wage suddenly has to pay double costs in average. This 
increases his monthly costs by 2,5 Mio Tk (26.000 Euro). There are three possibilities 
where this money can come from, if living wages are paid to workers: (1) Producers cut 
their own profits, (2) producers cut their own profits, but at the same time try to increase 
the own productivity to again increase his profits, (3) buyers pay a higher price for the 
products.  
Many producers argue that in case the national minimum wages are increased to a level 
of living wages orders will move to other countries, where no living wages are paid, with 
adverse effects on the garment sector in the whole country. In Bangladesh the industry 
has tried to defend its position by painting a threatening picture regarding the future of 
the country with even more adverse effects on the workers. In the debate regarding the 
national minimum wages in 2006, factory owners in Bangladesh argue that “the garment 
sector should be kept ‘above politics’ and the recent situation in the sector should be 
judged from a realistic point of view” (TDS 724). Factory owners have threatened that 
the competitiveness of the whole Bangladeshi RMG industry will suffer, if the national 
minimum wages are increased too much. Before accepting the MW of Tk 1.662, they had 
argued that wages could not be raised to more than Tk 1.300, and that up to 70% factories 
will need to close down, if minimum wages were set at the level of the workers’ demands 
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of 3.000 Tk (TDS 713, 722, 782). The President of a business association warns of saving 
RMG from ‘ruination’ and the President of a second association even argues that the 
entire economy will collapse “if a minimum wage is fixed in the present competitive 
business atmosphere”. In the context of the international competitiveness owners present 
the dropping of quota to China as a major problem, and envision the dropping of all quota 
as a major problem to Bangladesh: “Put forth our post MFA phase-out competitive 
scenario that has reduced us all to a state of complete and open competition that demands 
the absolute minimum” (TDS815, 722). Similarly the BGMEA President says that he 
does not question the ‘rationale’ behind the workers’ arguments, but regards too much 
increase as not realistic, if the industry shall survive (TDS 815). All arguments are linked 
to the relevance of the RMG sector to the whole Bangladeshi economy – around 80% of 
export earnings are from the RMG-sector – and a picture of the economy breaking 
together as an effect of too much rise is created:  
There will be a multifaceted effect in the society with over two million workers losing their jobs and 
all the related industries and business sectors like bank, insurance, transport, accessories, and ports 
facing a debacle. (TDS724) 
The BGMEA President further argues that factory owners in his industry have a hard life 
and do not earn much (TDS 815): “the truth is that a factory today normally does not earn 
even 3-4% as net profit” – this claim stands in stark contrast to what others say. He is 
particularly concerned whether the 30% factories that survive on subcontracting can stand 
an increase in minimum wages. In addition, BGMEA and BKMEA say that increasing 
the minimum wages would lead to increasing all other wages, which would again lead to 
problems regarding global competition.  
Producers blame workers, the government and buyers as causing the problem. 
Regarding workers, they argue that if workers concentrate on their job, and not on 
demonstrations, they can rise to Tk 10.000 within 6 or 7 years (TDS 722, 724). Regarding 
the government, it is criticized that it does not provide institutions “to breed and groom 
operators”, to make production lines more efficient. For that reason approximately 20% 
helpers have to learn up to 12 months in a factory to become an operator. Finally, factory 
owners complain about international buyers’ purchasing practices and demand ethical 
buying practices, particularly the payment of higher prices98 (! CH 10).  
Particularly NGOs, but also consultants/auditors have replied to the problems producers 
and buyers claim with the following suggestions: On one side, mainly NGOs argue that 
wages only amount to a small percentage of the final price, and that they should be 
increased, maybe by raising all wages in the Asian garment industries (i.e. the ‘Asian 
Floor Wage’ proposal). On the other hand, mainly the BSCI and consultants propose to 
increase the productivity in factories. 
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NGOs argue that the wages contribute to only a very small percentage to the retail price 
of a product. If a sneaker costs 100 Euro, the workers’ wages would amount to 0,40 Euro, 
whereas the brand gains 33 Euro. The CCC (! Figure 11) claims that consumers would 
be willing to pay the additional money for a shoe, if they knew about the low wages, and 
                                                      
98 http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=43306 (2008-06-29) (TDS815) 
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if this would guarantee that workers’ wages were doubled (N23). The CCC has also 
calculated that it takes 11 minutes to sew a T-shirt, which ends up at around 0,10 Cents99 
for a T-Shirt if living wages are paid (N23).  
Companies have countered this calculation by arguing that any increase in costs of 
production – whether they originate in social, environmental or other changes – raises the 
selling prices by more than just the increase in production costs, due to multiplying 
effects in the supply chain (B1). These multiplier effects are the more problematic, as the 
companies are in a competitive situation in which customers might walk off to some 
competitor, if the prices increase too much (! for more compare CH 10.1).  
The local organizations that have started the ‘Asian Floor Wages’ campaign argue that 
the excuse regarding competitiveness becomes invalid, if the increase of wages is not a 
matter of competition anymore. This would happen if the minimum wages in all Asian 
production countries would be raised at the same time. However, this addresses the 
governments and not the companies.  
 
Figure 11: Who gets the 100 Euro for my sneaker? (Source: Clean Clothes Campaign) 
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Mainly the BSCI and consultants argue that higher wages need not threaten the 
competitiveness of a whole nation and suggest that increasing wages can remain cost-
neutral, if they are financed through gains in productivity in the factory and therefore lead 
firms need not increase the prices they pay to their suppliers (A4, A8, TDS 722) (! CH 
10.3). Some claim that low minimum wages are also responsible for low product quality 
and that there is a business case for paying higher wages (N7, B20). Finally, some 
suppliers in Tirupur argue that they pay higher wages to keep the labour turnover – and 
therefore costs – low (S8, S10).  
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99 Calculation: 10.000 Taka living wage in Bangladesh = 62 Taka per hour = 7 Taka per 11 Minutes 
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The chapter has pointed out the following main struggles around living wages and legal 
minimum wages. These struggles are not only valid in Bangladesh, though the very low 
minimum wages and the countries’ strong dependence on exports may make them more 
extreme there:  
• Governments are responsible for setting decent wages: Those actors arguing that 
they want to pay a national minimum wage frame the government as responsible for 
setting the right wages. They also argue that it is the legitimate body to do so. If 
wages are too low, the government must increase them. Whereas some lobby the 
government to increase wages, others do not. This view does not take into 
consideration the adverse effects of global competition that motivate states and 
companies to pay low wages.  
• Companies share a responsibility for decent wages: Those demanding a living 
wage argue that national minimum wages are not necessarily set according to the 
needs of people, but in a way that is influenced by global competition. They accept 
the existence of structural injustice. In this view, competition and the threat of 
relocation influence corporate actors and governments in their decisions fixing low 
minimum wages. The example of Bangladesh shows that even if the wages are 
deliberated on a national level, those who are more powerful decide; and these are 
usually not the workers. Producers in Bangladesh, e.g., demand that the economy 
should come before politics, because politics prevent the growth of the economy. 
• Business reality vs. worker reality: Whereas those demanding minimum wages 
claim that living wages do not reflect the business reality, those demanding living 
wages claim that minimum wages do not reflect the daily reality of the workers.  
• Shared responsibility vs. delegated responsibility: The payment of wages in global 
production networks can be seen as a question of shared responsibility between 
producers, brands/retailers and consumers, and the action to improve these wages is 
connected to problems of collective actions (! CH 2.4): each actor must be willing 
to pay more. However, each actor argues that he is not the only one responsible for 
increasing the wages, but that this responsibility is shared between the consumers, the 
buyers, the producers and the governments. However, in a competitive situation no 
one dares to increase wage, if competitors do not join. There is a collective action 
problem. This problem recently led to the ‘Asian Floor Wages’ campaign to demand 
that all Asian countries should increase their wages at the same time in order to avoid 
particular buyers moving to another Asian country that does not increase its wages.  
• Input and output legitimacy: There seems to be a contradiction between input and 
output legitimacy: even if the negotiations get the seemingly ‘right’ groups to the 
table, the result can still not be legitimate, as in the Bangladesh case. This is most 
likely the case because of power relations between the agents, where those who 
argue that higher wages reduce the competitive position, have more say. 
• Arguments against living wages: While NGOs claim that paying only minimum 
wages often violates human rights and that companies must make sure that producers 
pay living wages, the following arguments are presented against the demand that lead 
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firms fix living wages: Factories are far from paying minimum wages, therefore these 
should first be achieved; there is no universally-accepted definition of living wages; 
lead firms do not have the power to ensure that producers pay living wages; wages 
cannot be increased in global competition. According to the latter argument, the 
economic competition in GPN has created a kind of post-political situation in which 
the open deliberation of issues such as wages is less important than the economic 
sustainability of an industry. 
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This chapter analysed how different actors in a global production network construct or 
deconstruct the legitimacy of legislative regulation in private standards initiatives, which 
I sum up in the following question: How and by whom must rules for companies 
operating in global production networks be set? Since the concept of legitimacy in 
global production networks is socially constructed and no global truth regarding this issue 
can be determined, various scholars argue that private standards initiatives must be 
legitimized by “engaging vis-à-vis the public by engaging in public discussion” or 
deliberation with the relevant stakeholders concerned by the rules (Palazzo & Scherer 
2008:774). In this context, questions like ‘which stakeholders participate?’ and ‘how 
transparent are the processes?’ are of relevance (! CH 3) (Dingwerth 2007). But the 
theoretical ideas presented in chapter 3 do not reflect in more detail how deliberation 
must work and particularly which stakeholder must participate so that private standards 
initiatives gain legitimacy. I empirically analysed in this chapter how different actors 
discursively frame this need.  
The two case studies FWF and BSCI obviously differ regarding their stakeholder 
participation in their legislative regulation approaches by definition, as one is a multi-
stakeholder initiative and the other a business initiative (! CH 6). Basically, both 
initiatives refer to the ‘territorial embededdness’ of global production networks, i.e. that 
corporate practices and their production networks are ‘anchored’ in particular places. 
Both use this embeddedness to argue that stakeholders from multiple locations must be 
included into the legislative regulation (network embeddedness), and both do include 
stakeholders. The FWF and supporters argue that as a multi-stakeholder approach they 
include company and worker representatives in the decision-making board, and this 
makes the whole approach legitimate/credible. Additionally, legitimacy is framed by 
involving stakeholders in the producing countries through the production networks. The 
BSCI and members claim that as a business initiative they do not have to integrate any 
stakeholders into the decision-making, however, the dialogue with stakeholders in Europe 
and in the producing countries is said to be important. Additionally, both initiatives also 
argue that they are transparent. Hence, can the legislative regulation of both initiatives be 
regarded as legitimate or credible?  
Based on CSR concepts presented in chapter 3.1.4, I suggest that the BSCI is 
legitimated within the ‘positivist CSR’ framework, i.e., corporations are seen as de-
politicized actors that only symbolically engage in discourses. Pragmatic legitimacy is at 
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use here. In contrast, the FWF is legitimated within the ‘political CSR’ framework, i.e., 
corporations can be seen as political actors who must legitimate their practices by 
engaging in public discourses. This framework draws on pragmatic and moral/discursive 
legitimacy. 
The BSCI constructs pragmatic legitimacy (! CH 3.1.4, Box 2) by engaging in 
stakeholder dialogues in Europe and in the production countries, but not by engaging 
them strongly. It presents how the different stakeholders (positively) evaluate the 
initiative and positively frame the initiative’s efficiency and effectiveness. However, 
stakeholders have no decision-making power in the BSCI. This lack of power of civil 
society agents can be seen in terms of pragmatic legitimacy, as member companies 
support the idea that they – and not NGOs – keep the decision-making power. Reasons 
given were that they – and not the NGOs – have to take the responsibility for 
implementing the standards in the end. BSCI and its members strongly argue that 
competition in global markets (institutional embeddedness) does not ‘realistically’ allow, 
e.g., the implementation of living wages, what NGOs – if they had the deciding power – 
would force them to do. Such arguments follow the concepts of pragmatic and cognitive 
legitimacy (! CH 3.1.4, Box 2) and thus reflect the ‘positivist’ CSR framework. 
‘Positivist’ CSR refers to the concept of liberal democracy where governments make 
rules, which companies have to follow. Arguments presented about why the BSCI 
implements national minimum wages also follow the positivist CSR framework. While 
members and governments might be key stakeholders, who provide pragmatic legitimacy 
to the BSCI, the CCC should also provide pragmatic legitimacy as a key stakeholder. The 
attempt to involve the CCC into the ‘Stakeholder Board’ failed, because this board is not 
connected to decision-making power.  
In contrast, the FWF has mainly constructed pragmatic legitimacy by involving the 
CCC and trade unions into the policy-making, but the FWF has not managed to gain 
pragmatic legitimacy by all companies. For instance, some BSCI members or some 
companies that are not members of a private standards initiative argue that they do not 
see the additional benefit in joining the FWF. In addition, interviews with local NGOs in 
the producing countries suggest that both initiatives have failed to gain pragmatic 
legitimacy with some local stakeholders, as they are fully excluded.  
Palazzo & Scherer (! CH 3.1.4) argue that organizations must gain (moral) legitimacy 
by ‘explicit public discussion’ or a ‘deliberate discourse’ – instead of using symbolic or 
strategic activities and manipulating and persuading opponents. Young argues that 
companies must discharge their responsibility through collective action (! CH 2.4). 
However, both leave open, how exactly collective action in form of public discourses 
shall be constructed in order to create legitimacy. The empirical analysis shows two 
different approaches to realizing ‘explicit public discussion’ on what rules companies 
should follow. I suggest that the approach of the BSCI creates pragmatic legitimacy but 
not moral/discursive legitimacy, while the FWF approach creates a more political form of 
CSR as it has the potential to gain moral/discursive legitimacy. However, the FWF 
approach also has its limitations.  
Although the BSCI does not integrate any stakeholders in the decision-making it 
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strongly frames the participation of stakeholders in terms of creating legitimacy. For 
instance, it argues that local stakeholders participate in order to gain their local 
knowledge and to make the initiative more effective. The round tables would reflect a 
relatively large scope of participation. However, interviewees from developing countries 
did not regard the interaction as particularly empowering. The quality of participation is 
therefore low (! CH 3.3.2). Findings show that the stakeholders are participating on the 
one hand, to make the initiative more effective, and on the other hand, for symbolical 
reasons. Whereas this does construct pragmatic legitimacy, it does not construct 
moral/discursive legitimacy in the eyes of most civil society stakeholders, since the 
results of a deliberation would entail that the better arguments win and that all 
participants can agree on the achieved result. However, the empirical analysis indicates 
that the CCC is not happy with the outcome of the BSCI, i.e., it does not achieve the level 
of deliberation required for moral/discursive legitimacy. Also the fact that the BSCI did 
not respond to critique by the CCC and that it does not give decision-making power to 
stakeholders reflects that we cannot speak of deliberation in a sense that the better 
argument wins.  
The FWF approach sets its rules in a deliberative discourse amongst a limited 
community of experts, which might provide moral/discursive legitimacy. The decision-
making in the FWF board is limited to a small group of experts, which could be seen as 
‘true’/empowering participation (! CH 3.3.2). The results of the decisions are made 
explicit, but not the way in which a decision was produced (i.e., it neglects power 
relations between the members on the board). In conclusion, whether the FWF generates 
‘procedural legitimacy’ depends on which audience we are looking at. The FWF, its 
members, the CCC and some other civil society actors argue that the FWF uses ‘sound 
practices’ and provide moral (procedural) legitimacy. However, some companies that are 
not members in the FWF and some local NGOs in producing countries criticize that the 
participation in the FWF does not represent their interests. The scope of participation is 
therefore questioned (! CH 3.3.2) The FWF counters claims of the local NGOs with the 
argument that they cannot include all NGOs. But the critique points to the fact that 
‘multi-stakeholder’ is not per se morally more legitimate if it does not recognise which 
actors participate and how they participate. Regarding the promises of the FWF that 
living wages are included, member companies and also NGOs are missing concrete 
measures of the living wages – hence: it is questionable how transparent an initiative 
must be to gain moral legitimacy.  
In conclusion, the way the FWF integrates stakeholders into legislative regulation 
comes closer to a deliberative arena than the way the BSCI integrates stakeholders. 
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As part of their corporate responsibility practices, brands and retailers that are members 
in the BSCI or FWF contractually demand from their suppliers in developing countries 
that they comply with certain social standards (! CH 7.2 & 8). The BSCI and FWF rules 
further demand from their members to test how the supply factories comply with the 
social standards by conducting social audits (! CH 7.3). Social audits are seen as 
necessary in order to prove that the suppliers make progress in implementing the 
standards. The audits are seen as part of the judicial regulation: “the means through which 
business responsibility is made practical” (Tallontire 2007:786).  
However, academics, social movements, suppliers and also auditors criticize social 
auditing practices for not being credible and effective (! CH 3.2.2 & 3.3). The CCC in 
particular criticizes the audit approach of the BSCI (! compare Box 10). The lacking 
credibility of social audits can endanger the legitimacy of a private standards initiative 
and of the member company implementing the CSR practices. Therefore it is of central 
importance for the BSCI, the FWF, and their member companies that their stakeholders 
regard their social audits as credible and effective.  
As there are conflicting opinions regarding social auditing this chapter focuses on the 
following question: What do various actors regard as ‘good’/’bad’ social auditing 
practices, and what arguments do they use to substantiate their claims? The results 
of this chapter do not tell us which audit approaches are de-facto good or bad. They rather 
highlight main struggles around the credibility and effectiveness of social auditing and 
examine the arguments presented by the BSCI, the FWF, their supporters, and the 
stakeholders criticizing these practices. And pointing out the mainly contested issues and 
the arguments, however, might help to draw some recommendations regarding good 
social audit practices and its limitations on the discursive basis of the ‘better’ arguments.  
The following four broader issues reflect the mainly contested issues (compare: Box 10).  
• Independence and transparency of social audits (! CH 9.1) 
• Quality of social audits (! CH 9.2) 
• Participation of local stakeholders in audits (! CH 9.3) 
• Costs and responsibility (! CH 9.4) 
Each chapter presents and discusses different viewpoints and finally sums up the main 
conflicts.  
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In this chapter I discuss two concepts that are mainly contested with regard to the 
credibility of audits, namely the independence of auditors (! CH 9.1.1) and the 
transparency of audits and their results (! CH 9.1.2).  
9.1.1 .*0%9%*0%*2%&'(&"103+'/,&&
Independent auditors create trust in the results they provide (! CH 3.2.2). The CCC 
demands that auditors must be financially and personally independent of the company 
whose claims it controls, which the FWF tries to achieve with verification audits. The 
position of the BSCI is that third-party auditors are independent because they use 
standardized and ‘objective’ methods of high quality. In this view trust is generated by 
assuming that auditors are neutral.  
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The CCC claims that audits conducted by ‘professional’ for-profit audit firms have a 
built-in bias and credibility problem and cannot be seen as fully independent: Audits 
“must be performed by organisations or individuals that are independent of the 
enterprises or organisations whose claims are being verified” (Pruett 2005:59f,84). The 
CCC defines independence in financial terms: An audit is not seen as independent if a 
buyer or a factory pays him (Pruett 2005:59f,84). Particularly civil society actors support 
this view: A local NGO, for example argues that auditors do not look properly into 
certain issues, because they are dependent on the company paying them and are afraid 
that they might not get another assignment if their results are not biased (N9b). Vice 
versa, a local NGO auditor says that his own audits are credible because they are doing 
audits “not for money purpose, but for the social purpose” (A5). The verification audits 
by the FWF are regarded as independent because the member or supplier does not 
directly pay an audit company because the FWF controls and pays the factory verification 
audits (! CH 7.3). The fact that the FWF finances the verification audits with the 
membership fees, which cannot be seen as independent according to the CCC statements 
quoted above, is not seen as problematic by one CCC member (N2) and is even supported 
by the FWF, as the quote shows: 
Financing of verification is a point of discussion. Non-members criticise that we are dependent on 
our member contributions and thus not neutral – we argue that we mainly live through donations of 
NGOs, even if we want the incomes from members to rise. We also do not want to carry the costs of 
implementing social compliance for the companies; the members shall add this to their products 
(FWF 2008c) 
Currently many FWF members cannot conduct audits and commission audits to the 
initiatives’ audit teams and pay them directly. In such cases the verification audits are 
seen as “not really necessary at the moment … because it would be kind of silly to verify 
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an audit where we ourselves audited” (FWF 2008d:6)100. However, this runs counter the 
idea of (financially) ‘independent’ verification audits, since FWF audit teams pay normal 
third-party audits instead of verification audits (! compare chapter 9.2). The importance 
thus shifts to the quality of audits (! CH 9.2) 
Another view regards auditors as independent, if they are biased towards the workers 
and not to the company. For instance, an FWF member states that an organization like the 
FWF ensures an independent and unbiased control, because it includes NGOs and other 
stakeholders. He says that NGO auditors do not have an incentive to deliver results that 
are biased towards the company and that NGOs cannot be bribed (B1). In this view the 
fact that trade unions and NGOs are sitting on the board of the FWF transforms the 
initiative and also its auditors into an independent body (B1, N2, N20).  
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The audits in the BSCI system are presented as credible because an independent external 
auditor conducts them, even if the company he audits pays him. In this view, the 
independence derives from the use of methods that ‘guarantee’ ‘objective’ and 
comparable results. The methods and the auditors are accredited by an independent NGO, 
the SAAS101 (B3). The belief in ‘objective’ audits is grounded in a far spread belief in the 
audit industry that the right (‘scientific’) methods – i.e. standardized methods and 
questionnaires – deliver objective and true results (compare Power 1999). In 2007, BSCI 
members argued that external verification by another NGO, as done by the FWF, would 
not improve the credibility of the audits (B3, B4)102:  
Wer soll diese unabhängige (Verifizierungs-)Stelle sein, sie selbst. Ha, ha. Was soll das bringen? 
Also, es sind SAI akkreditierte und externe Dritte, warum soll ich einen externen Dritten noch mal 
durch einen externen Dritten verifizieren lassen? (B3)  
This belief in ‘objective’ audit results is not shared by the CCC and organizations like the 
ETI, who argue that ‘objective’ methods do not identify the real problems in the factory 
and thus do not bring any improvement to the workers. The workplace situation, it is 
argued, cannot be evaluated objectively, but it is always the auditors’ subjective and 
contextualized interpretation. As the following examples illustrate, a local NGO would in 
many instances interpret a situation in a factory differently than a professional auditor, 
who might know little about the local situation and evaluates the workers’ rights as lower 
than the factories’ economic competitiveness:  
• The CCC criticizes that some auditors interpret the existence of a work committee as 
equal to having the right to freedom of association respected, and then write down in 
the audit results that the factory is compliant with FoA (Pruett 2005:32,34f). Whereas 
the CCC sees a vast difference in this specific interpretation, a BSCI member does 
not view this as problematic (B16). 
                                                      
100 That makes it quite unnecessary to verify that kind of audit, because it would be kind of silly to verify an audit where we 
ourselves audited. … So that makes it not really necessary at the moment to have this kind of redundant strategy structure 
to check afterwards. We are actually still very much, too much, involved in the actual process of auditing.  (FWF 2008d:6) 
101 SAAS=Social Accountability Accreditation Services, which is the accreditation body connected to the multi-stakeholder 
initiative Social Accountability International (SAI) 
102 In contrast to this statement, recently the BSCI introduced so-called ‘surveillance’ audits in 2% of the factories, in which 
another SAAS auditor joins the auditor in order to check whether the audit is conducted correctly and to improve the 
credibility of the audits. (B16)  
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• An auditor argues that he does not strictly stick to the rules, but interprets the 
situation in terms of the (socio-economic) ‘ground realities’ because otherwise “not a 
single factory in this country would pass an audit” (A2).  
• A local NGO criticizes an auditors’ interpretation of overtime: “They even hired a 
consultant who justified overtime. So even he doesn't have the heart to tell 8 hours is 
a normal shift. … This is kind of stupid, who can talk like that” (N9).  
In order to better grasp the local context, auditors claim that they interact with local 
stakeholders (! CH 9.3). In connection to their independence, interviewees point to the 
problem that audit results are not transparent and cannot be verified.   
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The CCC argues that audits have little crediblity if audit methods and results are not 
transparent and cannot be verified by an independent organization (Pruett 2005:53ff) 
(N9). The CCC criticizes that the BSCI does not disclose information on factory locations 
or social audits but that it sends the audit results exclusively to the member and the 
audited factory (Pruett 2005:65). However, the CCC does not criticize the FWF for 
lacking transparency although it also does not publish factory audit reports nor show 
them to the board or the expert committee (! CH 6)103. This chapter shows how the 
limited transparency is justified by the initiatives, and more so, how the initiatives use 
audit results to legitimize their practices.  
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Both initiatives claim that the disclosure of audit results is limited due to their members’ 
demands for confidentiality regarding their business information. For this reason, the 
FWF only uses local NGOs or trade unions working on labour rights issues as auditors 
that agree not to misuse information for campaigning activities (! CH 8.1) (FWF 2008d; 
FWF 2008b). This has evoked critique by some local NGOs, who complain that they are 
not involved properly into the practices of the FWF, perhaps because they were not 
considered as trustworthy (! CH 9.3). The following quote shows that the FWF does not 
use trade union members as ‘independent’ auditors due to the problems mentioned above, 
which contradicts the claim of the CCC to involve local trade unions more:  
So it's impossible to hire trade union people in our teams, also because they will always have the 
problem of two mandates. Like, when you work within Fair Wear Foundation you have to work 
purely within that commercial relationship. Any findings that you have must be related to the buyer, 
and the buyer must try to change it. So if you have a trade union, they might be tempted to go into 
direct action. … many of our workers' interviewers are people coming from labour campaigning 
organisations, but we have to tell them: look, whatever you find out that can only be used in our 
process. We don't want you be sending out leaflets the next day you are there. So we cannot have 
people that are too much involved. They must be committed. That, if they are really very committed 
radical labour activists, or if they are trade unionists, we cannot have them in the audit team. (FWF 
2008d) (FWF 2008b) 
BSCI members argue that transparency – as demanded by NGOs – is not necessary for 
them. One member from a BSCI Committee argues that the initiative does not have to 
justify anything to anyone, and that audit results are business secrets (BS1). They see 
                                                      
103 The FWF regards the audit reports as business secret, whereas it publishes a summary of the management system audit 
reports and the members publish an annual report. Personal communication, May 2010 
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themselves as a pro-active business initiative with good intentions that already exceeds 
what they have to do by law. Being a business initiative, it is argued, the BSCI is already 
sufficiently transparent with the annual reports.  
R%73+383]3*7&$"2C3*7&+/"*,9"/%*2>&3*&PQPD&kQ%&"/%&81$+3;,+"C%='$0%/l&&
The FWF and its members reject the demand by some NGOs that companies shall 
publish more detailed information such as supplier lists and audit reports, referring to the 
‘balanced’ way, which “shall guarantee independent and objective verification” (FWF 
2002:3-2). Due to the diversity of the members, the FWF refrained from comparing the 
efforts of the members in a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, as done by the BSCI, but 
publishes more descriptive reports since 2009, whose credibility is guaranteed by the 
multi-stakeholder character (FWF 2008c).  
Finally, too much transparency is regarded as problematic because the effectiveness is 
said to suffer from it. Reports are said to be formulated more softly if they are reported, 
and this way, the real problems might not be identified, because, e.g., managers might not 
speak openly about their problems: “Members are said to speak more openly about their 
problems with the increasing time they are FWF members, and this trust is said to be only 
possible because FWF guarantees confidentiality” (FWF 2008b). Trust between the 
members and the FWF thus creates a protected space where information that could be 
used against the companies does not get to the outside. However, the multi-stakeholder 
setting shall guarantee that the companies improve.  
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The BSCI also refrains from making detailed audit results public for similar reasons. 
However, it uses aggregated audit results to legitimate the whole initiative. In the BSCI 
annual reports the initiative juxtaposes the results of factories that were audited twice and 
presents the differences in the overall results as “our progress” (! see Figure 12). The 
BSCI frames the improvements in the re-audits as causally related to monitoring and the 
corrective action taken within the BSCI system. It claims that the audit results ‘prove’ 
that the implementation of the BSCI system brings a ‘real’ and ‘measurable’ 
improvement to the supply factories, and that it has reached 1,85 Million workers since 
its existence (BSCI 2005:20; BSCI 2007a:6,20,27; BSCI 2008:3,17; BSCI 2009)104. It 
further asserts that the system is the “most efficient way to make sustainable 
improvement in labour practices” (BSCI 2007a:27; BSCI 2008:3)105. The assertions are 
supported by quotes of stakeholders in the annual reports: 
I welcome the work of the BSCI and of the enterprises that contribute to it. Programmes such as this 
help to raise awareness of the importance of social and environmental standards in developing 
countries. … I would encourage the BSCI and other stakeholders to find ways to work together to 
further strengthen this initiative. (Günter Verheugen quoted in (BSCI 2008:17) 
As figure 12 suggests, the BSCI claims that participating in the system has moved almost 
30% of the factories out of the area ‘non-compliant’:  
                                                      
104 http://www.bsci-eu.com/index.php?id=2028, 20.7.2009 
105 The outcomes of audits, and more visibly of re-audits, shows that there is a measurable improvement after audits due to 
more awareness and corrective action being taken. 
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In order to assess the improvement that the implementation of the BSCI process has brought to the factories 
of the suppliers, the results of those suppliers which have been audited at least twice (audit and re-audit) 
have to be compared. The results of the initial audits (left figure) show that the working conditions in 
supplying factories were greatly lagging behind the requirements of the BSCI Code (71,29%). The results of 
the re-audits (right figure) provide a much more positive picture since the number of compliant companies 
has increased significantly (42,63%) whereas the number of non-compliant companies has decreased 
(41,37%). http://www.bsci-eu.com/index.php?id=2028, 20.7.2009 
Figure 12: “Our progress” from the BSCI website (http://www.bsci-eu.com/index.php?id=2028) 
The results generally present a very positive image of the initiative, while they say 
nothing about single members. However, in more detail, the BSCI writes that the effects 
of the initiative focus on obvious breaches “emanating from the sections Management 
Practice, Health and Safety, Compensation, Overtime”. It claims that the results ‘confirm’ 
that the ‘most important’ social compliance issues are working time, compensation, 
occupational health and safety (BSCI 2007a:6). At the same time the BSCI argues that 
voluntary regulation is a limited tool for tracing and improving non-compliances in 
certain areas like freedom of association or living wages (BSCI 2005:27), which are 
rather “difficult to track in an audit” and in some countries are of “highly political nature” 
(! CH 3.1). For these issues the solutions shall be found on the level of national politics. 
These limitations are not communicated prominently in the presentation of “our 
progress”, which is problematic, as many civil society actors regard the rights like 
freedom of association as the most relevant ones (! CH 10.3).  
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Regarding the credibility and effectiveness of social audits the following issues are 
mainly contested:  
• The credibility of social audits is legitimized with reference to different 
knowledges. One view (BSCI) bases the credibility of audit results on standardized 
and ‘objective’ audit methods that are based on quasi-scientific knowledge. In this 
view, the credibility of audits is not influenced by the question of who finances it. 
According to another view (CCC & FWF) audits cannot be objective, but are always 
subjective interpretations of the situation in the factory. Therefore context-specific 
local knowledge must be used to identify central issues. In addition, financing can 
influence auditors and audits should be (financially) independent from those whose 
claim to be credible it checks. However, in this view, the audits of the BSCI and the 
FWF would both not be credible.  
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• Independence and thus credibility of auditors is also seen in terms of being with 
the workers (i.e. having the trust of workers) or with the factory managers (i.e. having 
their trust). In this reasoning NGOs or trade unions are seen as credible auditors, 
because they are on the workers’ side, whereas paid auditors are rather biased by the 
management. The FWF claims that by being a multi-stakeholder initiative it is 
legitimized as conflicting parties participate, and argue that it therefore does not need 
so much transparency. In this perspective the credibility seems to extend to the whole 
initiative.  
• Credibility & transparency: The BSCI and the FWF do not publish audit reports 
related to each factory, these are only transparent to the auditors or the BSCI and 
FWF staff. The CCC still regard the audits by the FWF as credible, due to being a 
multi-stakeholder approach and using multiple-instruments, whereas it criticizes the 
BSCI for not being transparent.  
• Transparency & effectiveness: While the BSCI publishes annual audit results to 
legitimize the initiative by showing “our progress”, the CCC uses local knowledge by 
NGOs, trade unions and workers to deconstruct this image. The central argument is 
that the BSCI uses the wrong people and methods that cannot yield any correct 
results, and at the same time hides the audit results.  
• Effectiveness & priorities: The CCC and BSCI have different priorities in their aims 
and therefore evaluate audits differently. The BSCI argues that the most relevant non-
compliances are factory management practices, health & safety, overtime and 
compensation. More ‘political’ issues like freedom of association should “be better 
addressed through dialogue and lobbying at a political level”. In contrast, the CCC 
regards freedom of association as the most relevant issue and thus harshly criticizes 
that audit methods cannot identify breaches against this code – finally questioning 
social audits.  
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Arguments referring to the quality of audits discuss whether social auditors and their 
techniques can identify code violations in factories. NGOs, and also brands and auditors 
deny this, arguing that audits often do not identify the ‘real’ problems in the factory. 
Particularly, NGOs regard social audits as “eyewash”, “social wash” and a “waste of 
money” (N9). In their report on social auditing the CCC complains that many auditors 
from large ‘professional’ audit companies like SGS, BVQI or PWC conduct superficial 
factory audits and use the wrong techniques (Pruett 2005:26,28,49) (! CH 9.1). Auditors 
also say that it can be difficult in audits to identify certain problems and to prove that 
standards are breached (A1, A2). 
However, most claim that audits cannot identify all violations similarly well. One 
auditor explains that problems relating to health & safety are much easier to identify than 
“more subtle issues like discrimination” (A3) – which is confirmed by the BSCI (! CH 
9.1.2.). The CCC writes that audits fail “to bring significant improvements in freedom of 
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association and rights to collective bargaining, non-discrimination, wages, working hours, 
employment relationships, and abusive treatment of workers” (Pruett 2005). 
Suggestions to improve audit quality mainly deal with three issues: (a) who audits, (b) 
how do they audit, and (c) cheating in audits.  
9.2.1 Q='&"103+,^&&
There is a lot of mistrust in social auditors and many say that auditors are not trained 
well (! CH 3.2.2). The CCC criticizes that audit firms “have no professional training in 
other areas such as health and safety, labour law, workers interviews or human rights 
issues” (Pruett 2005:28,50f). As a result of their lacking training, auditors do “sloppy 
errors”, like having factory managers translate for them, or interviewing workers in the 
factory under the managers’ view, where workers do not speak freely because of the 
power relations, i.e., they fear being fired (! CH 9.3) (Pruett 2005:28,49). An auditor 
running a small, local, and specialized audit company supports this view, saying that 
auditors from the big auditing companies mentioned above are “basically lab-testing 
agencies” (A2), who are not working at the local level:  
Most auditors are not trained. They don't know what the heck is going on. I think there are a lot of 
companies who are just there to make money out of this than do any genuine and good work at the 
grass-root level. (A2) 
A local NGO similarly complains that large audit companies make much money for 
delivering no results (N9). Finally, representatives from large brands conducting their 
own audits claim that external auditors in general are badly trained and conduct audits 
superficially; they prefer to do their own audits also because of differences in codes (B9, 
B8), which they then have verified by the FLA:  
In terms of sharing a report, even if I got a report, I would still probably do an audit by myself. So 
they might have left something, which my workplace standard is strict about. They might be flexible 
about some issue, my brand might not be. So as in that case also, sharing audit reports is not 
something 100% I would do. (B9) 
While many NGOs criticize BSCI auditors for not being trained, vice versa, the BSCI and 
its members claim that their audits are of ‘highest’ quality, mainly because they “undergo 
constant training, further education and accreditation by SAAS” (BSCI 2007b:8) (! CH 
9.1.1). The accreditation to SAAS and surveillance audits is said to guarantee the high 
quality of audits:  
Only auditing companies that have been accredited by Social Accountability International (SAI) and 
selected by the BSCI will be entrusted with carrying out BSCI social audits. This assures the best 
possible audit quality while avoiding costly and bureaucratic accreditation procedures. (BSCI 
2007b:8) 
Er bezahlt, und wir sagen halt: die auf der Liste sind, sind alle in Ordnung, weil die sind SAI 
akkreditiert. (B3) 
Similarly the FWF emphasizes that it is working with specialists in their audit teams106.  
While the critique is often framed in terms of ‘low audit quality’ or ‘lacking training’, 
local NGOs claim that training of auditors alone does not solve the problem that auditors 
cannot build up trust with the workers. Therefore NGOs demand that auditors must be 
locals who have knowledge of the local background and who are permanently there for 
                                                      
106 http://fairwear.org/page/verification, 3.3.2010 
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the workers, as compared to auditors, who fly in to audit a factory and are later gone 
again (N4, N9b). This allows them to understand locally relevant issues, workers’ 
problems, and how to deal with workers (! CH 9.3) (N4, N9). NGOs say that whereas 
many auditors from large firms have a good knowledge related to the management of a 
factory, they lack knowledge of the ‘local background’ regarding workers (N4b). 
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Two issues are mainly contested regarding the ‘how?’ of auditing: (1) How long audits 
should take and (2) how must audits be integrated into the local context.  
First, the CCC criticizes that audits are more of a ‘quick fix’ and that in the short time 
they are done they neither can build up trust with the workers, nor discover more subtle 
problems. Due to such critique, the BSCI has extended the audit duration up to 4.5 days 
“to give auditors more time to complete the BSCI audits and to interview employees” 
(BSCI 2009a:7). However, an FWF member working with high quality products claims 
that audits by the FWF teams that take 2 days for three people do not show different 
results than a quicker look into the factory would show. Therefore it regards long audits 
are a waste of money (B21). This reflects the view of retailers and brands, when asked 
why they did not become member in the FWF: many doubt whether the higher efforts 
taken by the FWF have a higher impact than less cost intensive audits. 
Second, the CCC argues that workers, local NGOs and trade unions must be 
involved in audits. This is discussed in chapter 9.3.  
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NGOs, brands and auditors say that factory managers use different strategies to cheat 
auditors and present a different picture of the reality inside the factory when the auditors 
visit. Cheating undermines the credibility of social audits and thus its quality (Pruett 
2005:24,28,41) (A1, A2, A3, N2, B8). Managers use double bookkeeping or software to 
falsify the entries in the documents, they coach workers what to say in audits, and 
threaten to fire workers who do not comply. An auditor in Bangalore explains:  
There are people … (here) who sell punching card software; this software allows you to decide that, 
ok after six, the workers punch, but it will not record it. Or record it, but will take it to a different 
database. Or you can buy a program where you can do some changes that ensure that everybody is 
going out at six. (A3).  
Some factory owners build up a model factory – which is presented openly to the auditors 
– while other parts of the production are outsourced to subcontractors, which are not 
disclosed to the buyers. Buying companies confirm that subcontractors are difficult to 
identify (A16). Factory managers are also said to bribe auditors (Pruett 2005:25). If 
factory audits are announced, cheating can get easier, the CCC criticizes (Pruett 2005). 
However, many prefer to announce audits in order to work with the factory management 
and not against it.  
The FWF finds that managers are generally more open to collaboration and workplace improvements 
if audits are announced. Pre-planning audits also ensures that appropriate managers and documents 
are accessible on the days of the audit.107 
                                                      
107 http://fairwear.org/page/verification, 26.3.2010 
Chapter 9: Judicial regulation in global production networks  114 
Why do managers cheat? Some interviewees argue that the buyers can influence this with 
their demands and relationships to the mangers. Buyers mainly check the quality of the 
products and if they are not satisfied, the factory loses money. As a result, managers will 
do almost anything to get the production done according to the quality the buyer demands 
– including cheating auditors. In this view, factory managers either simply want to make 
profits, and believe that cheating is cheaper than telling the truth. Or some fear that the 
truth might lead to losing the business partner, even if there is talk of applying 
‘developmental approaches’.  
You should also try to understand the mind of our factory manager. His focus is only for that shift. … 
their whole focus, mind, and body is towards getting more production. So in the process, they will 
forget the basic standards. (S4)  
He is not really bothered whether he is working OT or breaking the laws. (A3, S4) 
Some auditors and brands suggest that mangers cheat less if auditors build up a better 
trust relationship to the management and offer help and a business case for improvement. 
They present solutions to them, which would result in a better sharing of information. 
This helps to identify more quickly the root causes of the problems and find out what is 
troubling the managers. In this view, managers’ trust also helps to build ownership with 
the managers, which is seen as necessary for sustainable change “because once you leave 
the premise, you don't know what is going to happen” (A6).  
However, building up trust in the supply chain runs counter to building up trust in 
vertical network relationships with the workers. One local brand representative and 
auditor illustrates this problem by explaining that they do not do worker interviews 
“behind the managers’ back”, like the CCC demands, in order to not lose the managers’ 
trust: “we could create a lot of problems with the relationship we have with the supplier – 
so we tell him that we do it (the workers’ interviews) here“ inside the factory (B8). 
Similarly, an auditor explains that she usually invites factory managers on the audits in 
order to gain their trust (A6). This way she respects the managers’ problems and gains 
more information by chatting with him; furthermore she can offer solutions to the 
manager and help improve the production efficiency, which makes management more 
interested in the issues and help gain his trust and ownership in the issue108 (A2, A6) – 
however, in contrast to the brand, she additionally interviews workers in their 
communities:  
Most auditors say we don't want the management when we are doing the walk around, and things like 
that. It doesn't make sense to me. Because, how much ever you try, the workers will not speak to you 
for the fear that they will lose the job, they will never talk to you. … So what I do, I ask the 
management, why don't you come with me. That really stuns them. How is she as an auditor asking a 
management person to come with me? Because that is quite unlikely. So when I take them around I 
still see these are my views. This is what I am looking at as an issue; what do you think about. When 
you ask them, they will feel that importance that I have been asked upon my views. Then they start 
getting involved in the process. And they say, yes you are right. Then you give a practical solution.  
(A6) 
Others argue that managers cheat because they are lacking the management skills and 
knowledge to properly implement standards. Various interviewees connect this to the 
historical and socio-economic context into which managers are embedded. They say that 
                                                      
108 There is clearly different opinions, whether auditors should offer solutions to managers or not. Some argue that they as 
auditors have a responsibility to help to resolve the situation and offer solutions, which they can, because they know the 
problems best (A2:1f). However, this way they could point out problems that do not exist, only to get assignments…  
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the garment industry is an entry for people who become entrepreneurs, due to its little 
capital intensity: e.g., farmers which have some capital start a textiles factory, and have 
not learned to treat the employees properly (A3, A4, A8). One consultant explains that 
the largest garment group in Bangladesh recruited 90% of its managers from the military, 
because they can handle many people – but certainly not with modern management 
techniques:  
Einfach, weil das Militär den Ruf hat, es kann mit Truppen umgehen und viele Arbeiter, das ist wie 
eine Truppe, man muss wissen, wie man sie beherrscht. … Das heißt ganz weit weg von Human 
Resource Ideen oder modern Management (A4).  
Another consultant in Bangladesh criticizes that managers always complain that they are 
lacking management skills, yet he assumes that they only complain because they do not 
want to change the status quo: 
Das Gejammer ist so sehr gross, wir haben keine gut ausgebildeten Manager, wir haben unskilled 
workers, das ist alles ganz schrecklich. Dieses Gejammer, das ständig zu hören, auf jedem Forum, 
round table wird das explizit geäussert: wir müssten dies und jenes haben. Aber wenn es dann darum 
geht, etwas zu tun, oder eben die gut ausgebildeten Manager einzustellen, dann sieht die Welt noch 
ein bisschen anders aus. Für mich ist das vielfach eine Entschuldigung - wir haben die nicht, und 
deshalb sind wir, wie wir sind und können es ja auch nicht ändern. (A8) 
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Whereas BSCI and FWF defend the quality of their audit approaches, many NGOs and 
local actors doubt that social audits identify the ‘real’ problems in factories, particularly if 
the auditors are not from the local place. The ‘audit quality’ mainly refers to the questions 
(a) what is seen as a ‘real’ problem, (b) who conducts an audit and how, and (c) has 
cheating occured. These questions are strongly connected to the credibility of audits. The 
different actors frame the quality of their approaches in different ways, and these ways 
touch issues related to concepts like subjective/objective knowledge, embeddedness, trust 
and power, which differ spatially:  
• Many conflicts in social auditing refer to trust relationships in the global production 
network. There are three different perspectives on what kind of trust relationships are 
necessary for good audits: (a) Workers must trust auditors (mostly NGOs claim). (b) 
Producers must trust auditors (mostly lead agents claim). (c) Producers must trust 
lead agents (lead agents claim). Since each stakeholder has a clear priority, these 
three demands are in conflict. For instance, if auditors are too close to the suppliers, 
the workers will not trust them anymore and if auditors are too close to workers, the 
supplier will not trust the buyer anymore. Audits might become ineffective, if one of 
the trust relationships does not work. It is suggested that all trust relationships might 
function, if workers are interviewed outside the factories.  
• The power and trust relationships between the lead agent and the producer 
influence audit quality, but they also seem to be in conflict. Some claim that the lead 
agent must hold power over the producer, because he needs to gain access to the 
factory, the workers and the documents to audit a factory. Others claim that too much 
power and too much pushing and ‘policing’ by the producer might rather be an 
incentive for factory managers to cheat than to cooperate. This might particularly be 
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valid, if they have difficulties to fulfil the requirements, which is often said to be the 
case, and as cheating is easy.  
• Some argue that short social audits lead to low audit quality, whereas others reject 
this. Short audits only get a snapshot of the factory, and auditors cannot build up the 
workers’ trust in a short time. To compensate this problem some suggest that workers 
(e.g. by interviewing them) and local groups that have good contacts to the workers 
need to be integrated into audits. Another approach is that auditors take more time in 
a factory to conduct an audit. Longer audits, however, cost more money, and some 
doubt whether this is necessary. Some criticize that money spent on auditing is 
wasted because it cannot be invested in actual improvements.  
• The concept of knowledge that is needed for high quality audits is contested. 
According to one view, audit quality is based on constant training and accreditation 
of the auditors by an external (multi-stakeholder) organization and standardized, 
quasi-scientific audit methods. Another perspective is sceptical about standardized 
‘one-size-fits-all’ approaches to auditing and argues that audit results are always 
subjective. The latter view suggests integrating local knowledge more into audits, i.e., 
by integrating workers and/or local groups who understand the local context and the 
situation of the workers.  
• Cheating in social auditing is said to be prevalent. Some argue that cheating is 
connected to the demands of buyers and can therefore only be changed by the buyers 
(! CH 9.1). Others claim that cheating is connected to low management skills of 
factory managers and can thus be changed by training managers (! CH 9.2).  
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Almost all groups say that local stakeholders have to be integrated into audits. However, 
which stakeholders are integrated and how they are integrated is very much contested. 
There are different opinions on how to include workers in audits (! CH 9.3.1), and on 
how to integrate local civil society groups into audits (! CH 9.3.2).  
9.3.1 I"/+3239"+3'*&'(&<'/C%/,&&
The CCC and various interviewees complain that in most audits workers do not 
participate sufficiently. Workers, the CCC claims, must be placed at the centre of audits 
to identify problems immediately and implement standards effectively (Pruett 
2005:34,41,45,47,79). Workers are seen as the best auditors because they are on the 
production site the whole day and thus have inside knowledge (Pruett 2005:33-48,80). In 
this view, workers must be empowered to speak for themselves, e.g. by teaching them 
their rights, interviewing workers in their communities or allowing them to unionize or 
using complaints mechanisms (! CH 9.3) (N4a, N5, N9a, A6, B8). As long as workers 
do not properly participate in audits, it will be difficult to identify more subtle problems 
in factories, they claim. Many social audits thus do not work because auditors only talk to 
managers or supervisors, who give a very biased picture of the situation in the factory. 
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This is one reason why the CCC sees “no reason to believe that … auditors have gotten 
any better at collecting information through interviews” (Pruett 2005:41).  
While most actors agree that workers have to be interviewed in audits, opinions differ 
regarding how to integrate them. The BSCI rules do not specify that workers shall be 
interviewed outside the factory, and according to the FWF rules at least seven workers 
have to be interviewed outside the factory (! CH 7.3). Auditors and brands say that they 
use special interview techniques to build up trust with the workers, e.g. by posing 
questions indirectly to the workers (A1, A3, A5, B8), or by adapting to the socio-cultural 
conditions of the region or the workplace (A1, A5, A6). They speak the workers’ 
language, dress like the workers, use women auditors, who are better able to talk about 
more private matters with the workers, not only in Muslim countries (A3).  
NGOs argue that the quality and credibility of worker interviews differs depending on 
where the interview takes place, i.e., whether workers are interviewed inside or outside a 
factory. The reason given is that the power and trust relationships between workers, 
auditors and managers vary in different places. Inside a factory the quality of worker 
interviews would be low. Here, workers would not tell the truth because they fear 
negative consequences from the management due to highly asymmetrical power relations 
(Pruett 2005:33ff,38,41,42). NGOs suggest that many workers do not trust auditors 
because they often do not introduce themselves properly to the workers; workers also do 
not trust anybody coming from the management side, as which most auditors or 
foreigners are seen (N4a). NGOs argue that managers threaten to fire workers any time 
they like if they tell auditors any negative things about the factory, and workers then lie to 
auditors because they fear to lose their job (N4a,b). Factory managers are also said to 
train workers on what to say when auditors interview them (A2) (! CH 9.2.3). The 
following quote sums up the problem of power asymmetry in a factory:  
So the power asymmetry is huge. Here is this company, who has lawyers, and there is this very 
vulnerable worker, whose livelihood is on a month-to-month-basis. … Everyone is against her. She 
barely survives there. It is a very frightening atmosphere. ... And then anybody who comes, who looks 
educated, well dressed is from the management. Anybody other than the workers is part of the 
management. So the workers never trust people who come and ask. Plus, in some factories we have 
heard recently about fake audits. Where the management conducts fake audits. Their own men ask, 
and assure the workers that they can say everything. You won't have any problem. And once they say, 
they come back and say, haha, see now. You must not say these things. If you say these things, the 
company will be closed, and you will be out of job. (N4a,b) 
While auditors and NGOs are sceptical that audits inside a factory can identify more 
political issues, they argue that certain issues (e.g. health & safety) can be identified (A1, 
A5, A6, N4b, N5): 
I do not completely say that the inside factory auditing is completely negative. I think it has a very 
strong role when it comes to safety and health. … It will become stronger, if there are parallel outside 
auditing. … See, the management's power comes from having no collective representation of the 
workers. … In the factory is their own ground. But the community is not theirs. They are not living in 
the housing provided by the management. And there are other community powers, political powers. 
The management is on a weaker ground, when it comes to the outside. (N4b)  
Finally, some companies say that they only conduct worker interviews where managers 
see them, because they fear that clandestine interviews would destroy their trust 
relationship with the management (! CH 9.2).  
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The CCC and local NGOs claim that credible audits require the ‘proper’ participation of 
NGOs and trade unions (N9, N4) (Pruett 2005:76): 
Companies need to develop programs that ensure the involvement of workers as well as local trade 
unions and labour rights groups. Their involvement improves the quality of social audits, the 
handling of complaints, and strategies towards remediation. … the varied contexts found throughout 
the global garment industry mean that what works or is appropriate in some situations might not be 
feasible in others. (Merk 2008) 
I first present how this participation is conducted in the BSCI and the FWF, and I then 
discuss conflicts regarding worker participation.  
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The rules of the BSCI and the FWF demand very generally that auditors integrate local 
stakeholders in order to understand the local context better (! CH 7.3)(B5, B3, B2). But 
they do not substantiate further which groups shall be integrated in what way (! CH 
9.2.1).  
Almost all auditors claim that they integrate local stakeholders, e.g. by collecting 
information about the local culture from local groups to understand the local culture to be 
better able to interpret what they see in the factories (A1, A5, A6) (! CH 7.3.1). The 
FWF chooses auditors from the area “with advice from local stakeholders”. Their 
auditors must read the country studies, which codify the local knowledge, and interact 
with local groups from the stakeholder network. This shall guarantee “a well-considered 
final assessment” (FWF 2008a:40). The BSCI demands that workers must be local, fluent 
in the local business language(s) and in the national language(s), and interact with local 
groups. BSCI members say that their auditors need not interview local organizations for 
every audit and need not discuss audit results with them (B3, B5). Instead, member 
companies say that local stakeholders “find recognition”, and a BSCI representative states 
that the Round Tables at the national level (! CH 7.2.1) play a very important role in 
integrating local stakeholders for the BSCI (B16). The two quotes show how members 
see participation: 
Die werden angehalten, das ist Teil des Checks auch mal Gegenchecks mit lokalen Organisationen zu 
machen – ob das jetzt die Gewerkschaften sind, wer auch immer – sie sollen eben nicht nur die 
Mitarbeiter vor Ort befragen, sondern eben auch mal das, was auch sonst hier passiert. (B3) 
Ich würde nicht sagen, dass das 100% und in jedem Fall gut funktioniert, aber wir haben schon das 
Gefühl, dass die lokalen Stakeholder durchaus auch eine Berücksichtigung finden - so können wir 
das, glaube ich, vielleicht am besten ausdrücken. (B5) 
One auditor from a large audit firm says he gathers information from local stakeholders, 
who play a prominent role in the community, like NGOs, community groups or religious 
groups in order to understand the local culture:  
For our audit purpose, as a third-party agency, we need to gather all the information from NGOs, 
local NGOs, local union bodies, local groups, and the villages, and all: What is the culture? Because, 
if you go South ... you cannot enter the factory with shoes. ... Even in some of the area, you cannot 
directly talk to the women front-to-front. … Example: You go in factory; you won't find a single 
woman there. So you think first, oh, there is no woman. Why? Discrimination? No, because in this 
village area, women are not allowed by the villager male to work in the factory. So it is not 
discrimination (by the employer). So we gather a lot of other information from local sources, NGOs. 
(A1) 
At the same time he argues that he works ‘efficiently’, confirming the problems local 
groups have regarding how they are included: “We don't disturb them (local groups) 
frequently. We meet them, if they have got information, that is fine” (A1).  
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In India, various local civil society groups see auditors that are not from the region almost 
as a ‘hate-object’. Much of the critique by locals is based on the fact that external actors 
intrude into their area and take over the work locals ‘should’ do, and by that earn a lot of 
money: 
Auditors are one of the worst and dirtiest in the world. They make a big money out of it on account of 
the labour unions, on account of the labour activists. (N9b) 
Some local NGOs project their hate on all external groups (also MSI) that are coming 
from the outside, claiming that these do not improve the situation of workers in any way:  
MSI appoint useless commercial social auditors who produce colourful pamphlets and write up to 
satisfy companies and MSI. … MSI have no relevance in Tirupur. Workers, Trade Unions and NGOs 
don't see them as any use in actually improving the working conditions. Once in a while they enter the 
offices of these organizations and take an interview and vanish in thick air. (N5b) 
GE5&%'+0)5')('%)&(,'#,")#'$/#)A+'E.0)H.+'."+#FI))
Local NGOs complain that although auditors claim that they ‘cooperate’ with local 
groups during their audits, they do not integrate them ‘properly’ into auditing practices 
and projects: “FWF, FLA or ETI … they should not only consult us. They should also 
involve the local stakeholder into the process of audit” (N9b). Auditors never really ask 
detailed questions about a certain factory they are going to visit, do not share audit reports 
and don’t let local groups make counter-suggestions – they rather ask broad questions 
“more of an opinion making way” to prove that they talked to locals (N4a,b, N9a,b, N20). 
The following quotes criticize that on the ground, multi-stakeholder initiatives are not 
really ‘multi-stakeholder’: 
So when ETI comes here, we don't know. Our union does not know, so they have some auditors, like 
professional auditors. They do the social audits, and make the report give it as a confidential to the 
supplier and buyer. ... but they call it multi-stakeholder initiative, but it goes between the buyer and 
the suppliers. So what is our role, or what is the role of NGOs? (N9a)  
Just not the really sharp information. Can you tell us about this company, is it good or bad? We have 
to say, yes, good or bad. If it is bad, they will just ignore us, and they will invite other persons. And 
when we have certain things like e.g. we want to check the working men hostel in the factory premises 
they will say, no no no, it is none of your business. (N9) 
They109 come and use our services. ... at the international level they claim that they are closely 
working with us or something. That is a false image they are getting. And also, when it comes to 
implementation of codes of conduct in factory, they never involve us. … All the five multi-stakeholder 
groups are like that. And they use us only for campaigns. … Only five, six organisations are there. 
They will come – FWF or CCC – and collect information from here. And we will spend our time and 
going around with them. … Then, when implementing improvement projects, they'll bring someone 
from Bangalore, Delhi or other place … . They keep us totally dark about what is actually going on in 
their project, even information-wise. (N5) 
NGOs criticize that no local experts from local NGOs are taken into the FWF audit team 
in India. The FWF instead brings auditors from the outside, who earn a lot of money, but 
do not know the local context, do not integrate and respect the local stakeholders, and 
who do not change the situation of workers (N9b, N20):  
Even FWF auditors never consult (us). … They come from different regions (500 km away). … They 
(auditors) are taking money out of it. In a way they earn good money, without respecting the local 
stakeholders. … See, I don't mind if you are engaging an auditor who comes from medical and 
different intellectual institutions. But when you bring three people, why don't you take two people 
from the local. … Somebody, who can really voice for (our city). (N9b) 
                                                      
109 In the interviews the following organizations were mentioned: FLA, FWF, ETI, ILO, and Solidaridad. 
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Local stakeholders thus argue that they feel ‘used’ by international organizations, and 
some plan to resist against that (! Box 11). Auditors, international organizations and 
NGOs come into their town, use their time, and do things that they themselves could and 
should actually do; they get money for that, and then often disappear without inflicting 
any improvements on the ground or giving local groups a ‘role’ (N4a,b, N5, N8, N9a,b). 
The local NGOs propose that they must conduct audits and trainings, because they are 
“some of the soil”, who are involved with the workers and thus understand their 
problems, contrary to outsiders “flying in and leaving” (N5, N9): 
They give some trainings; but their trainings didn't contain the social consciousness. It should be 
done by social activists, not by auditors. They fly overnight. Come here. Stay in hotel Velan and do 
something, write something in laptop, submit a report. Like that. Fly by night. Social auditors are 
involved. … She (FWF auditor) does not really know the social issues of Tirupur. What exactly are 
the things. Because, we are some of the soils. We are from this area, we understand these issues. We 
know the concerns of the people, we know the actual problems of the people. (N9) 
Many auditors confirm this impression local CSO groups have, saying that they are rather 
sceptical in involving local groups into audits too much because they do not regard them 
as competent or trustworthy but rather as charity or campaigning organizations (A5). This 
is particularly the case in India, where NGOs are often connected with charity. They 
doubt that NGOs can provide useful knowledge and information about particular factories 
– although local NGOs demand more integration here – and say that local groups are 
rather useful for delivering more general information. Reasons given are that local groups 
might not be able to access factories.  
Auditors are also sceptical about NGOs and see them as only trying to make money, 
whereas the image of a ‘good’ NGO is that of an organization working charitably with 
little money in a poorly furnished office (A1, A2, A8). One auditor argues that something 
with an NGO must be wrong, if it has an office as he has: 
If you go there, you see NGO office very luxurious. The man is sitting in an air-conditioned cabin, 
like me, people are waiting outside, because he is not allowing anyone to enter. This kind of .. - you 
will observe, and immediately know what kind of NGO that is. And some of the NGOs, very simple, 
you see the environment, you ask local site people; you understand this is a good NGO. (A1) 
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110 It should be mentioned that WRAP is a business and not a multi-stakeholder initiative. Often local groups do not 
distinguish.  
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Similar to auditors, suppliers also argue that they interact with local NGOs who regularly 
come into their factory, either to conduct an audit or to talk to workers (S2b, S4, S6). For 
instance, a manager from an SA 8000 certified factory says that NGOs do an audit and 
report their results as a requirement of SA 8000 (S6), and another manager of a SA 8000 
certified company says that he regularly invites a large local NGO to come to their unit to 
do an audit (S4, S10).  
Some local NGOs, however, criticize that suppliers purposely select to cooperate with 
local groups who do not represent workers, and that SA 8000 certified factories only 
invite local groups that are incompetent, funded by the suppliers, focus on welfare, and 
sign a paper and thus provide a certificate (N9a,b, N8). One NGO that usually builds 
infrastructure and does not do work-related issues was included in the audits by a supplier 
to confirm the SA 8000 certificate (N24). This NGO even admits that the supplier funds 
it. However, local groups criticise that many buying companies are satisfied, if they see 
that a local NGO is integrated into audits, without having the capacity and knowledge to 
distinguish between NGOs, who are representing workers and ‘biased’ ones, who are co-
opted by the companies and just write a ‘quick-fix’ report. The following quote sums up 
the problems many NGOs see:  
SA8000 may be inviting NGOs, who are not very harsh. They don't know what is a real labour issue. 
They don't understand the labour perspective. They will go and see, ok, this company is well shined, 
good colour is there, proper ventilation is there, ok, it is good. But they don't really interview the 
workers. They don't understand the reality; what is a living wage, and what is an overtime issue. And 
what is about the premium wage. So they don't go into the depth of the codes of conduct; … They are 
more looking into window dressing. ... They [the management] will insist that you are writing letters 
and issue. So the management will be happy to have one more extra document to produce ... saying, 
see, we are certified by the NGOs, we have put everything ... So this kind of social are not really 
productive. It is like a quick fix. (N9a) 
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The CCC and other NGOs argue that trade unions must be integrated into audits, but 
interaction with local trade unions is very limited. Many auditors, companies and also 
NGOs say that they do not interact with them or that it is very difficult to do so – either 
because there is no trust or because it bears too many conflicts to work with them. One 
NGO explains this problem where the FWF tried to integrate local trade unions in 
Tirupur into social auditing, which did not work out:  
He asked the trade union members to form a committee, and within the committee two or three people 
should be elected. From the committee, two people can be part of the audit. But .. see, we also make 
some mistakes. So these trade unions never agreed to form a committee, number one. … So this is 
always some kind of fundamental mistake I have experienced the last 10 years with the unions. … So 
even now the steering group, they don't want to elect one ... because even seven or eight years back I 
remember. Save was one of the first initiatives to form a trade union dialogue on several issues. It 
was always - 10 years back - that trade unions never can make a meeting together. ... we have 
suggested to form a committee of trade unions. They never agreed, and it was a bit allegation against 
Save: who are you to tell to form a committee. What subject are you going to do. ... they set no 
committee. … why we have to form a committee. It isn't a very much futuristic approach. Why we 
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have a committee. You can deal with each union as respectable organisation. … Even after their 
approach, again three years back, we were attempted to form a committee, and the bigger unions 
allegate, if the smaller ones were elected, then we have to honor him - which is not possible. The 
smaller will allegate: ok, the bigger ones are being elected by choice - the bigger ones always keep 
the smaller ones away. So the smaller ones say, we don't want the bigger ones. The bigger ones says, 
you are organising 100 people, why should I have to administer him. (N9b) 
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Even though most actors say that local groups have to participate in audits, the ideas 
regarding how they should participate are very much contested. Central problems 
regarding the participation deal with different viewpoints on issues like power and trust 
and the value of local knowledge:  
• Include workers: Both initiatives argue that workers have to be integrated into 
audits. However, the views conflict on where this should be done, particularly 
whether this should be inside or outside a factory. One perspective argues that inside 
a factory workers do not tell the truth, because of the prevailing power relations 
between workers and managers. Even if workers trust auditors, they are afraid to tell 
the truth inside a factory, because they fear that the management will know about 
them talking. According to this perspective knowledge about the working conditions 
– apart from visual issues like fire exits – inside a factory can best be yielded outside 
a factory. According to a second perspective, workers must be interviewed inside a 
factory because the trust relationship between the lead agents and the factory 
managers must not suffer. Power relations inside a factory are ignored in the second 
view.  
• There is a conflict of trust within the supply chain and within the vertical 
relationships of global production networks. Brands claim that they need to keep up a 
good relationship with the managers of the supply factory, and therefore they would 
not make them feel that they do not trust them, e.g., by interviewing workers inside 
their factory. However, NGOs and local groups claim that workers do not trust 
anyone coming from the outside that they do not know. In their view too much 
proximity and trust with the management limits the workers’ trust. In addition, even 
the FWF has problems integrating local NGOs working on workers’ rights, because 
they fear that they do not treat the information they gain in the factory confidentially.  
• Differentiate local groups (NGOs / trade unions): The findings suggest that one 
problem of participation is that there are many different local NGOs and that most 
actors have a different perspective on them. Local NGOs that were interviewed see 
themselves as working on and with the workers, some cooperate more with 
companies working on charity issues, whereas others cooperate more with 
international NGOs like the CCC and are worker rights’ groups with a close contact 
to the workers. Some local groups view international NGOs critically, because they 
do not see how they are integrated into their work or improve the local situation. 
Producers are said to use and fund NGOs, which are then seen as biased, incompetent 
and not to be trusted. Auditors regard local NGOs as charity or campaigning groups 
with no access to factories and thus no knowledge of working situations or as 
corrupted groups with a lot of money that cannot be trusted. International NGOs also 
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differentiate between NGOs that work more on campaigning and that have an 
internal conflict when they audit, but that are knowledgeable due to their contacts to 
the workers and biased NGOs that are funded by companies. Brands, some claim, are 
not able to distinguish between these different types of NGOs and run the danger of 
cooperating with groups that do not represent the interests of workers. Trade unions 
are seen by most as difficult partners to work with and often corrupted and not 
interested in the workers and rather competing with each other. However, there are 
also trade unions that are independent of party politics and that cooperate with 
workers, and various stakeholders say that these have to be involved.   
• Participation of local civil society groups in auditing: Actors struggle over the 
question: What is meaningful participation? This struggle is connected to the variety 
of NGOs and different viewpoints on which NGO to trust. One perspective holds that 
auditors need to be knowledgeable of the local situation and culture and need to 
collect information. In this perspective, local knowledge can be codified and gained 
by external actors. They do this by talking with the local groups about the general 
situation and interviewing workers inside factories. In this view, local campaigning 
NGOs provide more general information and not the relevant knowledge about the 
situation inside the factories because they have no access. In contrast, the second 
perspective (local NGOs) argues that companies and auditors do not respect local 
groups sufficiently. They claim that local NGOs can provide a special connection to 
the workers to yield relevant information from the workplaces. Only those, who are 
“of the same soil” and who have permanent contact to the workers can gain this 
information. In this view auditors flying in for a quick factory visit will not yield in-
depth information about the problems of workers, even if they speak the same 
language, because workers will not trust them and fear punishment by the 
management. They conclude that participation of local groups has to go beyond 
informing auditors about the general local problems and culture.  
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Social audits are a nuisance to lead agents and the suppliers. Lead agents have to force an 
audit upon their suppliers with whom they try to develop relationships that are built on 
trust, and they also cost time and a lot of money. Then the results of an audit only identify 
the non-compliances in a factory – and sometimes the causes (! CH 3.2 & 3.3). 
Suppliers often complain about multiple audits, because the lead agents do not coordinate 
their audit efforts. Finally, stakeholders criticize social audits for not being credible. 
However, various stakeholders demand brands and retailers to prove that they take 
responsibility and improve the workplace situation in their production factories. This is 
why audits are undertaken.  
In this chapter I show that the power of lead agents vis-à-vis their suppliers and audit 
costs are seen as a limitation to taking responsibility for working standards in their supply 
chains (! CH 9.4.1), and that actors use different strategies to reduce costs of auditing 
(! CH 9.4.2).  
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Almost all actors share the view that the power of lead firms depends on their relationship 
and is limited if their orders only make up a very small share of a factories’ capacity. For 
instance, an auditor says that the quality of an audit can be bad if he controls a factory on 
behalf of a company that only has a tiny percentage in that factory (e.g. 5%) (B7). In such 
a case, the auditor even fears that he has difficulties to enter the factory, because the 
buyer is more dependent on the supplier than vice versa (A5). For this reason small 
companies (B22, B24) that are not involved in an auditing programme fear that it might 
become very difficult for them to demand an audit from a factory in which they only 
produce e.g. 100 pieces – and it might become even more difficult to tell this factory to 
improve the standards (B22). In contrast, a buyer placing orders of 100.000 pieces, says 
that he has no problem getting a supplier into audits and qualification, compared to a 
buyer who only orders 800 pieces (B6).  
However, one small company argues that due to their size it selects factories in which 
larger companies with a reputation place their orders, trusting that they do good audits 
(B24). Some brands and retailers also claim that the power they hold over a producer is 
also low if they do not have a direct contract relationship with a producer, e.g., if they 
work through agents or if the supplier subcontracts (! CH 2.2). Some lead firms argue 
that because of their lacking power in the whole supply chain, they cannot implement the 
standards throughout the whole supply chain and therefore cannot be seen as responsible 
for the working conditions of particular producers.  
Whereas many interviewees see power as a necessary requirement for audits, one 
auditor argues that an audit need not always be based on power, but that it can also be 
based on trust (A6). She explains that social audits must be communicated properly, if 
they shall not destroy the business relationship; particularly buyers must not fear negative 
consequences from an audit, which would provide incentives for factory managers to 
cheat on auditing. However, NGOs point to the problem that a too good relationship 
between the auditor and the factory management can reduce the workers’ trust in the 
auditors and make them tell lies.  
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Companies and initiatives use diverse strategies to reduce the costs and increase the 
efficiency of auditing. While both initiatives recommend their members to vertically 
integrate their supply chains and work on harmonizing standards, the BSCI mainly works 
through limiting the responsibility of members for their suppliers.  
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It is disputed how far lead agents must take responsibility for auditing, and BSCI and 
FWF follow different strategies (! CH 9.4.1 & Table 15). How do they legitimate their 
different approaches? I argue that due to the history and background of the FWF (! CH 
7) it regards a more comprehensive scope to auditing as more relevant than problems 
related to the complexity of the chain. The approach of the BSCI is rather cost 
minimizing and risk oriented. It mainly requires that non-compliances are somehow dealt 
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with, but not necessarily by the BSCI member. The BSCI and lead agents use two 
different strategies to reduce the responsibility of lead agents in the supply chain: limiting 
the scope of auditing in the supply chain and limiting the percentage to be audited. 
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According to one position, a lead agent is responsible for working standards in the 
factories of its direct suppliers, i.e. in the company where they place the orders. This 
company is again responsible for his suppliers. The BSCI follows this approach (! CH 
7.2.3). The arguments behind this approach are based on the complexity of supply chains, 
efficiency and power.  
Das System ist zu komplex. Die Zulieferer arbeiten wieder mit Unterauftragnehmern zusammen und 
diese wieder mit Zulieferern. In diesem Produktionsnetz kann es ein Loch geben. Wir können 
lediglich einen Prozess in Gang setzen, der bei den Hauptlieferanten beginnt. (Ferry den Hoed, FTA, 
EU-Nachrichten Nr. 43, 1.12.2005) 
Companies argue that it is too much effort if they had to implement social standards in all 
of their complex chains. Some substantiate their argument by saying, e.g., that they sell 
800.000 different products, for which they simply ‘cannot’ check the whole chain (B3, 
B6). Due to the complexity of the supply chains most buyers claim to be ‘practical’ and 
do “first things first” (B3, B8). According to many, this practicality stops where they do 
not have any power anymore, where it is not ‘possible’ anymore, or where it gets too 
costly. Hence, the BSCI simply take the responsibility where they have a business 
relationship. 
Somewhere we need to stop. It has to be practical. (B3) 
My question to you is then: How far should we go? To the farmers raising the sheep in new Zeeland? 
… Or fertilizers, or whatever grains? So I think that is the issue. I am not saying that that's that - I 
mean what you are saying, that is one reason why we are going to the factory suppliers with this 
cleaner production projects. To see how we can address that problem. So, valid point, but it is not 
easy. And maybe you should do first things first. That is another approach. If you start here. (B8) 
To extend the auditing throughout the chain and at the same time keep auditing costs for 
members low, in 2009 the BSCI audit rules changed (! CH 7.2.3). Because of this new 
rule the membership of BSCI rose strictly. Some importers who supply BSCI members 
complain that their buyers more or less forced them to become a member in the BSCI 
system. The same suppliers said that they now forward the power to their suppliers, who 
have to pay for the audits. This is seen as shared responsibility: “everyone has to take 
some responsibility” (S15). Eventually, according to this system a retailer in Germany 
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who is a BSCI member and who sources from importers in Germany only has to assure 
that his importers are BSCI members and need not change anything in his sourcing. Some 
BSCI members criticize this (B23).  
In contrast the FWF claims that their members can influence all producers in their ‘own 
production’111 and therefore also share a responsibility to audit and improve these 
garment suppliers (! CH 7.2.3). If a members’ power to implement a standard at a 
producer is limited, because he might source through an agent, this is not seen as an 
excuse for not auditing the standards. The member can change the suppliers or he can try 
to cooperate with other members or companies in the audits (FWF 2008d:11). Similarly 
the CCC argues that lead firms have no reason not to implement social standards, they 
should just make the standards as important as quality standards or shift its production to 
a smaller supplier (! CH 9). However, going further down the chain than garmenting is 
regarded as too much, due to the history of the FWF that originates in campaigning 
activities by the FWF: 
Even within a simple shirt, the kind of fabric you use moves with the fashion. And sometimes you have 
to buy it from that weaving company, and sometimes from a totally other. … The chain is just too 
complicated to move deeper down. And it would be very interesting to discuss, e.g., what could we do 
in the textile part of it? What can we do in the spinning part? But there is no direct connection with 
the brands. So the consumer-push on it is not feasible anymore. (FWF 2008d:29) 
Priorisierung ganz notwendig; der Konfektionierer ist drin in diesem Programm, ganz klar. die 
Stufen des Wertschöpfung, die selber unter seinem Dach vereinigt, auch. Wenn er eine eigene 
Färberei hat, ist sie natürlich auch mit drin. Dann die Subcontractoren, die er einsetzt. Nicht die 
Zulieferanten von Stoffen oder Knöpfen oder Reißverschlüssen, sondern das sind ja die Teile des 
Auftrags, die häufig vergeben werden, weil seine eigenen Kapazitäten erschöpft sind, aus welchen 
Gründen auch immer. Subcontractoren sind also auf jeden Fall drin, weil das fertige Textil ja nun 
wirklich - das ist ja völlig egal woher das dann kommt, aus seiner eigentlichen Produktionsstätte, die 
uns gemeldet ist, oder aus seinen zwei oder drei Subcontractor-Produktionsstätten. Also die müssen 
auf jeden Fall mit rein. (B6) 
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A further method to reduce auditing costs is to reduce the percentage of suppliers that 
have to be audited. The reasons given for this strategy refer to practicability considering 
the flexibility of global sourcing. BSCI and the FWF use this strategy. However, BSCI 
prescribes its members that 67% of suppliers have to be involved in the audit process, 
whereas the FWF says that 90% have to be audited (! compare CH 7). Particularly the 
BSCI allows members not to audit suppliers that they only keep for one season and thus 
allows for some flexibility. For instance, one member explains that they only audit a 
supplier if they have worked with it for several seasons and they are sure that they want 
to continue working with them (B4).  
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Finally, the BSCI and the FWF both frame their approach as ‘development-oriented’, 
which is important as it gives the members and their suppliers time to implement 
standards. The CCC criticizes that this framing, combined with a limited transparency 
regarding the single companies, reduces the possibility to make single firms accountable. 
It complains that the BSCI is not transparent regarding each single member and their 
factories, and thus no one can verify or falsify the claims done by the BSCI (Merk 2008).  
                                                      
111 ‘Own production’ is the production in all factories that manufacture products which are commissioned by the FWF 
affiliate, directly or through an agent or other intermediary, normally to the design of the FWF affiliate. 
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The BSCI argues that the approach is ‘practical’ and says that it respects the difficulties 
suppliers face in meeting social requirements within the “intense competitive climate” in 
the global markets (BSCI 2007a:3). Thus, the BSCI admits that “in almost all countries” 
some major non-compliances still exist and argues that this is normal in what they term 
‘risk countries’ (BSCI 2007a:20). Similarly the FWF argues that the approach recognizes 
the members’ business realities. The development-oriented approach is designed in 
contrast to ‘policing’ or ‘pass-or-fail’ systems that cancel relationships with suppliers 
who do not respect codes, and is criticized for that. This approach acknowledges slow 
progress in the improvement of working conditions (BSCI 2007a:8):  
Wenn Sie jetzt fragen, haben die alle bestanden, dann ist das natürlich nicht so ... wenn Sie in solche 
Risikoländer gehen, dann ist das ja gar nicht denkbar, dass die den ersten Audit bestehen. Dann 
werden mindestens 70 bis 80% erst mal durchfallen und müssen sich dann einem Re-Audit 
unterziehen, ... und dann werden die auch angeleitet, d.h. es werden Schulungen durchgeführt, damit 
sie wissen, woran es gelegen hat, und und und... Was eben dazu geführt hat, dass heute 100%  
unserer Lieferanten heute in dem Audit Prozess drin sind. (B3) 
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The CCC criticizes that some companies reduce audit costs by letting others pay:  
Labour advocates have long argued that suppliers and buyers have a shared responsibility for the 
costs of compliance—if they start sourcing from a factory that is not compliant with a code, then the 
buyer should bear some of the costs of bringing the supplier into compliance. Initiatives such as 
WRAP and BSCI, however, tend to shift audit costs to the supplier. (Pruett 2005:70) 
In the BSCI buyers and suppliers have to agree on who pays the costs for the audits and 
corrective actions. If the buyer is powerful, he can transfer the costs to the supplier. Not 
every member misuses this, as the CCC fears. A stock-listed company (B3) claims that 
they could not justify costs of a social audit against their shareholders, and argues that a 
privately owned company has less difficulty with that, as it only has to justify the 
expenditures with their own conscience. However, privately owned companies are also in 
a competitive situation, in which they have to reduce costs, and having suppliers pay for 
audits is an easy way to reduce costs. Having said this, another stock-listed BSCI member 
argues that his company prefers to pay audits themselves, because they will have the 
ownership of the audit information and thus more control over an audit and the supplier 
(B5). It argues that this way they can better talk with the suppliers about improvements, 
and know where the supplier stands with his implementation. Members of the FWF pay 
for audits in order to take responsibility.  
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Social auditing has been strongly criticized for not harmonizing codes and auditing 
approaches. This has led to inefficient private regulation systems, it has created a whole 
auditing industry with huge costs, particularly for suppliers (! CH 2).  
Most suppliers and NGOs criticize that buyers do not harmonize their codes of conduct 
and that in consequence, suppliers have to pay a new audit for every buyer, which is not 
efficient and does not add value. Some argue that 95% of the contents of the different 
CoC is the same, only in different words, but the rules, procedures, and communication 
channels are different for each buyer (S4, S5). Also NGOs and consultancies argue that 
suppliers are confused about the variety of private and public rules and standards (A2, 
N7, N9a).  
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It is extremely frustrating, expensive, time taking for us to cater the demands of 18 different 
customers who come at 18 different times, and do the same thing again and again and again. What 
we really wish for is a common standard which will be acceptable for different buyers. And we have 
petitioned our own government for that. But why doesn't the government define a particular agency, 
which is a certifying agency. … We don't have to go through the same thing. We go through 
compliance inspections every second week. It is a huge expense. … some of them are staying two or 
three days here. Some of them walk in, in a surprise, completely unannounced. You know, you have to 
be ready for them. They want to speak to your supervisors. It takes a long time. You are running a 
factory, and suddenly they want to talk to them, sitting in closed doors and talking to them. (S5) 
Suppliers particularly criticize the confusion with private standards, particularly as they 
are obliged to stick to national laws anyway (S2, S5):  
They think that this is a waste of their time, confusion of all these clients. Better, if there is an 
approach of integrated code. Some singular kind of standard, so that the same standard can be 
applicable for all kind of factories. (A1) 
Everyone is doing his own thing, and in the factory with multiple brands, they are going crazy. 
Because they say, why don't you all get together and tell us one thing. And let us do what you guys 
want, but follow one standard. (A2) 
Particularly suppliers that have many customers from different countries complain about 
the so-called ‘audit fatigue’ and say that they are audited up to 50 times a year (S4, S5, 
A2, A3, A5). NGOs similarly argue that this is a waste of money, considering that audits 
do not change the situation of the workers but only raise awareness, and that the multiple 
different codes that all want the same thing only confuse factory managers (N7). An 
auditor sums up these problems as follows:  
If I (as supplier) need to get certified to WRAP, I need to pay 1.000$ registration fee. And I need to 
pay annual fee of 750$. Which is a lot of money for a small supplier. Vis-a-vis, if I need to get 
certified to, say, SA 8000. I will probably spend over a three-year period ... So if I am having 100 
people in my organization, and this is my turnover, I am going to definitely think whether I am going 
to do this or that. And then, the other thing is the cost of auditing itself. ... So if you have multiple 
standards, I am going to think, do I need to spend money on everything? Because the overlap is very 
high. If you take SA 8000, FLA, WRAP, BSCI and things like that, the basic promise ... you can't have 
child labour, forced labour, safety, and things like that. Only some differences are there.  … If I am 
supplying to multiple buyers, e.g. Walmart, Disney, and ... It goes to the roof. Spending 30% of my 
time (A3) 
The FWF and the BSCI both try to counter the audit fatigue. The BSCI does this by 
building up a database. If a member enters a new supplier into the database he is 
automatically informed by the BSCI, whether this supplier is already audited. The FWF 
also strives at this, but so far has not built up a database. One excuse is that this will be 
done but that the buyers fear disclosing their suppliers. However, disclosing can also save 
costs. The FWF points out one example, where two members cooperate regarding one 
supplier, e.g. by sharing costs. It depends on the member, whether it is seen as a 
competitive issue. Additionally, the FWF argues that it also accepts other audits. For 
instance, if the FLA has conducted an audit in a factory of a FWF member, this member 
need not do an audit, if the member regards the audit as sufficient. It is more likely that a 
report by an MSI is accepted than one by a business initiative. The FWF argues that the 
member has the responsibility to decide by himself, whether this audit is sufficient. 
Member companies criticize this and demand more transparency in the rules regarding 
what audits are accepted.  
Two more reasons are given, why harmonization of codes of conduct and audits are 
regarded as difficult. One reason points to differences in the national laws of the 
members’ countries, why, e.g., European initiatives and US-American initiatives are 
difficult to harmonize. Another one is that due to the lacking trust in other audit methods, 
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there is always mistrust in the audit reports of other companies. An interviewer from a 
big brand said that he would not simply accept another audit report:  
In terms of sharing a report, even if I got a report, I would still probably do an audit by myself. So 
they might have left something, which my workplace standard is strict about. They might be flexible 
about some issue, my brand might not be. So as in that case also, sharing audit reports is not 
something 100% I would do. (B9) 
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This chapter points out that there are struggles regarding the following issues: 
• Responsibility: NGOs argue that lead agents are responsible for good working 
conditions in the production factories in their whole supply chains. In contrast, the 
BSCI and their members argue that the complexity of their supply chains limit how 
much responsibility they can take. It is argued that auditing too many suppliers is too 
costly and that due to power relationships not all producers can be audited. BSCI 
members thus only have to initiate audits at their direct suppliers, whereas these are 
responsible for their own suppliers. Thus, the responsibility is passed down the 
supply chain. The FWF, in contrast, argues that the members are responsible for the 
whole garmenting supply chain and have to disclose and audit all producers that sew 
clothes. Excuses that auditing is too costly or that members hold no power over 
factories are not accepted. This view originates in the history of the initiative that 
stresses that the whole chain is important.  
• Audit costs: The CCC claims that lead agents should take responsibility by also 
paying for audits. FWF members have to pay their audits, and this is explained by 
arguing that the members share a responsibility for improving working conditions. 
The BSCI allows the members to shift the costs for audits to the supplier and also 
argues that responsibility should be shared in the supply chain. BSCI members can 
shift all costs for auditing and implementing standards to the suppliers. Suppliers 
complain if they have to pay for audits, particularly when different lead firms demand 
different audits.  
• Saving audit costs: Lead agents try to save audit costs by only auditing some of their 
suppliers and by passing costs of audits to the suppliers. The latter strategy, however, 
conflicts with views regarding the independence of audits (! CH 9.1). 
• Harmonizing audits: Producers complain that they are audited too often and 
criticize brands and retailers for not harmonizing the approaches. NGOs also 
complain that there are too many audits and that there is too much focus on audits. 
They criticize this focus, as audits alone do not improve working conditions. Private 
standards initiatives basically try to harmonize codes and audit approaches among 
different brands and retailers. However, because private standards initiatives are 
strongly embedded into national contexts of the country in which they were 
developed, there are still many different approaches, and even if brands are members 
in an initiative, they sometimes have their own audits in addition.  
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The analysis in this chapter suggests that there are different views regarding what ‘good’ 
social auditing is and how brands and retailers must take responsibility through social 
audits. Main differences refer to the questions, who conducts social audits, how local 
stakeholders are involved, and what responsibility for auditing lead firms have.  
I argue that the concepts embeddedness, value and power help in understanding 
different arguments used for framing audits as ‘good’ or ‘bad’.  
I suggest that there are two different approaches to social auditing. The first approach 
strongly legitimizes the credibility and effectiveness of audits with concepts of network 
and territorial embeddedness. It is a more discursive approach to CSR and gaining 
legitimacy, and it is followed by the FWF (! CH 3.1.4). The second approach rather 
legitimizes the credibility and effectiveness with concepts referring to value and power. It 
is rather based on a ‘positivist’ approach to CSR and gaining legitimacy and followed by 
the BSCI (! CH 3.1.1).  
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I claim that the first audit approach is strongly based on discursive/moral legitimacy, 
even though it might fail to gain it due to some limitations. Some actors frame the 
credibility and effectiveness of audits with vocabulary that refers to concepts related to 
embeddedness. In this view audits must be based on local knowledge, and the local 
knowledge must be gained through networks with local stakeholders whom workers trust. 
Credibility and effectiveness are based on trust in networks and people. It is argued that 
due to corporate power against workers inside factories (including cheating), an audit and 
worker interviews inside a factory can never gain insight into the real situation. However, 
outside a factory in the communities workers have collective power. Trust relationships 
to other workers can be build up better. Local NGOs say that they have the understanding 
of the local backgrounds and culture of the workers, because they are “from the same 
soil”. This way audits can provide information from the factory floors that is relevant for 
identifying non-compliances with process-oriented rights like freedom of association (! 
CH 3.3). More visual issues, e.g., questions whether the toilets are clean or whether a fire 
escape exists, can be identified through factory visits.  
There is a conflict regarding which stakeholders shall participate in what way. This 
conflict is connected with trust in the network relationships: Basically, actors have 
different opinions regarding who can and need to be trusted for gaining information from 
the factory floor. There is obviously a conflict in trust to the workers and the factory 
management, according to which it is difficult for an auditor to gain both, trust of the 
managers and of the workers. If auditors need to cooperate with workers and managers, 
this conflict becomes problematic. Some suggest that interviewing workers outside the 
factories might solve this problem. For different reasons auditors do not trust every local 
NGO and also MSI do not trust all local NGOs. The local NGO must be (financially) 
independent from the factory it checks and must support the needs of the workers – but 
the FWF argues that it should not be involved in campaigning for being independent. 
This leads to a situation where local NGOs that are connected most to workers might not 
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get involved in auditing because the auditors do not trust that they will keep the 
information confidential, despite their expertise. Thus, local groups criticize every private 
standards initiative for not integrating them enough and confirm results of other studies 
(! CH 3.3).  
Local NGOs suggest that a ‘good’ approach to auditing would need to interact with 
them, because they connect with the workers – which would consider ideas of the 
discursive approach to CSR. However, this would need transparency of the audits, 
which is not given. Many local NGOs complain that auditors talk to them, but that they 
do not tell them what factory they audit, neither BSCI nor FWF auditors. Hence, the 
question is, what involvement of locals and how much transparency would an approach 
need to be legitimized in a discursive way. The analysis suggests that although BSCI and 
FWF somehow involve local stakeholders, they are still away from a political approach to 
auditing that would be legitimately called discursive (! CH 3.1.4). The FWF argues that 
the right networks and the fact that they are multi-stakeholders provide credibility for 
audits.  
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A second approach also emphasizes that the local context is important for social auditing. 
However, in this approach the inclusion of stakeholders has a different quality than in the 
first one and transparency to stakeholders is non-existent. I claim that the arguments of 
this second approach are based on pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy rather than 
discursive/moral legitimacy (! CH 3.1). In my view the BSCI follows the second 
approach.  
The arguments defending this audit approach aim at gaining pragmatic legitimacy, 
according to which the key challenge for the organization that tries to gain legitimacy is 
“to persuade key stakeholders (and the wider public) of the usefulness of its output, 
procedures, structures and leadership behaviour” (! CH 3.1.4, Box 2). The BSCI frames 
auditors as independent and neutral, because they work according to good methods. The 
claim is that the required information from the factories can best be yielded, if the 
auditors follow certain quasi-scientific methods and techniques. Auditors are 
knowledgeable of management systems inside factories, because the underlying argument 
is that workers’ rights violations are based on lacking management skills. Problems in the 
factories are seen as technical (i.e. the bad factory management), requiring a technical 
solution (i.e. sound management). Stakeholders are involved in a ‘consulting’ way in 
order to show that these groups are involved (These individuals will ascribe legitimacy to 
the corporation as long as they will benefit from the corporations’ activities). The 
inclusion is merely based on gaining information, while not political responsibilities or 
duties are connected to it. Finally, aggregated results are presented like scientific facts in 
diagrams and statistics that sound very impressive and that may please stakeholders and 
the general public, even though they suggest results that their own system does not even 
promise (e.g. showing results on freedom of association although it is stated that audits 
cannot identify such issues). These aggregated results do not allow any discussion about 
single companies. However, the message is that the results can be trusted, because they 
are based on standardized reasoning, and progress is developmental. The BSCI argues 
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that the evidence of the audit results ‘proves’ that working conditions in the factories 
improve because the right systems are used.  
The arguments are further based on cognitive legitimacy, which bases acceptance “on 
some broadly shared taken-for-granted assumptions (e.g. shareholder value ideology, free 
and open market narratives, normative homogeneity)” (! CH 3.1.4, Box 2). Many of the 
arguments of the BSCI are based on the need to remain competitive and efficient, or of 
their lacking power in complex supply chains – and the need to approach these problems 
in a developmental way are based on the need to survive in a competitive market. 
However, the FWF demands from the members to audit the whole supply chain and does 
not allow compromises on this. Furthermore, the BSCI approach is based much more on 
efficiency than the first one. The buyers’ responsibility for audits is limited to the direct 
relationships in the supply chain, while the supplier will usually pay the costs of 
discharging responsibility.  
Finally, the BSCI audit approach is far from gaining discursive/moral legitimacy. 
Auditors consult local NGOs to better understand the general background but do not 
disclose the information regarding what factories they visit. Workers are usually 
interviewed inside the factory, where they fear the power of the factory management and 
fear that they might be fired if they say something wrong. This lack of participation and 
transparency in auditing does not allow decisions between the different stakeholders that 
would be based on the better arguments. The hiding of the audit results and the lack of 
real involvement of local groups rather suggests that this approach does not aim at 
gaining discursive/moral legitimacy, but rather pragmatic legitimacy.  
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There is a large consensus that audits can only identify problems of workers in factories 
or the causes of these problems, but that they do not change the situation. The CCC and 
other stakeholders criticize the over-reliance on social auditing by some companies or 
initiatives like the BSCI. Most actors conclude that audits need to be combined with other 
instruments to inflict change: “Given the amount of resources and thinking and tackling 
the difficulties faced by workers in supply chains over the last decade and a half, the lack 
of progress to date is scandalous” (Pruett 2005:74). This confirms results by others (! 
CH 3.3), who showed that audits do not change the workplace situation, unless they are 
combined with other instruments. Such other instruments are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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The previous three empirical chapters show which rules and standards private standard 
initiatives set, how they set them, how they try to make sure that the suppliers comply 
with the rules – and how these activities are contested between different actors in global 
production networks. Legislative and judicial regulation are common practices firms use 
to improve the working conditions in supply chains. However, chapter 9 concluded that 
many actors claim that merely setting standards and monitoring them is not effective and 
does not have any positive impact on the working conditions (! CH 2). This is where 
executive regulation becomes relevant.  
Executive regulation deals with “the processes of standard implementation and the 
different tools that are used by the private standards initiatives to ensure that standards are 
met” (Tallontire 2007:786). There are three main claims what companies must do to 
improve working conditions in supply chains in addition to having their suppliers sign a 
Code of Conduct and audit it: 
• Buyers must change their purchasing practices. In a nutshell, the argument mainly 
presented by the CCC / civil society organizations and suppliers and adapted by the 
FWF rules goes as follows: Lead firms in global supply chains hold power over their 
suppliers and use it to demand low prices, short lead time, high flexibility, high 
quality, high social standards etc. Their suppliers cannot fulfil all of these demands at 
the same time. They have no other option but to focus on what is most important, e.g. 
quality and prices, i.e. workers end up as victims (! CH 10.1). 
• Management skills of the suppliers must be built that enable them to run a factory 
efficiently and to implement social standards. It is argued that many managers know 
little about efficiently running a factory. More management knowledge would help 
them to organize their factory better. This would increase their profits, which they 
could use to finance the implementation of standards. In consequence many problems 
would not occur. Both, the BSCI and the FWF do capacity building in factories (! 
CH 10.2). 
• Workers must be empowered to enable them to claim their own rights. It is argued 
that workers do not and cannot demand their rights without support. The right 
institutions and set up (e.g. mature systems of industrial relation) would enable 
workers to demand their rights, which might one day render audits useless. The 
empowerment of workers is not seen as an exclusive alternative but as something that 
should be done in the long-term (! CH 10.3).  
Although the strategies are in the best case additional, the rules of the FWF focus on 
changing the purchasing policies of their members in Europe, whereas the BSCI rules 
focus on qualifying the suppliers in the production countries. These focuses are strongly 
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connected to where the initiatives see the main responsibility for action and change. The 
following three sub-chapters analyse the arguments actors present in support or 
against one of these options.  
-U4- I1/2=",3*7&9/"2+32%,&
This chapter discusses how different actors see the relationships between purchasing 
practices and power in supply chains and how they connect this with lead firms’ 
responsibility. There are two main arguments. On the one hand, mainly NGOs112 criticize 
that lead agents have power in supply chains and that they therefore are responsible for 
workers. They argue that purchasing practices prevent suppliers from implementing 
social standards and instead make suppliers exploit workers (! CH 10.1.1). On the other 
hand, companies claim that their power is limited mainly by the complexity of value 
chains (i.e. transaction costs), the demands of the fashion market (i.e. particularly 
consumers) and also factory capacities (! CH 10.1.2). Both viewpoints propose different 
solutions for improving working standards. Table 16 provides an overview of the main 
arguments.  
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This chapter presents how mainly NGOs criticize purchasing practices and make lead 
firms responsible for poor working conditions. They have three main arguments:   
• First, lead firms hold power over their suppliers. This derives from their flexibility in 
selecting suppliers, i.e., that they have the power to select their suppliers.  
• Second, due to their power, lead firms share a responsibility for the wellbeing of 
workers in their supply chains.  
                                                      
112 Not only NGOs argue this way, but also suppliers, auditors, and some companies. The FWF implements rules and 
systems to prevent deal with this problem, whereas the BSCI does not have any rules or systems.  
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• Third, while companies claim that they take responsibility for working conditions in 
supply chains, NGOs criticize that the purchasing demands of lead firms are often 
conflicting. As a result, the producers cannot implement the social standards and the 
workers suffer.  
As a possible solution to these problems NGOs demand that buyers need to adapt their 
purchasing policies. This helps to ensure that background conditions are created which 
enable suppliers to implement standards. The FWF does this, but not the BSCI. The 
remainder of the chapter presents the arguments in more detail.  
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The CCC argues that particularly large lead firms hold power over their suppliers and has 
been focusing accordingly (! CH 2). The CCC criticizes that large companies use their 
economic power to gain good terms of trade (prices, lead time, quality) and make profits, 
but do not use it sufficiently to improve working conditions. Accordingly, large lead 
firms are framed as the oppressors in a supply chain, who determine the purchasing 
conditions for their suppliers, and suppliers as passive victims “at the mercy of buyers”, 
who are only able to accept or turn down orders (CCC 2008:48). This argumentation is 
most evident in the context of the CCC critique against “giant retailers” and discounters 
(! compare: Box 12). The ‘Cashing in’ campaign uses the picture that workers 
“subsidize” retailers’ profits with low wages and bad working conditions: 
The business models that make the Giants’ everyday low prices possible rely on subsidies from 
millions of people around the globe. For women working in garment factories, these subsidies are in 
the form of poor conditions and terms of employment and poverty wages - subsidies that they cannot 
and should not have to afford, and which are largely imposed on them by economic necessity. 
(Hearson 2009:12) 
While the International Secretariat of the CCC focuses on the power of large companies, 
the 12 National Sections of the CCC in Europe mainly focus on companies in the own 
country, also including the smaller ones (N22). The power of lead agents is seen in fixing 
prices, lead times and sourcing flexibly.   
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NGOs, suppliers and auditors criticize that buyers make large profits and pay the lowest 
prices in the market without adapting their prices to allow suppliers to implement the 
social standards. Suppliers criticize that buyers bargain on the price but do not support 
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them to improve the situation. They rather threaten not to place orders the next year, if the 
compliance situation has not changed. One factory manager argues that compliance costs 
money and that they cannot comply without any financial support (S2):  
We find that buyers are very keen to tell us what to do and what not to do. But not very keen to 
helping us with the alternatives. … You see, compliance actually costs money. To put in a system, to 
implement it, costs a lot of money. And at the same time, the pressure on pricing is very very tight. 
Every year there is a discounted price, 10% less than the previous year. I mean, you go on, where is 
the off-set. You know, you want to make money, you want to be a profitable business, you want to take 
care of your employees. And you want to deliver a good product to your buyer. And then you also end 
up in losing money in your compliance. And further losing margins. We feel that buyers are inflexible 
when it comes to pricing and compliances, it is not mutually exclusive, but then you need support. 
(S2) 
In this context, the CCC demands that companies have a duty to report how they 
overcome this problem: 
While actual price data is considered competitive information and therefore confidential, companies 
should report on what safeguards are in place to ensure that prices are sufficient to allow compliance 
with CoC provisions, including wages that meet workers basic’ needs. (CCC 2009b:14) 
Similarly, the CCC criticizes that large discounters “shamelessly take advantage of their 
immense power”, dictate prices and drive them down in the competitive market and are 
“primarily motivated by the lowest price for the merchandise” (CCC 2008:47f; EvB 
2008:18; Hearson 2009:24:5). This situation is seen as particularly bad in the case of 
large discounters like Aldi or Lidl. The actors are powerful due to their order volume and 
are under a lot of pressure to cut costs because of low profit margins, due to their low 
prices (CCC 2008:48ff). However, the critique is not only directed to discounters, but 
also to other lead firms:  
Another fundamental purchasing practice issue that is seldom discussed in CSR reports is the matter 
of prices paid to suppliers and how they impact on the wages paid by suppliers to workers. (CCC 
2009b:14) 
Alle Einkäufer drücken die Preise massiv. Hierzu nutzen sie ihre Macht als Besteller großer Mengen. 
Akzeptieren die Lieferanten die Abnahmepreise der Multinationalen nicht, bleiben sie auf der Ware 
sitzen: Das Risiko liegt voll beim Lieferanten. (KsK 2008b; KsK 2009c:2) 
Allein der Übergang vom Quota Ausstieg hat die Preise um 40% gedrückt. Und die Einkäufer 
machen enorme Gewinne. ... Enorme Gewinne! Ich glaube, Otto hat vor 2 Jahren sein bestes 
Unternehmensergebnis eingefahren in seiner Geschichte. Wo kommt denn das her, wo überall die 
Preise runtergehen? (A4) 
The pressure and exploitation by lead firms is being connected with global competition: 
buyers always find a supplier who is willing to accept an order that has conditions he 
cannot accommodate without exploiting the workers. Accordingly, suppliers express their 
fear that buyers will place their next order in a different factory if they turn down an order 
that goes beyond the capacity of their factory: “We really can’t negotiate because we’re 
afraid they’ll award the contract to another supplier or to another country” (CCC 
2008:46). In this power situation buyers are criticized as follows: They “force 
concessions” onto the suppliers or influence the terms of trade to their own advantage 
(CCC 2008:47f). Some buyers, for instance, pay with a ‘letter of credit’ by which the 
buyer can still reject the merchandise on its arrival in Germany for a variety of reasons, 
while “the supplier has the full risk” (CCC 2008:47f). Particularly larger buyers are 
criticized for conducting so-called online inverse auctions, where the buyer pre-selects 
some suppliers, who directly have to bid for an order against their competitors. This is 
criticized for driving down prices a lot (Hearson 2009:47) (N25). The quote from a CCC 
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publication hints to some of these problems: 
KarstadtQuelle hatte im Herbst 2006 seine gesamte Beschaffung an das Hongkonger Unternehmen 
Li&Fung ausgelagert, wodurch u.a. die Einkaufspreise um 5-10% fallen sollten. Bereits im Mai 2005 
hatte KQ im Zuge eines Sanierungsplans Rabatte von seinen Lieferanten verlangt. Bis heute bleibt 
Arcandor / KQ den Nachweis schuldig, wie seine Einkaufspraxis mit sozialverträglicher Beschaffung 
verbunden ist. … adidas denkt zur Zeit laut darüber nach, seine Produktion aus China nach Vietnam 
oder Kambotscha zu verlegen. Der Grund: in China wird ihm die Produktion zu teuer. Es entwickelt 
sich eine globale Konkurrenzbeziehung der Lohnabhängigen, die sich immer weiter verschärft. (KSK 
3&4-2008:6f) 
The CCC calls upon buyers to set retail prices in “a responsible manner” that allows 
suppliers to implement the Codes. Lead agents shall “refrain from advertising that creates 
consumer expectations of unsustainably low prices” (Hearson 2009:24:9; KsK 2009a:3).  
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Suppliers complain that the lead times are continuously getting shorter, e.g., that they 
have come down from 130 or 90 to 60 or 45 days within ten years. If they do not supply 
in time, they have to pay a fine according to the contract with the buyer (A2, A5, S1, S2, 
S3, S4, S6, S9). Short lead times are seen as problematic, because they make factory 
managers set production targets in an ‘unrealistic’ way, i.e., in a way that cannot be done 
within the normal working hours. Supervisors then are afraid that they do not manage 
their targets anymore and start shouting at workers, because they come under pressure 
and are more interested in getting the production done than in keeping compliance up, as 
an auditor illustrates (N7): 
The guy who does the compliance enforcement in the company is different from the guy who does the 
production. This guy is concerned, he wants the order done. He is not really bothered whether he is 
working overtime or breaking the laws. (A3) 
NGOs and suppliers mainly claim that lead agents cause short lead times (e.g. by lacking 
coordination or short notice orders). For instance, suppliers complain that they cannot 
start producing because the buyer delays the order (S4, S5, S7). An auditor says that 
suppliers are afraid to protest, fearing to loose a customer, if they do (A3). The three 
quotes illustrate this:  
And pardon me for saying it, but at times the quality control people from the buyers, they come late. 
They come at six o'clock in the evening or at 5.30. But that time they have changed the material. By 
that time it is loaded. Obviously it will go beyond the working hours. But we as the manufacturers are 
not supposed to raise fingers towards the buyers. (S4) 
Let's say the brand is sitting in NY city. We have various sourcing divisions, and we have a 
compliance division. … Sourcing says, I want this delivery in 45 days. But they delay the approval by 
15 days. They don't give me an extension of 15 days, so I am down to 30 days. What do I do? And 
compliance says, you can't work more than 12 hours OT a week. It's a self-conflicting situation 
created in NY city. (A2) 
They (Walmart) are the worst. They keep on giving changes until the last minute. After that we will be 
finding it so difficult to finish production before the shipment date. But they will never accept that it is 
their fault. They will find some excuses to show that we are at fault. What can we do then? They are 
big buyers, right? We will only have to adjust. Then they will start asking us to send it at a discounted 
price and so on. They are the ones who delayed the approval. (Hearson 2009:48 quoting Indian 
Manufacturer) 
The CCC does not blame companies in general. It differentiates between some companies 
that put stress on producers to an extreme form, whereas it emphasises that others, like 
Tesco, cancel orders if pre-production samples are not accepted within 30 days in order to 
prevent excessive pressure on the suppliers (Hearson 2009:49). The quick changes of 
fashion styles also cause stress in a factory and are attributed to particular buyers (KsK 
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2008b). 
Finally, some NGOs also say that problems inside the factory (e.g. bad management 
and low efficiency) can also cause stress situations that are connected with labour abuses 
(N4a, A2) (Hearson 2009:48). However, the CCC argues that most ‘giant’ retailers bias 
their supply chains towards suppliers “whose owners are more desperate and less 
scrupulous than might otherwise be the case” (Hearson 2009:7). The fault, in the end, is 
with the buyers.  
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NGOs, auditors and suppliers criticize that lead agents do not commit themselves to 
reliable, long-term relationships with their suppliers, but that they ‘jump’ between 
suppliers and markets, as soon as they find a supplier who produces for a cheaper price. 
The CCC claims that this problem is aggravated by global competition and the 
liberalisation of the garment trade by the MFA, as buyers can more freely choose where 
to produce (Wick 2008). One consultant illustrates this permanent need for flexibility: 
Und was macht der Handel, wenn er dort nicht mehr produzieren will? Der hat keine Schwierigkeit 
von heute auf morgen zu sagen: Wir schließen. … Also dieser Markt, der ändert sich alle 8 bis 15 
Jahre wandert er. In dem Moment, wenn einer zu teuer wird, dann geht er weiter. D.h. er verpflichtet 
sich ja nicht lange irgendwo zu bleiben und da Entwicklung zu machen. Aber dann wenigstens 
während er Geschäfte macht, soll er die so machen, dass er nicht nur Müll hinterlässt. (A4) 
The trend towards an increasing number of seasons and a frequent change of fashion 
styles is argued to worsen the situation. The CCC criticizes this as “fast fashion”, 
according to which retailers respond to customers in real time by means of lean 
production, placing smaller, more frequent orders with a short turnaround time but with 
even less long-term perspective for the suppliers (Hearson 2006:15f; CCC 2008:49). The 
problem NGOs see in this flexibility is that suppliers do not have any long-term 
perspective, which makes it more difficult to plan. They cannot provide any long-term 
security to their employees and they are not able to build up a cooperative, trust-based 
relationship with their buyers in which they both invest into compliance issues, as one 
quote illustrates:  
Some “achieve the terms they want by constantly jumping between suppliers, pitting them in 
competition with each other and moving on as soon as they find a supplier willing to go cheaper or 
faster” (Hearson 2006:17).  
In addition, the CCC criticizes brands and retailers for terminating their relationship with 
suppliers without caring what happens to the workers. The CCC and other NGOs demand 
that even if the working conditions in a factory are bad or if breaches against the labour 
codes are detected, a brand or retailer shall not terminate the relationship with his 
supplier. Instead, buyers shall take the responsibility and cooperate with the supplier to 
improve the situation of the workers in that factory, and build up stable, long-term 
relationships with their suppliers. This would make it more likely that factory owners and 
managers address workplace issues requiring capital investment and time to improve 
(Merk 2008:8) (CCC Spring 2009:14). If workers are dismissed, one common claim is 
that the buyer shall take care that workers are re-employed (KsK 2009a:2), as the quote 
illustrates:  
Erst beutet man die ArbeiterInnen jahrelang gnadenlos aus – und wenn es jemand mitbekommt, flieht 
Metro aus der Fabrik. … (Die CCC fordert Metro auf) wieder in RL DEMIN produzieren zu lassen, 
dies aber endlich unter menschenwürdigen Bedingungen. (KsK 2009b) 
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However, other interviewees deny that buyers change frequently, saying that most brands 
try to grow with their suppliers and build up a trust relationship (A5). A quote of a 
supplier, who consciously decided to deliver to only one buyer, illustrates this, even if 
this is an extreme form of relationship:  
I consciously decided to put my eggs into one basket. It was a very strategic move. Instead of being a 
small supplier to multiple customers; or, for a given customer, being one of the many suppliers. I 
thought that it was a better alliance by which I mean something to one customer, and that customer 
means something to me. It is like a marriage. You know, you are married to one wife, and it is a good 
relationship, it goes on and on. The moment you start flirting with too many people, you run risks 
there. And the chances are of all the associations, including the marriage fails. (S1) 
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BSCI and FWF members and many other companies (but not Lidl anymore) similarly 
claim that they take responsibility for improving working conditions in their supply 
chains, e.g., by setting and auditing social standards. The arbitrarily selected statements 
of BSCI and FWF members demonstrate this (! Table 17).  
Many interviewees say that they demand a social audit from a new supplier, even 
before an order is placed to “guarantee that everything they import is done according to 
their standards” (B2, B3, B4, B6, B9, B12). However, most BSCI and FWF member 
companies implement social standards in line with the ‘developmental approach’ (! CH 
7). Companies do not always communicate this, but FWF and BSCI both argue that there 
are still many standards violations on the supplier level. As not all companies 
communicate this clearly, such statements might be seen as deceiving consumers, as the 
Verbraucherzentrale Hamburg e.V. claimed against Lidl (! CH 6, Box Box 3).  
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The CCC claims that the demands lead agents have in the purchasing policies – i.e. low 
prices, short lead times, social standards – are conflicting and ‘incompatible’. They are 
seen to “undermine the suppliers’ capacity to comply with labour standards” or even 
structurally impose a situation that the suppliers cannot accommodate (Pruett 2005:78f; 
Merk 2008; Hearson 2009:52)113. Vice versa, suppliers cannot and do not implement 
social standards, if buyers do not provide them with long-term security in sourcing, if 
they pay low prices, and if they require the goods to be delivered too quickly – lead 
agents are simply framed to cause bad working conditions, while workers are the victims: 
The company should address the conflicting logic of simultaneously pursuing lower prices and 
shorter delivery times whilst simultaneously pursuing its compliance with labour standards. Current 
purchasing practices tend to undermine the capacity of the supplier to comply with labour standards. 
For example, demanding short lead times may result in excessive or forced overtime. Or, when the 
company constantly shifts its orders, suppliers may end up feeling that there is no incentive for 
making the required improvements. (Merk 2008) 
Ein wesentlicher Grund für diese schlechten Arbeitsbedingungen ist bei den Einkaufspraktiken der 
Discounter zu suchen. Aufgrund ihres riesigen Auftragsvoluments haben sie eine enorme Macht über 
die Lieferanten, können die Preise drücken und Lieferfristen kürzen. Das Motto lautet: Billiger, 
schneller, flexibler, das Risiko sollen die Lieferanten tragen. Die Produzenten in Bangladesh und 
anderswo setehen diesen riesigen Konzernen machtlos gegenüber. Sie geben den Druck weiter an die 
Näherinnen, auf deren Rücken letztentlich der Kampf und die niedrigen Preise ausgetragen wird.  
(KsK 2008a:6) 
Some suppliers furthermore criticize that buyers use audit reports to pressure them and 
tell them what to do (A3, S2). In the eyes of some suppliers, buyers put enough pressure 
on them in terms of quality, lead time, and price; social compliance is then seen as a 
disturbing cost factor, but they find ways to deal with it (S2, S5, S8). The CCC and other 
NGOs claim that in a situation of structural power in global supply chains, suppliers 
mainly react with one of the following strategies or a combination (Hearson 2006:15f):  
• They pass the pressure to the workers, exploit them, pay low wages, force them to 
work overtime and provide insecure contracts, as NGOs regularly report – i.e., they 
do not implement the social standards.  
• They cheat in audits (! compare chapter 9.2.3).  
• They subcontract to factories in which social standards are often bad, without being 
transparent about this (CCC 2008:49). Local NGOs claim that many of the firms 
subcontract more than they admit (N9a,b). Most interviewees regard subcontracting 
as problematic because social standards in the often rather small, subcontracted 
factories are very low (A2, A6). As the quote of one auditor pinpoints: “That factory 
has to be audited for compliance. It'll never pass. These small types subcontractors, 
forget it. It's like banging the head on the wall” (A2). Many subcontractors are said 
to be working informally, often children work. Business-wise subcontracting can also 
be problematic, as it can lead to delays in inputs (A6). One main problem about 
subcontracting, as one auditor says, is that it is hardly possible to identify when 
orders are subcontracted without authorization, even if it happens all the time: “you 
can't always find it out, but occasionally we do” (A2).  
                                                      
113 http://www.labourbehindthelabel.org/background/responses/101-purchasing-practices, 10.10.2009 
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The CCC demands that brands and retailers address the impacts their purchasing practices 
have on the implementation of ethical standards and report about the results of 
assessment and remediation in the supply chain (Hearson 2009:24:8) (Wick 2009:48):  
As an integral part of internal monitoring and external verification, companies should determine the 
negative impacts of their purchasing practices on working conditions, and take steps to alleviate 
these negative impacts. This could include measures such as establishing stable, lasting relations 
with suppliers, a preference of unionized factories and by setting clear values for living wages by 
country, and showing that these have been factored into pricing agreements. (Merk 2008) 
The CCC claims that even if smaller companies might have less power, they can also 
change their purchasing practices and are thus responsible for working conditions (N22). 
The FWF, for instance, mainly has small and medium companies as members, whereas 
many large and powerful companies join the BSCI. Being a campaigning and not a 
consulting organization, the CCC does not go into great detail how they should be 
changed, but refers to membership in the FWF, which it co-founded for such reasons.  
Various BSCI members and other companies in their own defence claim that they 
already consider the issues that the CCC demands in their purchasing policies, e.g., by 
building up long-term relationships with suppliers or by discussing factory capacities 
(B1, B4, B6, B27). These practise are said to have positive effects on quality, reliability 
and social performance.  
However, as there is no transparency about what companies do, they can assert what 
they want. For instance, one buyer (B6) confirms that the buyers’ purchasing policies – 
low prices and lead times – contribute to a large part of the problem and says that he must 
discuss capacities with the suppliers according to which they can orient themselves in the 
mid-term. In his strategy long-term relationships shall raise the quality and the social and 
environmental standards in order to better compete with other suppliers. In a longer 
cooperation the one-time investment into a supplier, whose social standards were 
developed, might even pay off due to efficiency or lowering acquisition costs. But the 
same interviewee says that his company has major difficulties if it has to pay ten cents 
more for a T-Shirt just because the supplier is a better performer in terms of CSR. In this 
case, the space for manoeuvring is relatively small. The quote illustrates his view:  
Mit unserer Einkaufspolitik leisten wir einen maßgeblichen Beitrag auch dazu, dass es zu diesen 
Problemen kommt. Das heißt, wir müssen uns dann auch gefallen lassen, darüber zu diskutieren, wie 
sieht das mit unserem Pricing-Verfahren aus: Können Lieferanten überhaupt zu den Preisen, die wir 
machen, die Qualität produzieren, die wir verlangen? Also auch die soziale Qualität. … das setzt 
wiederum voraus, dass man sich die Kalkulation auch mal aufdeckt. Das geht nur, wenn man als 
gleiche Partner an diesem dialogischen Prozessen sitzt und nicht als Mediator steht, und dann den 
großen Dirigenten macht und sagt: Einigt euch mal schön, dass Ihr die sozialen Parameter einhaltet - 
und wir geben euch dann auch nochmal ein paar Tipps, wie man den Feuerlöscher richtig hängt. 
(B6) 
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Companies frame their arguments in terms of structural constraints and costs. They claim 
that their power to implement social standards into their supply chains is limited in four 
ways:  
• The fashion market is highly competitive, and it demands flexibility, short lead 
times, and high quality. 
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• The price competition on the consumer markets for a particular product limits how 
much lead firms can increase the FoB114 prices in order to compensate or support the 
suppliers for implementing standards.  
• The complexity of supply chains and their lack of transparency connect the 
implementation of social standards with high transaction costs, which can be lowered 
by reducing the complexity of the chain.  
• The factory management skills limit the possibility to integrate standards – i.e. the 
knowledge on the supply level of how to manage a factory is missing, which can be 
compensated by qualifying suppliers. (! This argument is presented in chapter 10.2)  
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Although most lead firms argue that quality, price and social standards are equally 
important, lead firms usually focus most on quality and on prices. Lead firms focus a 
large part of their attention in their supply chain relationships on product quality, e.g. 
product measurements, shrinking of textiles after washing, colour fading etc. and 
therefore the confection part is most relevant (B2, B3, B5, B23). Mistakes that happen 
here can make a product unsellable, which leads to losses for the buyer, and the supplier. 
Therefore, buyers and their suppliers take a lot of efforts to assure that the products meet 
the buyers’ quality requirements, and many lead agents take a lot of effort to test the 
quality of their products (! compare Box 13). NGOs sometimes criticize that brands and 
retailers test the quality of their products more rigorously than they test the quality of 
social standards (N2).  
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Buyers show different opinions and experiences regarding the flexibility in sourcing and 
their relationships with the suppliers. Some say that “it doesn’t make sense to change 
permanently” (B2), and others claim that they consciously keep a constant supply base 
                                                      
114 FOB=freight on board 
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and try not to change suppliers often, but only if they have to. Others say that “it is not 
possible” to survive without frequently changing the suppliers that will always be there 
(B6, B7), the fluctuation can be up to 35% of the annual order volume (B5, B6, B7). 
Buyers name three reasons why they cannot rely solely on long-term relationships:  
• Need to adapt to the changing fashion market, increased by liberalization of the 
MFA.  
• Flexibility reduces risks. 
• Flexibility allows buyers to exert power over suppliers.  
First, the most important reason given for the need of flexibility is fashion and the 
quickly changing fashion market and demand for styles. This is said to require a broad 
spectrum of suppliers, who are able to produce different goods. If suppliers are not able to 
produce according to the demands anymore, maybe because the new season demands a 
different style, suppliers must be changed (B4, B5, B6). Changing factories is easier than 
factories changing their products. Thus, fashion is seen as a structural issue that a single 
company cannot change: 
Man braucht ein breites Spektrum an Lieferanten um möglichst schnell unterschiedlichste Produkte 
liefern zu können. Werden in einem Jahr Pailletten nachgefragt kann man von einem Basic-
Lieferanten nicht erwarten seine Produktion umzustellen. (B7) 
Es gibt immer wieder Modetrends, denen man Folge leisten muss, das ist ein ganz großes Thema, wo 
einfach auch ganz klar ist, ein Jahr ist Pailletten ‚in’, das braucht man, und das hält dann vielleicht 
noch ein 2. Jahr, aber im 3. Jahr möchte das keiner mehr sehen, da spezialisiert man sich natürlich 
schon sehr, gerade bei Modetrends, das ist ein Grund. Das ist relativ schwierig, diese Fabriken 
umzustellen. (B4) 
Having said this, which products a company produces and how much it follows a certain 
trend is strongly determined by the corporate philosophy. Some companies purposely 
decided to only offer simple basic products, like T-Shirts, which make it more possible to 
build up an ecological and fair supply chain. With basic products this is easier, because 
the fashion trends do not change quickly (B1, B26) and there is no need to quickly 
change a supplier for fashion reasons.  
Second, buyers use flexibility and diversification in sourcing to fight off risks coming 
from the supplier or from external sources. A typical quote used by almost every single 
corporate interviewee is:  “You don’t put all eggs into one basket”. A buyer never knows 
whether this supplier keeps up to his promises he makes in a contract, or whether the 
market might not offer a better alternative. This prevents buyers from setting up contracts 
that last longer than one order. Many buyers explain that they ‘test’ suppliers – i.e. place 
an order and see whether they are satisfied with what this supplier delivers. If the supplier 
does not satisfy them, they need to be able to dismiss the supplier after two or three years 
(B5). However, as long as a supplier is tested, a buyer will not invest in him. 
Additionally, things can go wrong with a delivery, and then the supplier needs to be 
changed (B3). For instance, despite the attractiveness of Bangladesh as innovative and 
high performance knit-market, sourcing from it was a big problem in 2007 due to the 
insecure political situation (B6). Such risks explain why buyers do not source only from 
one country, even if conditions seem very attractive (B3, B5, B12). 
Third, one lead firm says that the flexibility in sourcing allows to exert more pressure 
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on suppliers, as the supplier is aware that each order might be his last one if he does 
things wrong (B5). But the power relations are not always so clear-cut as suppliers also 
cut relationships with their buyers, for instance, if the lead firm is too small to be very 
relevant (A2, B4, B23).  
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Interviewees from lead firms limit their responsibility by saying that they are not very 
flexible on prices (B3, B6, B8).115 Some interviewees claim to be in a ‘high priced’ 
market, whereas others are in a ‘low priced’ market. One company that is selling eco-
quality garments for a higher price explains that it is more flexible in the prices it can pay 
because their corporate philosophy does not emphasize low prices, but quality, ecology 
and fashion (B1). In contrast, the corporate philosophy of discounters like Aldi and Lidl 
that are strongly criticized by the CCC (! CH 10.1) has a much stronger emphasis on 
prices and has much less space to manoeuvre.  
The difference between lead agents that are oriented towards ‘high prices’ and those 
oriented towards ‘low prices’ can be illustrated with the example of a plain white T-Shirt, 
which when bought from India or Bangladesh in large amounts costs between 
approximately 1 and 5$ FOB116, depending very much on the amount and quality. Some 
interviewees considering themselves not as low priced explain that they would not change 
the supplier if he raised the price of a T-shirt by 4 cents (B4, B16), 10 cents (B1) or even 
more (B22). One company that is selling T-shirts below 5 Euro argues that the prices do 
not play the top priority in sourcing. However, he says that it will become very difficult 
to stick with a supplier, if he raises the price of a T-shirt price by 9 cents (B6), even if he 
is a better performer in CSR than the cheaper supplier.  
Nächster Fall: Der Best-Performer im CR-Bereich ist aber von den drei besten der Schlecht-
Performer im Preis (lacht). … und dann muss man gucken, so nach dem Motto, wie ist im pricing ... 
jetzt der Unterschied. Sind das 0,02 ! pro Artikel? Sind das 0,03 !? 0,10 !, 0,20 !? Ja? wie ändert 
sich eine Kalkulation, wenn ich das quasi bis zum Verkaufspreis durchkalkuliere. Nicht? Da wird es 
ja spannend. ... wenn dieser Best-Performer CR, sag mal, 8 oder 9 Cents im Einkauf pro Stück teurer 
ist, dann haben Sie schon ein Problem. Ein echtes Problem. (B6) 
These examples suggest that a company that is selling a T-Shirt to a low-price buyer (e.g. 
below 5 Euro) might have a different understanding of price flexibility in their purchasing 
practices than a company selling a T-Shirt for a higher price, e.g. 30 Euros117; but the 
interviews also show that it cannot be generalized and that it also very much depends on 
factors such as economies of scale, or the channels lead firms use to distribute the 
products.  
One interviewee from a company criticizes that NGOs use too simple models to 
calculate the labour costs in a product (compare CH 2, Figure 11 & CH 9.1.1). He regards 
the claim that the relatively low wages in garmenting could easily be raised or even 
doubled if the end price is increased only slightly as not realistic. The buyer argues that 
there are several points in the chain where the price increases. The increase in buying 
                                                      
115 These figures are hardly possible to get through interviews.  
116 FOB: Freight on board – shipping and taxes is extra.  
117 One company explains that he needn’t compete on the “Wühltischliga”, because they do not sell a T-Shirt for 5 Euro, 
but for 15 Euro; and this is not more expensive from a more comprehensive prespective, because the more expensive T-
Shirt compensates the higher price through its higher quality and longer life (B1:9). 
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prices might end up much higher than proposed by the CCC, and you “die in beauty”, 
when no one buys your product anymore (B1, B22). However, both buyers that are 
portrayed as critical, finally opted for a positive approach towards fair trade and organic 
cotton, saying that “you will somehow get it done”, if you approach the topic (B1, B22). 
While NGOs demand from lead firms that they pay high prices to enable the suppliers 
to pay living wages, buyers doubt that workers benefit from increased FOB prices, saying 
they do not trust that managers forward the prices. For instance, one interviewee argues 
that it is naïve to believe that the workers get the 10 Cents if he paid each supplier 10 
Cents more for a T-Shirt. Rather, the managers would take the profits: “I’ve seen it in 
China: the workers work hard, but the managers drive a 7er BMW” (B1). Due to such 
problems, the FWF argues that individual solutions have to be found for every supply 
chain situation in order to pay living wages, which might also be transferring additional 
money for each product directly to the workers, instead of paying the factory a higher 
price for the shirts (N26). Others suggest calculating the exact time it takes to produce a 
T-shirt, which would enable to calculate the exact wages and pay accordingly. This, 
however, requires some transparency.  
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Various companies argue that the power they hold over suppliers is limited and refer to 
the complexity of supply chains, indirect sourcing and subcontracting. Some brands 
propose to build up more partnership-like supply chains that include more trust.  
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Corporations refer to differences in power between direct and indirect sourcing. 
Companies argue that in direct sourcing they are better able to influence the supplier 
regarding social, environmental and quality standards. He has direct contact to the 
producer, direct access to the factory in which the goods are produced, and larger 
companies might also have a local office to support them (B2, B3, B6, B7). Particularly 
companies with local offices argue that they visit the factories very often, have a better 
trust relationship, and know exactly what happens inside with regard to workers (B3). 
The buyer also has a responsibility that the quality of the product is good and that the 
goods are delivered in time (B8), he therefore has to establish quality control systems and 
sanctions for delays.  
In indirect sourcing the lead firm has a contact to an import agency in Europe or to an 
export agency in the production country, but no direct access to the factory and therefore 
holds no direct power against the producer. In such cases the lead agent focuses even 
more on design and marketing and less on supply chain management. In indirect sourcing 
the agent, who has an office in the production country and usually also the market 
country, does all the work that needs to be done, like the direct interaction with the 
producer including quality control, logistics, taxes up to the shipping of the products, 
control of social standards – but its costs are therefore integrated (B2, B5, B6, B7). Some 
lead firms say that they are interested in the transparency of the production steps in the 
chain but do not want to interfere in the contracts the agency has with their producers 
(B7). Others argue that they know where their German importers source the products 
from, but that it is totally irrelevant because they are only interested in the product itself 
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(B5). Others again say that they are lacking transparency about their own supply chains, 
but hope that ‘Radio focus identification technology’ might in the future fill this gap 
(B3). 
Indirect sourcing thus makes it difficult for the lead firm to take responsibility for 
working conditions in the chains and to develop the producer, because there is no 
business relationship. At the same time buyers that are sourcing indirectly seem to be less 
interested in issues of responsibility. Some complain that agents are usually little 
interested in integrating social standards (B6)118. Due to problems regarding transparency 
in indirect sourcing, the BSCI adapted its rules and opened the membership for importers, 
shipping agents and exporters in 2008. For instance, the German discounters and BSCI 
members Aldi and Lidl work a lot through importers. According to the BSCI rules, the 
importers must also be member and then integrate his suppliers. Even one BSCI member 
criticizes that Aldi and Lidl now do not take responsibility anymore: 
Importeure und die Reedereien, vor allem in Deutschland ... kamen dazu, weil Lidl und Aldi gesagt 
haben, wenn ihr uns liefern wollt, dann müsst ihr BSCI Mitglied werden. ... Lidl und Aldi müssen 
nichts machen, dann machen es ihre Lieferanten. Also sie haben eigentlich die Verantwortung jetzt an 
diese Lieferanten weitergegeben. ...  das System erlaubt das, ermöglicht das, ob das jetzt gut ist oder 
nicht, das sehen wir dann in den nächsten zwei, drei Jahren. ... Wir könnten das ja eigentlich auch 
machen, ich habe mir das einmal überlegt, weil es uns das Leben auch einfacher macht. Aber man 
will ja wissen, was passiert auf diesen Wertschöpfungsketten. (B23) 
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Most lead firms expect that their suppliers tell them when they subcontract production as 
they fix in the contracts that this information must be disclosed, and they must assure that 
their suppliers stick to the same standards (B2, B3), or forbid subcontracting (B6). 
However, most buyers see subcontracting as a problem, and admit that it is difficult to 
identify whether a supplier subcontracts production (A2, B2, B3, B4, B5, B16). One 
interviewee explains that they have stopped sourcing from Tirupur due to the enormous 
subcontracting problems in all the small companies there, and instead they have moved to 
Bangladesh, where factories of 500 or 1.500 people do not subcontract, as the quote 
illustrates:  
Dieses ’contracted working’, dass wir in Indien gesehen haben, da schüttelt es einen, weil, sie nie den 
Verantwortlichen haben. Sie haben immer nur Leute, die sagen, nö, das macht jemand anders, habe 
ich gar nichts mit zu tun, ich kenne die wohl, aber was die da machen .. ich weiß nur wer die .. - der 
bekommt dann den Auftrag, dieser Achmet, besorge mal für morgen 30 Näher, und wo der die dann 
her kriegt ist dann seine Sache. Wie er sie bezahlt und wie lange die arbeiten, interessiert ihn 
überhaupt nicht. Das geht in China nicht. (B5) 
Various reasons are suggested why subcontracting can be found: Lack of management 
skills, company or industry structure, or the local institutional context:  
• Suppliers might take more orders than the capacity of their factory allows, which 
either leads to subcontracting or working overtime, and which is seen as bad 
management practices (A2). Suppliers, in contrast, argue that they are afraid to 
deter buyers if they do not accept the orders, which rather links to power. An auditor 
argues that the suppliers’ fear that they might loose business because they 
subcontract: “Am I going to loose trade? That is the first question that they ask, 
                                                      
118 This little interest in CSR by the import agents is confirmed by the research: Whereas most of the brands addressed for 
an interview agreed to do an interview, the big players sourcing through an audit – Aldi and Lidl as well as their importers 
who were addressed – did not agree to an interview.  
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because that is what they fear. They think that everyone wants in-house production” 
(A6). The interviewee suggests that a better trust-relationship between the buyer and 
the supplier is necessary. 
• A factory might not be able to conduct all processes under its own roof, due to 
company size or industry structure, which might make outsourcing necessary (A5, 
B4, B5). As factories are rather smaller in some regions than in others, one auditor 
suggests that the factory size might be connected to local laws (A6). One interviewee 
from a Top-10 German company claims that a factory in China with 50.000 workers 
does not do subcontracting, but the buyer explains that he is not able to place his 
orders in such a factory, because it prefers large buyers from the US that place much 
larger orders (B5). In contrast, in Tirupur, factories with more than 100 workers must 
have a medical room etc., which might lead owners to decide to stay small (A6). 
• Production might also be subcontracted for ‘cultural’ reasons: an auditor explains 
that in some regions women are not allowed by their husbands to go out of the house, 
and so they have to work at home – “it’s cultural reasons” (A6).  
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As most refer to supply chain complexity as a problem to implementing standards, the 
main question most have is: How to reduce complexity? Many strategies thus aim at 
making things ‘doable’, particularly in terms of costs and efficiency, e.g., by prioritizing 
and consolidating: 
If you scatter it all over, it is very difficult to monitor. … If you are doing big volumes in two or three 
factories, the productivity is bound to be better. So simply for better controls, most buyers are 
consolidating. … Quality will improve, productivity will improve, controls will. (A2) 
If you want to integrate the whole chain, you can take the producers times 15 or 20 – so you ask 
yourself: where to start and where to stop? That is why we need to prioritize. (B6) 
Many lead firms use the strategy to consolidate their supply chain by reducing the 
number of suppliers. They focus their efforts on some ‘strategic’ or ‘core’ suppliers or 
plan to do so (B2, B5, B6, B7, B9). A strategic supplier is often a larger supplier and 
forerunner in quality, who has been working extensively with the buyer, and who shall 
grow with the company. Some brands or retailers build up a long-term relationship with 
so-called ‘core’ or ‘strategic’ suppliers that entails a good trust relationship. One larger 
lead firm says that they are working with 20 suppliers out of 700 for more than 10 years 
(B5). This enables them to invest limited financial and time resources for CSR on fewer 
suppliers and can develop ecological and social criteria. This is argued to have positive 
effects on business performance factors. Companies see the benefits of strategic supplier 
relationships in increased trust relationships between the buyer and supplier, more control 
over the managing systems, lower costs e.g. for monitoring, prioritized treatment, e.g. by 
getting a high percentage of the capacity, a supplier will, however, only invest a lot in 
favour of one company, if he is also recognised in the orders over a longer period (B1, 
B9). Strategic suppliers must therefore somehow build up trust and better guarantee a 
certain amount of orders, whereas the buyer does not want to become too restricted by 
binding himself too long to a certain supplier (B6).  
The one factory I was talking about earlier they were growing with us from a very small. They have 
been working with us for 10 or 12 years now and daily would probably be more interested in putting 
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their time, money etc in for us. (B9) 
Having said this, there are huge differences regarding what percentage accounts to 
strategic suppliers. Even if a buyer tries to build up long-term relationships with some 
‘core’ suppliers, most that are involved in fashion will still have fluctuating suppliers. 
And despite the advantages of better relationships in the chain, to remain flexible it might 
still be necessary to break up the relationship with a strategic supplier who has been 
supplying for 30 years, a company argues (B5). Having said this, some very small fashion 
brands with less than 5 Mio Euro turnover argue that they do not have a choice but that 
they work with a very few suppliers; this is seen as both, an advantage, but also a risk, if 
things go wrong (B25).  
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In sum, on the one hand, lead agents’ purchasing practices are criticized as structural 
constraints that prevent suppliers from implementing standards and put them into a 
situation of dependency. On the other hand, lead agents defend their practices with 
reference to the structural conditions into which they are embedded such as: the demands 
of the fashion market, costs and competition, and the producers’ poor management skills. 
The following issues are mainly contested: 
• NGOs claim that due to their power, lead firms share a large responsibility for 
improving the conditions in factories. Most lead firms agree that they share some 
responsibility, but also claim that they already do a lot. However, since the situation 
for each company and each order is different, there is no common understanding how 
this responsibility can be defined with regards to purchasing practices. The BSCI 
does not touch this issue but recommends trainings for buyers, whereas the FWF 
deals individually with the issue through the management system audits and annual 
reports that are published by every company and for every supplier.  
• One conflict deals with the structural conditions in which each actor is situated. 
According to the NGO/producer perspective, suppliers are the victims of lead agents 
who exert power by demanding social standards, fast delivery and low prices, and by 
threatening to move to another producer if the demands are not fulfilled. According 
to the brand/retailer perspective they also are in a position that they cannot do much, 
as the fashion industry and the consumers demand a quick turnover of products (i.e. 
short delivery times) and the global competition demands looking for the best prices. 
The reference to the structural conditions suggests that the focus on transaction costs 
alone does not help understanding the struggles regarding purchasing policies, but 
that e.g. the concept of embeddedness of the GPN is needed in addition.  
• Whereas NGOs claim that buyers pay too low prices for the goods and demand too 
short lead times, most companies either argue that they try to adapt their purchasing 
policies to the suppliers’ needs or that the structural conditions do not allow them to 
pay higher prices or admit longer lead times. However, the insecurity of the market 
makes some suppliers accept low prices if these are connected with a high order 
volume, since it provides some short-term security. These conflicts call for more 
transparency to be able to evaluate whether prices are fair.  
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• There is a conflict between power and trust relationships in the supply chain. Mostly 
NGOs stress that lead agents have the power to implement standards and that they 
should use this power in a way to demand standards but also support the suppliers. 
Economic actors in the GPN rather stress that a trust-based relationship is needed in 
order to implement standards. But both initiatives, BSCI and FWF, argue that they 
follow a partnership-based approach to implementing standards, although the CCC 
criticizes the BSCI for not requiring the adaptation of purchasing practices, which is 
not seen as partnership-oriented.  
• While structural conditions constrain each single economic actor in the global 
production network, lead firms refer to the management skills of the suppliers that 
constrain the possibility to implement standards. Lead agents and the producers 
further refer to transaction costs as constraining factor for implementing standards.   
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The BSCI, the FWF and many lead firms claim that the management skills of factory 
managers need to be improved to raise working conditions. The FWF demands from its 
members that they support the suppliers, build up an auditing system, change their own 
purchasing policies and report about this. The BSCI, in contrast, demands that members 
initiate audit processes and capacity building in the direct supply factories (! CH 7). 
This is a quite strong difference regarding how the two initiatives frame ‘corporate 
responsibility’ (! Table 18).  
!"#$%&-?D&e'<&LM).&"*0&PQP&(/"8%&+=%&8%8#%/,N&/%,9'*,3#3$3+3%,&('/&389/'J3*7&<'/C3*7&2'*03+3'*,&
a'<*&0%,37*b&
& LM).& PQP&
Q="+&3,&+=%&8"3*&9/'#$%8&#%=3*0&
<'/C3*7&2'*03+3'*,^&
U37+(-(),+,-.!3-!.5,!C(2.&*3,7! P1*25(73-)!/*(2.32,7!&C!'18,*7!6!
+37+(-(),+,-.!3-!C(2.&*3,7!!
Q='&3,&8"3*$>&/%,9'*,3#$%&('/&
389/'J3*7&+=%&,3+1"+3'*^&&
P*&012,*7!(-0!7.(D,5&%0,*7!3-!.5,!
/*&012.3&-!2&1-.*8!
G5,!7.(D,5&%0,*7!3-!.5,!/*&012.3&-!
2&1-.*3,7!(-0!.5,!'18,*7!75(*,!(!
*,7/&-73'3%3.8!!
e'<&("/&0'%,&+=%&/%,9'*,3#3$3+>&'(&
+=%&#/"*0,O/%+"3$%/,&7'^&&
ZMIQ!+,+',*7!5(J,!.&!3-.,)*(.,!.5,!
71//%3,*7!3-.&!.5,!(103.!787.,+4!3#,#!.&!
3-3.3(.,!.5,!/*&2,77,7!
S\S!+,+',*7!5(J,!(!*,7/&-73'3%3.8!
.&!3+/*&J,!.5,!71//%3,*7!(-0!.&!
25(-),!.5,3*!&H-!',5(J3&1*!.5(.!.5,!
71//%3,*7!2(-!3+/*&J,!
 
h'*;2'89$3"*2%&2"1,%0&#>&9''/&8"*"7%8%*+&,C3$$,&
The framing of responsibility can be connected to what actors portray as the main 
problem of poor working conditions. The main reasoning behind the BSCI approach to 
responsibility is that the ‘relevant’ work-related problems in factories are mainly caused 
by mismanagement in the factories. This reasoning is connected to the belief that 
national governments take care of more ‘political’ problems (e.g. minimum wages and 
freedom of association), whereas the companies have to deal with the ‘managerial’ 
problems (e.g. health & safety) inside the factory. The solution to the ‘relevant’ problems 
offered by the BSCI is proper management and training of factory managers, whereas 
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politics shall deal with ‘political’ problems (! CH 9.1.2). The CCC and FWF agree that 
management in the factories has to be improved. But in contrast, both argue that the 
structural conditions of global competition are such that producers de facto cannot behave 
responsibly. One central aspect of a solution is therefore presented to be a change in 
purchasing policies (! CH 10.1). The remainder of the chapter presents the arguments 
related to training factory managers.  
Training managers how to run a factory efficiently shall help to manage factories 
within the legal rules, and some argue that this might end up in higher profits on the 
supplier side, which they could transfer to the workers, a consultant argues (A8). 
Management training is regarded as necessary, as major problems in the management and 
organization are seen in the whole industry: “This whole business is substantially 
disorganised. You are not sure whether fabrics come in time or not come in time; and 
then whether your imported trims are going to get stuck at the customs or not” (S1).  
What NGOs frame as power of the large lead firms, the BSCI and some other actors 
rather regard as the normal competition in a free trade market (A8). Producers argue that 
every factory manager has the responsibility to decide what he can produce within the 
‘rules of the game’ and what becomes too much. If prices get too low or lead times too 
short to produce according to the laws, a responsible factory manager must turn down an 
order (A8, S6, S8, S9). If other producers are cheaper and thus more competitive, the 
market moves on: 
So why stop here, why not go somewhere else where it is cheaper? That is a fact of life, that is the 
way how international trade works, and must work. … If there is a Vietnam or a Cambodia, or a 
Bangladesh, which can supply the equivalent quality of the product, satisfying the customers, giving 
at a good price, and work a lot of consistency over a bit of time, and the buyer shifts to that customer 
… that is a fact of live. There is no other answer to this. The reason the buyers came to me in the first 
place, is that our wages are cheaper. (S5) 
For instance, one producer says that he simply cannot take orders from Zara, H&M or 
Esprit, because they demand a lead time of 55 days, which does not fit into his own 
stringent production planning (S2). Others argue that due to the demand and risks 
connected to them in the export of garments they prefer to supply the national market in 
India. Here the orders are lower in number, but the lead times longer and the quality 
control not that strict and he does not run the risk of cancellation (S1). A third producer 
argues: “Buyers from Europe, they are asking very low price. We are facing difficulty, 
we find it too tight. … We don't take that risk. We don't go for this play of games. It will 
kill you” (S9). However, he says that some suppliers with low skills take such orders 
(S9).  
Some interviewees argue that factory managers can best be convinced to comply with 
the laws in the business language, e.g., by pointing out win-win aspects of the 
implementation of rights e.g. referring to productivity, even if it is connected with costs 
(A6, A8, N7). However, NGOs agree that increasing productivity might help producers to 
implement standards, but warn that there is no automatic link between increased 
productivity in a factory and better working conditions. The quote illustrates how auditors 
try to convince managers to improve standards:  
A subcontractor, he was just into ironing of garments. I happen to visit him, and I said, there are no 
fans on your premise. It is too hot. It is inhuman. He said, you can check with the workers, and they 
like it that way. … Then I sat with the supplier, and a spoke to him, and I said, have you ever heard 
Chapter 10: Executive regulation in global production networks  151 
an incidence, were your product has been rejected? He said yes. Was it due to the reason of there 
were being a stain on your garment. He said, yes. How do you know? I said do you know from where 
the stain had come? He said, no, in fact, I had kept hunting for it, because I am so particular about 
the quality, and I couldn't identify. I said, it came from your pressing unit. Because they were 
sweating. … So I said, now, to think they want fans for your workers are not. He said, yes of course I 
need fans.  (A6) 
These arguments are very much ingrained in the free market model, which is regarded as 
beneficial, as one consultant argues: “we have globally developed quite well with the free 
trade model so far” (A8). In his argument he presupposes a functioning market economy 
in which basic conditions like laws are set, and thinks that Bangladesh is moving towards 
this situation: 
Wenn wir davon ausgehen, dass wir eine funktionierende freie Marktwirtschaft haben, die die 
Umsetzung bestimmter Basisanforderungen auch umsetzen ...  ich im Rahmen dieser Marktwirtschaft 
immer das bestreben habe Produkte effizienter und günstiger zu produzieren und einzukaufen. Das ist 
letztlich das Modell, mit dem wir uns - denke ich - global uns doch recht gut entwickelt haben. Das ist 
der Bezugsrahmen, in dem wir uns bewegen. Und innerhalb dieses Rahmens muss ein Lieferant, wenn 
ich bestimmte Preise nicht machen kann, dann auch den Mumm haben auch zu sagen: Nein, das geht 
nicht. Und dann wird der Einkäufer auch sehr schnell feststellen, dass bestimmte Sachen nicht gehen. 
Das ist ein Prozess, der findet ja auch tatsächlich statt. Einkäufer kommen immer wieder in Märkte 
zu Produzenten mit Vorstellungen, die nicht realisierbar sind. Und sehr viele Unternehmer sagen 
dann auch, nein Leute, das geht nicht, tut mir Leid, versucht's woanders. Und dann stellen die Leute 
auch fest: das geht nicht. Es gibt dann natürlich auch immer wieder Unternehmer, die akzeptieren 
auch jeden Preis, um dann hinterher festzustellen, dass sie weder die Qualität liefern können, noch 
dass sie pünktlich liefern können oder dass sie auch irgendeine Mark dran verdient haben. Das ist 
auf der einen Seite dann natürlich bis zu einem gewissen Punkt die Verantwortung dessen, der den 
Preis akzeptiert hat. (A8) 
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Some argue that low management skills are connected to the embeddedness of economic 
actors. Particularly in Bangladesh low management skills are connected to cultural and 
historical reasons. Garment and textiles is a starting point for many, who want to start a 
business. In Bangladesh many factory managers were farmers before they opened up a 
garment factory, and e.g., the largest supplier recruited 90% of its management from the 
military because they are known to lead many people, but not in a sense that is connected 
to working rights, a consultant says (A4). The garment industry is not capital intensive, 
the people have land to build a factory, but many have no skills to run it with a good 
human resources management (A4, A8). An Indian government representative similarly 
argues that their own garment industry is very bad in productivity, as compared to e.g. 
China (G1). 
A consultant argues that managers in Bangladesh have only started to realize that they 
need to increase the efficiency of their production in order to survive the competition in 
the global market, and that factories in other countries are much more efficient, pay 
higher prices and are still competitive (A8). The complaints of suppliers in Bangladesh 
regarding low prices for their products are thus seen as a bad excuse that mainly refers to 
their lack of management skills or willingness to deal with the issues (A6). A consultant 
recommends brands and retailers to focus on issues relating to efficiency – as the 
government should focus on guaranteeing that the ‘rules of the game’ are fulfilled (A8). 
Das ist nach unserer Beobachtung ein typischer Markt, wo das Thema der Effizienz in der Produktion 
eigentlich erst am Anfang ist, dass die Leute jetzt langsam realisieren, dass sie auch ihren Betrieb 
entsprechend optimieren müssen, um dann im globalen Wettbewerb bestehen zu können. dass es eben 
nicht nur super-niedrige Löhne sind, die man braucht, um dauerhaft zu überleben. (A8) 
Nach unserer Einschätzung ist der wesentliche Stellenmechanismus dafür zu sorgen, dass die 
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Rahmenbedingungen in den Ländern, was Sozial- und Umweltstandards angeht, dass die Einhaltung 
dieser Standards, das sollte möglichst garantiert sein. Da wird es immer Ausbrecher und 
Ungerechtigkeiten geben. Aber im Prinzip sollte dort schon eine möglichst einheitliche Basis sein, 
und der Rest ist dann normale Marktwirtschaft, wo der Markt, der in der Lage ist, sich effizienter zu 
organisieren, und der Betrieb, der in der Lage ist, seine Prozesse entsprechend zu organisieren, dann 
den entsprechenden Zuschlag bekommt…. es gibt dann natürlich immer noch finanzielle 
Notwendigkeiten. dass natürlich das Spannungsfeld ist, die Preise, die ich bekomme, und die 
Effizienz, die ich habe, da habe ich natürlich immer ein großes Spannungsfeld. (A8) 
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Most interviewees argue that workers need to be empowered to achieve their rights. 
Mainly NGOs and trade unions regard the right to freedom of association as the single 
most important standard to improve working conditions – “the ultimate way to achieve 
any of these other codes” – and some view denying this right as a crime119:  (B6, A6, N4a, 
N8, N9a,b, N7). Workers are regarded as the best auditors, who know best what they 
want and who have an interest in changing their situation. The CCC writes: 
Freedom of association and collective bargaining are known as enabling rights because they give 
workers a tool to monitor their own workplace and to negotiate with management on the 
improvement of working conditions. This standard is routinely denied in both law and in practice. 
(Merk 2008) 
Many interviewees agree that workers first need to know about their rights (A1, N4a) and 
then have to be empowered. However, the opinions on how the right must be realized and 
who is responsible for doing so vary strongly. This chapter asks: How should workers 
be empowered, and what arguments do the BSCI and the FWF present? 
10.3.1 P/%%0'8&'(&",,'23"+3'*:&+/"0%&1*3'*,&"*0&<'/C%/&",,'23"+3'*,&
Interviewees disagree on the question whether workers should join trade unions to realize 
their right to freedom of association. One the one hand, CCC and other NGOs argue that 
workers must join trade unions. They claim that they cannot, because the (structural) 
conditions in the factories and in the production countries prevent them from doing so. In 
this view, the power relations inside a factory prevent a proper organization of workers 
and therefore buyers and other groups have to support an ‘enabling’ environment where 
workers are free to join a trade union. The FWF argues similarly.  
On the other hand, mainly buyers, suppliers and some auditors argue that workers could 
unionize but do not want to. Various reasons are given, mainly that workers do not see 
the benefits in unions and that there are alternative ways of empowerment. In this view, 
solutions can best be found inside the factories, e.g., in workers’ committees. Trade 
unions, in contrast, are seen as a political task beyond the responsibility of a company. 
This view reflects the arguments of the BSCI.    
kQ'/C%/,&81,+&_'3*&+/"0%&1*3'*,l&&
Workers must make use of their right to organize and they should best do this in trade 
unions, because this is seen to lead to better working conditions and might help save 
costs. This view is supported by the CCC, which sees one of its major tasks in the urgent 
                                                      
119 On a multi-stakeholder meeting of the FLO one participant said that the denial of the right to freedom of association is 
as bad as child labour. (FLO Meeting in Utrecht, 4.3.2010) 
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action campaigns which often make public dismissals of workers that join trade unions. 
Local NGOs have a similar view: 
Our philosophy has been workers are the best monitors of labour standards. And it is very important 
that workers' organisations emerge. … The economic conditions may not be ideal for unions to 
emerge, but these efforts have to be made. (N4a) 
If you are an external person coming from away, and you have less power to control, but whereas the 
union can really hit back immidiately with their workers. They will say, you have to pay me this, or I 
will not work. When you say that, the man has to change, or he has to close the production. (N9a) 
Social dialogue system is healthy, your workers are like foot soldiers in the war of competition; they 
know exactly how to improve productivity best. So your accidents will come down, the quality of your 
products will go up, all these kind of measures. So in the end, the assumption that production costs go 
up, because you respect labour standards, is outweigh by the benefits that you get from the fact that 
you respect labour standards. And we have more and more going on that (N8) 
According to this perspective most workers do not know about their rights, and even if 
they knew about them, they would not complain or unionize. They are seen as 
constrained by the ‘disabling’ environment in the factory and in the production country. It 
is criticized that the power relations between employers and workers inside factories do 
not allow workers to make use of their right to freedom of association (! CH 9 on 
auditing). They argue that workers do not engage in trade unions because they fear being 
fired if they complain and not being guaranteed their working rights if they engage in 
trade unions (A1, A6, N4b, N9a). NGO representatives say that every worker can be fired 
immediately with some official excuse, even if he has worked in a factory for 8 years. 
The high worker turnover is seen as proving this (N4b, N9b). In a nutshell: having this 
right “doesn’t mean that I respect your right” (A3). A visit in a factory producing 
expensive German shoes in South India owned by a German company illustrates this 
problem120: During the factory visit the (German) local factory manager openly says that 
he doesn’t want to have any trouble in the factory; as soon as he realizes that workers are 
trying to organize, he fires the leader of the group. The following quote illustrates the 
problem of power relations between employers and employees inside a factory that are 
connected to trade union activities: 
If anyone becomes part of the union process, they are being thrown out. So generally there is a kind 
of fear among the workers in a broader perspective - if we are part of the union, if we get into union 
activities, I may lose my job. So I don't want to be in union. … I had a few cases that tailors had been 
terminated and they got a short cast notice. A notice that you have made a mistake; if you don't 
answer within 24 hours, the management will decide upon your job. Then he doesn't respond. And 
even if he responds, then they will say that we are not satisfied with the reply. … So the union is 
slowly disappearing because of the hard policy of the employers. (N9b) 
Various actors argue that local/national institutions in production countries prevent 
workers from unionizing, for instance the government policies towards trade unions. 
Some buyers argue that it is almost impossible to integrate trade unions in some countries 
for reasons controlled by the sourcing country government: In China independent trade 
unions do not exist, former communist countries in Eastern Europe have large problems 
with trade unions, in Bangladesh they argue that there are too many, and in export 
processing zones in Bangladesh, they are forbidden (B2, B5, B8). Also the FWF argues 
that e.g. in Turkey it is hardly possible to push through freedom of association (N26). 
Others’ arguments refer to beliefs, which are also informal institutions. NGOs suggest 
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that producers try to reduce trouble with the workers by mainly employing women, 
because women ought to be less likely to complain or organize in unions, but are “more 
concerned of earning their bread and butter”. In contrast, various suppliers in Tirupur 
argue that it does not make sense that workers fear being fired because due to the higher 
worker turnover factories are having problems keeping workers in the factory. Workers 
leave their factory, if the factory next door offers some Rupees more, they explain. 
Threatening to fire workers, they argue, cannot frighten the workers.  
How to achieve freedom of association? NGOs and the FWF say that lead firms should 
generally prefer unionized factories in their sourcing policies (N4). If this is not an 
option, buyers should adapt a ‘positive’ approach and build up an ‘enabling’ 
environment that actively supports workers to make use of their right to FoA by building 
or joining a trade union without being fired, particularly in regions/countries where trade 
unions are forbidden (! Box 14). Freedom of association is prevented in two ways by 
the ‘disabling’ environment. 
First, there are no institutions that would encourage workers to raise their voice and that 
reduce the workers’ fear that they might lose their job (N4b). The most important 
(informal) institution is seen in the trust workers should have to local groups. These local 
groups would work to help the workers: educate them, build leaders that raise their voice, 
check workers’ security documents or the contracts, or who ask buyers to demand 
contracts that refer to the maximum turnover of workers (N4b). NGOs claim that in order 
to establish something like this, it needs local network structures that support the workers, 
like grievance mechanisms or local governing boards (! Box 14 & CH 10.3.2). 
However, various existing national institutions are rather seen as disabling rather than 
enabling workers to associate freely. For example, the Bangladesh Economic Processing 
Zones (EPZ) is an exceptional space where trade unions are forbidden by law to attract 
investors and promote exports. The “No.1 business portal to Bangladesh” still advertises 
restrictions in freedom of association as “production oriented labour laws”:  
PRODUCTION ORIENTED LABOUR LAWS. Law forbids formation of any labour union in EPZS. 
Strike within the zones prohibited. BEPZA is vested with responsibility to administer labour matters 
for all enterprises in EPZs.121 
The FWF argues that it has taken up some of these thoughts in their local partner 
networks, and the BSCI also claims that it has established its round tables in the 
production countries to help raise awareness of worker needs (! CH 7). However, one 
buyer, who argues that it is very important to install unions, says that it takes a lot of time 
to install such structures, and refers to the need of time to develop, referring to the 
industrialized countries that have taken many years during industrialization to establish 
worker participation:  
Wenn es uns gelingt, hier Formen der Mitbestimmung, der Mitarbeitermitbestimmung in den Märkten 
zu implementieren, dann ist viel gewonnen. das geht aber nicht von heute auf morgen, und dafür hat 
auch die westliche Welt Jahrzehnte gebraucht, um zu so einer Form des, ich sag mal, sozialen 
Dialogs zukommen mit Gewerkschaftern und Arbeitnehmervertretern, dass man auf so hohem Niveau 
miteinander umgeht, wie wir es hier in der westlichen Welt gewohnt sind. Da sind wir auch zu Beginn 
der Industrialisierung. Die fangen da an, zu den Zeiten, die wir hier in der westlichen Welt ja auch 
mal hatten, als Mitarbeiter Mitbestimmung entsprechend auch mal entstand. (B6) 
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Second, one local NGO argues that the workers have a weak position, because they have 
no contracts and because of the need for flexibility in the industry: 
Some of the traditional trade union ways of enrolling membership and organising may not work in 
this sectors. Because of the vulnerability of the workers. Vulnerability because of these weak 
contracts between the management and the workers. The workers can lose their jobs any time. It is a 
very flexible, quick moving industry, which can move from place to place very fast. So it is very 
important that, if you want to have workers coming to organisations, it is important to have pre-union 
structures. So that the organising urge is content. And of course, unions have to emerge. (N4a) 
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While most interviewees agree that freedom of association (FoA) should be granted to 
workers, by far not all share the view that workers must achieve this through trade 
unions. Workers are seen as reluctant to unionize for different reasons. Most factory 
managers claim that workers can organize and that they are open; workers can always 
approach them with problems, and they will discuss the problems with the conflicting 
parties122 (A3, S2, S6). Similarly it is argued that ‘freedom of association’ is a right and 
not a duty, and that they will not force workers to associate if these do not want to do it 
voluntarily (B8, N26). Three main arguments are presented that shall explain why 
workers do not want to join trade unions.  
First, some managers and consultants blame the workers’ mentality as a reason why 
there is little trade union activity. For instance, one consultant explains that workers think 
                                                      
122 This can certainly be related to the bias of data selection that managers were open for the interview, who are also more 
open for workers.  
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that it is wrong to go to the management cabin and complain, and that they will be fired if 
they do so. With reference to Hindi movies he argues that workers have a subservient 
mentality that is rooted in their socio-cultural history: “(in) old Hindi movies you see this 
culture very well. The boss comes, and they are supposed to stand and bend over for him” 
(A3). In addition, migrant workers are seen as trying to earn as much money as possible 
and thus not interested in paying money for unions (S7) or in organizing unions, because 
this also keeps them from working and earning money. Local NGOs admit that workers 
do not complain about the situation at work (N9a). However, they do not argue that this is 
the workers’ mentality, but structural reasons like job insecurity and the permanent risk 
of being fired for minor problems.  
Second, particularly producers and local auditors criticize trade unions as corrupt and 
politicized (S7, S8, A1, A3, A6) and as not representing or serving the workers. 
Politicians might use unions to instigate trouble against their opponents, unions might 
talk more about political issues and thus detract from issues within the factory, and they 
try to collect votes for the party from the workers or collect money from the workers or 
the management (S2, S7, A6). Local NGOs confirm such problems:  
Some experience that I have had, where the workers themselves said, we don't like trade unions. 
Because they only take money from us as membership. They don't do anything for us. They strike, and 
then, ultimately, lie and starve at home. So I am not interested in that. (A3, A6, N9b) 
The politicization is seen as a problem that makes cooperation with trade unions difficult. 
For instance, they are said to discuss every move with their political party before agreeing 
to a decision (N9b). A local NGO explains that the FWF tried to include local trade 
unions into audits, but nine local trade unions were not able to select a committee that 
would represent the unions in audits by the FWF:  
Why do have to form a committee? It isn't a very futuristic approach. Why do we have a committee? 
You can deal with each union as respectable organisation. … Even after their approach, again three 
years back, we were attempted to form a committee, and the bigger unions allege, if the smaller ones 
were elected, then we have to honor him - which is not possible. The smaller will allege: ok, the 
bigger ones are being elected by choice - the bigger ones always keep the smaller ones away. So the 
smaller ones say, we don't want the bigger ones. The bigger ones say you are organising 100 people, 
why should I have to admire him. (N9b) 
However, despite these problems many NGOs also argue that trade unions should not be 
condemned in general, and that there are large regional differences between politically 
affiliated trade unions and independent or free trade unions. The latter are more interested 
in the workers’ rights (N9, N26).  
Third, the workers’ reluctance to join trade unions is also explained with arguments that 
construct trade unions as bad for economic development. It is regarded as a threat to 
the competitiveness of factories and eventually to the workers’ jobs. The reluctance 
against trade unions might be normal company behaviour, as a German consultant says 
(A4). It is stronger in Bangladesh and in some parts of India, where many see trade 
unions as politicized or corrupted. One supplier sums up a view shared by many: “The 
more unions the more problems. With no union there is no problem” (S7). Some auditors 
argue that managers connect the existence of trade unions with an increased number of 
strikes, which are seen to raise production costs. Workers and managers fear that factories 
may close down, if trade unions protest too much (A1, A2, A4, A6): 
They have experienced unionization so often, so they are not encouraged to do any kind of thing. If 
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you know very well East Bengal. There were approximately 95 textile mills, jute mills, due to this 
union politicising, out of these 95, 91 are closed now. They striked, and only four are left. So this is 
not good. All are unemployed. So, taking this experience, any of the factory people, especially the 
lower price worker, who is to earn money for the food. (A1) 
The history is such, that the trade unions and the associations have only hampered work. It has cost a 
lot of closing down the factories. A lot of strikes and ... things like that. So the management has 
always been no no no to the trade unions. So they have a very different image. (A6) 
The argument that trade unions support strikes and that strikes destroy the economy was 
also widely reflected during the strikes in the ready-made-garment sector in Bangladesh 
in 2006, when factory workers protested for higher wages (! CH 8.2.3). Factory owners 
in Bangladesh and the associations representing them claim that striking workers and “so-
called trade unions” are a problem to the working atmosphere in the industry. In their 
view, establishing trade unions will be “suicidal” for the whole national garment industry 
– and in conclusion the employers’ representative body, BGMEA, demands that the 
industry should be kept ‘above politics’:  
If Trade Union / CBA is established in the garment industry it will be suicidal because of the attitude 
of the political leaders of Bangladesh. The CBA leaders will be close associate of the leaders of that 
area, the local leaders will act as guardians of the CBA leaders and the factories will be a common 
place of visit by the leaders, and the factory workers will start thinking of getting paid even without 
working (Article by a factory owners in TDS722). 
Allowing so-called trade union would destroy the working atmosphere in the labour intensive 
factories … If the garment factories close down, there will be a multifaceted effect in the society with 
over two million workers losing their jobs and all the related industries and business sectors like 
bank, insurance, transport, accessories, and ports facing a debacle, the speakers said. They said the 
garment sector should be kept above politics and the recent situation in the sector should be judged 
from realistic point of view.123  
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Many companies and the BSCI try to find management solutions for enabling freedom of 
association within factories, arguing that the national government should deal with 
political issues. One BSCI member argues that in some regions it is not possible to 
introduce trade unions. He regards freedom of association and trade unions as less 
important than, for instance, improving issues referring to health & safety, because there 
are solutions for empowering workers inside factories (B16). If workers protest too much, 
the situation gets too insecure for buyers. 
In 2006 when workers demonstrated for higher minimum wages and when there was 
turmoil in the country, European buying companies threatened to withdraw orders from 
Bangladesh: “Buyers are not sure about what is going on in Bangladesh and what will 
happen here next week. It creates uncertainty and the buyers tend to shift to other 
countries”124. In sum, buyers are more reluctant in establishing union structures, arguing 
that workers do not have to join or found a trade union, but that they have the ‘freedom’ 
to do so (B9, B16). Particularly buyers, suppliers, auditors and consultancies argue that 
they do not see the necessity for workers to build trade unions, as long as they do 
organize somehow (B16, A6).  
Many companies argue that they prefer working with solutions inside the factory 
                                                      
123 The Daily Star 11.6.2006 “Owners oppose minimum wage, TU at RMG units”: 
http://www.thedailystar.net/2006/06/11/d6061101139.htm, TDS724 
124 The Daily Star Bangladesh, 1.9.2006 quoting Arnd Bornemann, manager-Bangladesh operation of KarstadtQuelle said 
recently 
Chapter 10: Executive regulation in global production networks  158 
instead of trade unions, which they regard as ‘external’ to the factories. They regard 
workers’ committees or ‘open forums’ as adequate solutions, in which the problems of 
the workers are collected and discussed inside the factory (S6, S7, S10, A1, A3, A6, A8). 
One major advantage of such committees is seen in their focus on the problems within the 
factory, instead of dealing with ‘political’ issues that they see as not connected to the 
workplace but rather to party policies. Often such committees already exist, dealing with 
issues, such as welfare, sexual harassment, health & safety etc. (A6).  
There is a company here in Bangalore, it is a small company, maybe 150 or 200 workforce, they 
have, I think, first Saturday in month an open session of the CEO … The satisfaction the people are 
having is very high. Because he has an open forum, where you can come down to the canteen, and 
you speak whatever you want. Absolutely good systems are there. (A3) 
People are educated nowadays. They know what freedom of association is. There is no problem for 
association. And they know their own issues. They make committee. So if you go into garment 
industry, you will find women's committee, stitching committee, and all. Parallel to union, they will 
address their issue, they note down all applications. They discuss with the management. And they not 
only issue their own issue, they also think about their companies issue. (A1) 
However, NGOs and auditors claim that several problems are connected to worker 
committees and many criticize them for not working (A3, A1, A4, N4b, N2, N9a). 
Problems with committees are said to originate in the situation that they are located inside 
the factory, where managers can exert power. Problems are seen in the lack of 
transparency and control of the committees, i.e., workers’ committees might just be on 
paper and workers that are listed as members, without knowing of it; and if they exist, 
they might be biased. Local NGOs similarly complain that they have not yet seen a 
committee that was democratically elected by the workers, as it should be, but only such 
that are appointed by the management. In such committees it is not certain, whether 
workers can talk freely. The following quotes sum up some of the problems seen in 
workers’ committees.  
They are just namesake. These are just formulated just on paper. Some of the members don't know 
they are members. There are no minutes of these worker committee meetings and this is what auditors 
themselves say. There is just a list of workers and hardly anything happens. (N4b) 
There are a couple of other companies also in Tirupur, where management and workforce have a 
very good set up. But sometimes again, it can get a little bit biased. (A3) 
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Complaints (or grievance) mechanisms are seen as an additional tool to empower workers 
and to make a private standards initiative more credible. The CCC suggests that such a 
mechanism “balances and supplements the limitations of ‘snapshot auditing’”, as it 
allows workers to voice their grievance at any time (Pruett 2005:77).  
However, even if most suggestions to realize a grievance mechanism try to escape the 
power relationship between the manager and the workers, the understanding how it 
should be best realized vary quite a bit.  
Many auditors and consultants suggest that they provide workers with a ‘complaints 
mechanism’ by giving workers their addresses (A1), or by installing complaint boxes in 
toilets (B1, B2, B9, S2, S7, A6, A8):  
Why not you have this kind of suggestion box? It will help them to open up. Because a lot of people .. 
- I mean, how many of us will be able to speak on a stage. A lot of people have a staged fright. a lot of 
people have a people fright. Not for any reason that the management is unfairly of the supervisor will 
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some kind of victimise him; sometimes it is also a personal fright. … where this box is open in front 
the workers' committee, they open it up and there is no name written. So you are free to talk anything. 
even the management can put in something. ... even the management has certain issues to address the 
work. (A6) 
The BSCI communicates ambivalence regarding the complaints mechanism. On the one 
hand, members have argued that it is not easy to set up a complaints mechanism and that 
it might not even be necessary. The very few complaints the FWF or FLA handle each 
year are seen as evidence that the system is inefficient (B16). Instead, factory managers 
are not regarded as bad people but as lacking skills. In addition, it is seen as not easy to 
set up a ‘proper’ mechanism done “like NGOs are often demanding” (B16): by involving 
stakeholders or even trade unions, which might be difficult due to the “incompatibility 
between suppliers and TU in some parts of the world”. Finally, buyers claim that workers 
would have to use it, which might also be difficult (B5, B16). In January 2009, a BSCI 
representative (B16) concludes that the BSCI does not manage to install such a system. 
He argues that it is not needed, because the current BSCI-standard of auditing is high and 
sufficient for identifying major labour-rights violations in the daily business (i.e. health & 
safety, child labour, overtime) (B5, B2, B4, B16). BSCI members argue that it is already 
a large step, if all the health & safety issues are settled in a factory, even if there is no 
trade union in a factory (B16).  
Es sind ja nicht alles böse Menschen, die eine Fabrik führen, also das muss man sich auch bewusst 
sein. Die haben ja auch ein Ziel, sie wollen ja auch irgendwie produktiv sein, sie wollen ihre Aufträge 
erfüllen, also man kann, es gibt auch dort gute Unternehmer. Und wenn es halt nicht so ist, dann 
muss man sich halt überlegen, ist dann der ’Complaints’-Mechanismus wichtig oder ist das einfach 
kein Partner für uns. Eben es ist irgendwo noch vorhanden diese Idee, dass man dem nachgehen 
muss, aber es ist nicht ganz klar so das Konzept, was dann auch funktioniert und was bringt. (B16) 
Dass mal 20 Leute rausgeschmissen werden, all die sich einer Gewerkschaft angeschlossen haben. 
Das sind so typische Fälle, wo so ein ’Complaints’-Mechanismus sicherlich funktioniert. Für andere 
Situationen, die so das Tagesgeschäft bestimmen, und im Moment für uns viel wichtiger sind, weil sie 
wirklich täglich passieren – wenn die Leute täglich dazu gezwungen werden, Überstunden zu machen 
– dann brauche ich keinen ’Complaints’-Mechanismus. (B5) 
On the other hand, annual reports said that such a mechanism shall be established, and in 
November 2009 the BSCI announced that it has built a complaints procedure in China 
and India:  
One other task of the new BSCI representatives in China and India will be to collect complaints by 
employees of factories who feel unfairly treated according to the social rights detailed in the BSCI 
Code of Conduct. With this complaint procedure, the BSCI is taking a further important step towards 
ensuring credible monitoring and improving working conditions in local factories.”125 
The CCC criticizes this as no real complaints mechanism.126 It demands that companies 
have to provide workers with the possibility to complain whenever they think their rights 
are violated, i.e. a complaints mechanism that has the workers’ trust:  
Workers and other stakeholders should have access to secure, anonymous, confidential, and an 
independent mechanism for the registering of complaints when they believe their rights are being 
violated. It is crucial that workers are able to report violations of a code of conduct or national 
labour laws without having to fear disciplinary action. Good complaints mechanisms would provide 
workers, trade unions, and NGOs with the tools to address breaches of labour standards among the 
suppliers with buyers, instead of having to wait for the next social audit. (Merk 2008)  
The FWF verification system includes a complaints mechanism that is described in their 
own words as “fair and effective and local”. It works through local complaints handlers, 
                                                      
125  www.bsci-eu.org (3.11.2009), http://www.csrnewseurope.com/article.php?articleID=199 (2.5.2010) 
126 Personal communication CCC, March 2010 
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who shall be:  
… accessible: Because they are based locally, they can be reached in the time zone and on a local 
number. In most cases, complaints handlers are also the worker interviewer during audits, which 
means workers have seen them and can put a face to the name on the information sheet. 
… can understand: They speak the local language(s) and English, allowing them to follow up on 
details with workers, FWF staff, and FWF affiliates. This means better and faster follow up. 
… are trustworthy: Handlers are usually female representatives from labour or women’s NGOs. They 
are able to communicate with workers in a way that enhances trust.127 
FWF members praise the FWF complaints mechanism. One member argues that they had 
been naïve in thinking to provide the workers with their contact details, because the 
worker would have a too high mental barrier to contact him. He claims that the FWF is 
much better because it works through local people, who share language and mentality 
with the workers (B1): 
Also für ein Beschwerdesystem in meiner Naivität habe ich ja damals in diesem Pilotprojekt gesagt, 
Beschwerdesystem ist doch prima, gebt bitte den Leuten unsere E-Mail und Fax Adresse und von mir 
aus meine persönliche Telefonnummer. Aber natürlich ist es so, dass die Näherin da eine mental hohe 
Hürde hat, weil sie natürlich denkt, durch die kaufmännische Verknüpfung wird sie uns 
wahrscheinlich gar nicht trauen. (B1) 
 
10.3.3 M188"/>&"*0&2'*2$1,3'*,&
The discussion shows that the issue ‘freedom of association’ is important to most actors. 
However, there are different viewpoints how it should be put into practice. The analysis 
indicates that the question, whether workers can and want to associate freely, is strongly 
formed by the prevailing discourses and deeply embedded into local and global contexts 
of the GPN:  
• There are struggles regarding how to empower workers: Whereas some actors 
propose a more political solution, others propose more technical solutions inside 
factories. Civil society organizations and also some companies claim that freedom of 
association and the forming and joining of trade unions is maybe the most important 
right of factory workers, whereas the business side argues that workers’ disinterest in 
forming trade unions shows that the right to freedom of association is not that 
important, and if workers really want to associate, they can always do this through 
worker committees in the factories.  
• The different viewpoints are connected to different understandings of CSR. One side 
follows a more political view of CSR according to which lead firms should help 
create the enabling structures within the countries and within the factories that 
empower workers to complain and build trade unions. The other perspective 
(positivist CSR) would rather propose management solutions within factories 
without the need of additional groups like trade unions. The second perspective does 
not recognize power relations within the spaces of a factory.  
• The BSCI argues that workers needn’t realize their freedom of association in trade 
unions, but can do it equally well in worker committees. Issues like trade unions, 
freedom of association, and wages are regarded as political questions that companies 
                                                      
127 www.fairwear.org, 16.12.2009 
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do not have to deal with. Supply factories shall rather work on issues inside the 
factory. Various companies and their representatives in the producing countries and 
many buyers support this perspective. In this context, trade unions are framed as 
corrupt and politicized, which might be true to some degree, but there are also trade 
unions that act in the interest of workers.  
• The CCC and local NGOs argue that local institutions have to be set up that 
empower workers and create an enabling environment. They refer to the need to build 
up local formal and informal network structures generating trust between these 
groups and the workers. Within factories workers fear to speak freely, therefore 
solutions inside factories are not preferred, as long as such power relations do not 
change. FoA and the inclusion of local groups (trade unions, workers advocacy 
groups etc.) are seen as highly relevant. The FWF has established local partner 
networks and local complaints mechanisms to empower workers by interaction with 
these groups.  
• Civil society actors favour trade unions that are situated outside factories, where 
workers are said to speak freely, but also have access to the factory. However, trade 
unions are more generally criticized for having a bad influence on factories and the 
whole economy. This is connected with claims that unions are too much embedded 
into local politics and that they do no good to factories and workers. It is suggested 
that this frightens workers or might be used strategically to frighten workers. The 
BSCI, e.g., suggests replacing trade unions with worker committees.  
-U4A &X3,21,,3'*&"*0&2'*2$1,3'*,&&
This chapter aimed at answering the question: How do lead agents frame and legitimize 
their corporate responsibility practices or the ‘right’ practices regarding the 
implementation of standards (i.e. executive regulation)? The question is relevant 
because basically every examined company claims that it takes responsibility for 
improving working standards, while the CCC criticizes the practices of many companies.  
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Many of the struggles in executive regulation can be analysed by using the GPN 
framework.  
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According to one view (supported mainly by civil society actors) lead firms in global 
production networks hold power over their suppliers. This claim corresponds with much 
of the academic literature on buyer-driven global commodity chains (! CH 2.1.2). 
NGOs argue that global buyers are powerful because they buy large volumes and because 
they can select where they produce. Their power allows them to demand that their 
producers implement social standards. As Iris Young argues (! CH 2.4), the power puts 
a lead firm in a privileged position in which it shares a larger part of responsibility. 
NGOs further argue that due to the huge profits large brands and retailers make, and due 
to the (relatively) little money it costs to improve working conditions, lead firms must 
support producers to implement the standards. For instance, they demand that lead firms 
must pay ‘fair’ prices. One suggestion to calculate ‘fair’ prices is to use the exact time 
measurements to come to a fair wage. However, the CCC claims that brands and retailers 
rather reduce prices than increase them. The FWF mostly shares this view, and therefore 
focuses its efforts on working on the structural conditions in the supply chain caused by 
the lead firm.  
The CCC and other civil society actors furthermore demand from lead firms to be 
transparent about purchasing practices. This transparency mainly entails naming the 
suppliers, disclosing audit reports, and presenting more information about the purchasing 
practices. Even though the FWF only has an internal transparency, where detailed 
findings are only made transparent to the FWF staff, the CCC accepts this kind of 
transparency, as it is carried out by a multi-stakeholder initiative.  
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However, the analysis shows that many do not share this view. There are three main 
counter-arguments.  
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Many lead firms argue that they do not have the power to force their suppliers to 
implement social standards, which opposes arguments of buyer-driven supply chains 
from chapter 2.1.2. There are three main arguments. First, lead firms suggest that power 
cannot be determined as a characteristic owned by every lead firm. In their view, the 
power they hold over their suppliers depends on each single order. The argument is that 
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it very much depends on how much an order of a lead agent fills the capacity of a factory. 
As the findings show, this can take any value between maybe 0.1% and 100%. If an order 
is only a small percentage of the factory capacity, the lead agent has little power. Many 
lead firms argue that they are powerless against larger suppliers, either because they 
themselves are very small or because the suppliers are very large. Some buyers also argue 
that they do not hold any power over producers with whom they do not have any direct 
contracts. The CCC and the FWF counter these arguments by saying that lead firms 
should select the right supply chain partners and can thus enhance their power. However, 
this neglects that lead firms may be happy quality-wise with a supplier and not willing to 
change the partner. Companies rather argue that they can improve the working standards 
in the factories step-by-step.  
Second, lead firms suggest that the decisions they take are constrained by their 
embeddedness into global competition and the fashion system. According to this 
argument, a lead firm is not fully free to set the purchasing conditions as he wishes (like 
some scholars using the GCC theory often suggest), but this power is limited by external 
factors. For instance, many lead agents argue that they cannot raise the FOB prices they 
pay for a product to enable the implementation of standards (as the CCC demands), 
because they would not sell the product anymore. Many companies seem to regard such 
limits as factual. However, the price paid for a product depends on multiple factors, and it 
is hardly possible to pinpoint these because of the variety of the products. Further, many 
lead firms argue that factories should work more productively to compete and that they 
do not want to subsidize factories that do not work efficiently. It would be interesting to 
analyse how lead firms come to the conclusion that a certain FOB price is a maximum 
price and cannot be increased, something this research could not do.  
However, many lead firms do not share the view of NGOs that the prices they pay are 
too low and need to be increased. These companies believe that as long as a producer is 
found who is willing to produce, this is normal and good economic competition that 
leads to the most productive supplier getting an order. Instead of increasing purchasing 
prices, such lead firms suggest to suppliers who are complaining about low prices that 
they should raise their productivity, e.g., by improving management skills. This 
perspective neglects two issues: One, costs that are saved by gains in productivity are first 
of all seen as profits and not necessarily re-invested into CSR. Two, economic 
competition is said to work efficiently under perfect market conditions. However, usually 
there are no perfect markets (! CH 3.1.3).  
The BSCI aims at implementing national laws and thus generating more of a level 
playing field in social standards between different actors. But its voluntariness allows 
companies to free ride and save costs with regard to social standards, as members 
criticized. Therefore we cannot speak of a situation in which the national laws are 
guaranteed. Factories can thus still win the economic competition by saving costs on the 
social end, as the CCC suggests. In addition, this perspective does not recognize that 
global competition structurally forces national governments also to adapt their laws to 
being attractive to investing companies, but not to workers, for instance by keeping the 
national minimum wages very low. Instead of seeing a shared responsibility in improving 
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the purchasing policies (! CH 2.4) the BSCI argues that it is the responsibility of the 
governments to make good laws.  
The results suggest that some national governments, like Bangladesh, compete a lot on 
cheap labour. To properly evaluate, in how far global competition also prevents 
discounters from implementing ‘fair’ purchasing conditions, these companies need to 
become more transparent about their supply chains, their purchasing conditions and their 
auditing practices. So far, the results indicate that the approach to CSR taken by 
companies – even if they are all member in the BSCI – can differ enormously and thus 
lead to different impacts (compare Hughes 2005). 
Third, the power of a lead firm depends on his possibility to terminate the 
relationship with a supplier, if the supplier does not comply with his demands. Lead 
firms very quickly change their suppliers, if these do not deliver the required quality. 
However, BSCI and FWF follow so-called developmental approaches, according to 
which the lead firm shall try not to cancel the relationship with suppliers, if these do not 
follow their social standards; the standards shall rather be improved in a stepwise 
approach. What is being done is not at all transparent in the BSCI, while the FWF has 
started publishing the management system audit reports. However, I suggest that the 
developmental approach reduces the power a lead agent has against his supplier. 
Particularly if audits do not reveal the factual problems in a factory, e.g., because the 
supplier can cheat, the lead agents’ power against the supplier is very low regarding the 
implementation of social standards.  
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The BSCI and many member companies argue that even if lead firms are powerful, they 
are not mainly responsible for what happens in the factories in their supply chains. In 
their view, the lead agents take the responsibility to initiate the improvement processes, 
while the main responsibility for improvement lies with the producers in the production 
countries, the governments and the local stakeholders. The argument is that producers 
need to act according to the national laws and the local stakeholders have to makes sure 
they do. Issues like structural power or structural injustice are not recognized. If a 
producer can only participate in the market by exploiting the workers, the producer gets 
some time to improve the standards, and if he cannot manage, he must stop producing. 
Hence, in this view, the lead firms’ shared responsibility is limited to initiating processes 
of improvement. Contrary to Young’s (! CH 2.4) position, structural injustice is 
neglected. The processes also do not have to be made transparent, because the companies 
are not liable to the general public. This corresponds to the positivist CSR model (! CH 
3.1). 
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There is a general understanding among the interviewed brands and retailers that their 
relationship to their producers is based on trust and partnership relations. They argue 
that in their purchasing practices they try to build up long-term relationships with 
‘strategic’ suppliers. It is seen as efficient to invest in suppliers to whom there are long-
term relationships. They try to make them more efficient and try to raise the working 
standards. This way standard implementation shall get more efficient. However, although 
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many argue that they try to keep fluctuation in the supply base low, it is argued to be 
unavoidable, although it seems to differ strongly. Also outsourcing is argued to be not 
always controllable, even if the relationship with the supplier is good.  
Some see a contradiction between the trust-based relationship to the suppliers and the 
power exerted through demands for standards. They say it might lead to a situation in 
which the lead firm loses his suppliers’ trust, and this would be fatal for the actual aim of 
production, i.e., the production of fashion garments.  
Another problem to a good trust relationship in the supply chain is seen, if the lead firm 
engages too much with the workers, as managers mistrust them. However, these 
relationships are seen as relevant, for empowering workers. If empowerment should 
work properly, some argue, workers need to trust those who empower them. They refer to 
problems of trust inside the factories, where managers are powerful, or in export 
processing zones where an institutional structure is missing that protects the workers 
from organizing collectively. Outside factories, the managers are said to hold no power 
over the workers, and therefore NGOs suggest that workers should organize outside 
factories and not in so-called worker committees.   
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The CCC argues that buyers have to adapt their purchasing policies so that their suppliers 
do not need to suffer under the conditions of competition. However, it also argues that 
voluntary regulation has not brought about any changes and has only led to ‘green 
washing’, and demands mandatory international rules from the national governments or 
the EU or the WTO.   
Freiwillige Selbstverpflichtungen der Handelskonzerne haben zu nichts geführt, sie werden nicht 
umgesetzt. Sie dienen einzig dem ‚Greenwashing’. … Grundsätzliche Änderungen von Einkaufspraxis 
und Unternehmens-strategie gibt es nicht. Deshalb sind von der Bundesregierung über die EU bis zur 
WTO verbindliche grenzüberschreitende Regeln einzuführen, damit Unternehmen bei Verstößen ihrer 
Zulieferer gegen Menschenrechte und Umwelt haften müssen.  … In Sinne einer wirklichen 
Verbesserung von Arbeitsbedingungen ist aus Sicht der CCC entscheidend, dass nicht über immer 
neue freiwillige Instrumente nachgedacht wird, sondern dass endlich verbindliche Regeln für ein 
sozial verantwortliches Handeln international tätiger Unternehmen gesetzt werden. (KsK 2009a:1ff) 
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The analysis in this chapter indicates that the BSCI and the FWF have a different 
understanding of corporate responsibility and of how it shall be executed through 
executive regulation. The main differences touch three questions: How are problems and 
their origins framed? Who is mainly responsible for solving the problems? Which 
instruments are appropriate? The remainder of this sub-chapter sums up the view of the 
BSCI and the FWF on these questions (! compare Table 18). 
The analysis of arguments and practices regarding executive regulation suggests that 
the BSCI reflects the positivist concept of CSR, whereas the FWF reflects a politicized 
concept of CSR (! CH 3.1). I claim that the BSCI tries to build up pragmatic legitimacy, 
but that it does not manage to build up discursive/moral legitimacy. The FWF, in 
contrast, manages to build up a form of discursive legitimacy.  
LM).&
Most of all, the BSCI argues that poor working conditions in supply factories are mainly 
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caused by bad management practices, which result in bad planning, low efficiency and 
low productivity. The BSCI member companies are seen as responsible for initiating 
improvement processes in their supply chains. Audits determine the improvements that 
have to be implemented in a factory, and usually suppliers have to implement these. 
BSCI members can support their direct suppliers to execute these improvements, if they 
want to. However, producers and stakeholders128 in the production countries are seen as 
mainly responsible for resolving the problems, because they cause them. As the problem 
is seen in bad management, the proposed solution focuses on qualification of managers. 
The BSCI allows members to engage more or less in implementing standards. For 
instance, one company might be paying the audits and trainings for all of its suppliers, 
whereas another one sources from importers and transfers qualification costs to them. The 
importers then often again transfer the costs to their suppliers. Further, the BSCI 
recommends members to sensitize and train the staff from the buying department in the 
company to adapt their purchasing practices; but it does not demand or control whether 
these are changed.  
The CCC criticizes that lead firms use their power in the supply chain (! CH 2.1.2) to 
pass the responsibility (and costs) for implementing standards to their suppliers. In the 
end, buyers exert pressure on suppliers, who would pay the costs. The empirical findings, 
however, show that this is not necessarily the case. Some BSCI members say that they 
pay costs for certain suppliers, either because they want to support them or because they 
do not have the power to push through their demands.  
However, these details are not made transparent, i.e., the claims of the CCC and of the 
companies can both not be verified. Results show that the possibility to pass the 
responsibility and costs of implementation to the suppliers has led to the situation that, for 
instance, a BSCI with a turnover of $800 million employs only one person on a 20% 
basis to deal with CSR issues. The CCC criticizes that this way a company cannot take 
responsibility for the workers.  
I argue that the BSCI has created a system in which single member companies can 
almost free ride regarding the costs they need to pay for taking responsibility, which is 
also criticized by some BSCI members129. Members, who pass costs to their suppliers, 
can still use the BSCI label and say that they take responsibility, which might protect 
them in terms of reputational damage. Members, who engage more in taking 
responsibility, criticize this kind of free riding. The way transparency is dealt with in the 
BSCI enables such free riding. The BSCI publishes its overall audit results (! CH 8.1), 
which only indicates a general trend. These figures do not make single companies 
accountable, but rather protect them, indicating that there is overall progress. The lack in 
transparency could be interpreted as trying to achieve legitimacy without engaging in 
public discourse about the problems more concretely. The case against Lidl illustrates this 
problem. The discounter advertised as being a BSCI member, but major non-compliances 
in factories were found. The lawsuit suggested that this deceived consumers. In terms of 
                                                      
128 Mainly governments, NGOs, trade unions 
129 For instance, one BSCI member with a turnover of around $800 million employs one person 20% to take care of the 
BSCI issues.  
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pragmatic legitimacy, the company tried to persuade key stakeholders of their legitimacy 
through strategic public relations (! CH 3.1.3, Box 4). The reference to the BSCI now 
turned out as a failed attempt to gain pragmatic legitimacy.  
PQP&
The FWF claims that the buyers and suppliers both cause the problems and therefore 
share the responsibility to improve the working standards (! compare Iris Young: CH 
2.4). The main focus, however, is on the lead firm (i.e., the FWF members), who the 
FWF sees in a privileged and more powerful position to make changes than the supplier. 
Not all companies share this view, but the FWF argues that the members have to select 
such producers that are prepared to take responsibility.  
Members have to disclose their whole garment supply chain (including subcontractors) 
to the FWF. Their purchasing policies are examined and evaluated in a management 
system audit130. By annually publishing reports from these audits, the FWF aims to ensure 
transparency of the changes in the single firm, which makes the single firm accountable 
for their practices. The focus on the members’ purchasing policies supports the argument 
that the members take responsibility for changing the working conditions in the supply 
chain, without transferring responsibility down the supply chain.  
Further, to improve standards in the factories, FWF members engage in discussions 
with their suppliers and with local stakeholders and discuss with them what is needed to 
improve the situation. These might be issues like management skill training and 
qualifications, raising workers’ awareness etc. This is not set, but the MSA audit reports 
annually make public what a single company undertakes.  
In addition, the FWF uses a local complaints mechanism to empower the workers. This 
mechanism is accessible to the workers and protects them. It is therefore questionable, 
why they do not use it more.  
I argue that the efforts a FWF member company has to take to meet the initiatives’ 
requirements and the transparency granted, allows a better public discourse and critique 
than in the BSCI and can be seen to be in line with the political CSR concept. However, it 
is questionable how good the quality and scope of inclusion is and there are also 
limitations regarding the transparency, which do not allow a full discourse on the issues, 
as local NGOs criticize. I suggest that it needs a more detailed analysis, whether the 
transparency allows this. &
                                                      
130 The first management system audits were conducted only briefly before the finishing of this book and could therefore 
not be examined in any detail.  
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This research has examined how different organizations – mainly companies, private 
standards initiatives, and NGOs – contest the corporate responsibility of garment brands 
and retailers for improving working conditions in global production networks. In this 
final chapter I sum up the answers to the following questions from chapters 1 and 4: 
• How do actors contest the causes of poor working conditions? 
• How are the CSR practices of the BSCI & the FWF legitimized and contested?  
• What limitations does voluntary regulation have? How can voluntary approaches be 
evaluated? 
• How can the understanding of corporate responsibility of the BSCI and the FWF be 
conceptualized theoretically? 
Finally, I point out some limitations of the research and conclude with some practical 
recommendations.  
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Table 20 subsumes the causes of poor working conditions that I identified in the 
empirical research under the three categories embeddedness, power and value (! CH 
4.2).  
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Some of these causes are what Iris Young (Young 2004; Young 2006) calls ‘structural 
background conditions’ – i.e., the rules and structures that actors accept as normal or take 
for granted in their daily actions and routines (! CH 2.4). I suggest that the following 
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four causes are such background conditions: (1) global competition (2) the fashion 
system, including consumer demands for cheap clothes, (3) the belief that national 
governments must regulate labour issues, (4) the belief that human-related problems can 
be solved with technical management solutions. In addition to these ‘background 
conditions’ various other causes of labour rights violations at production factories are 
pointed out.  
The findings indicate that different actors in the GPN take different background 
conditions for granted (! Table 20). While most CSR approaches only deal with some of 
the causes, I argue that all causes need to be dealt with in order to solve problems 
connected to poor working standards.  
11.1.1 V8#%00%0*%,,&
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Corporate actors in Europe and in production countries argue that global economic 
competition prevents them from investing much money in CSR practices. Many 
companies (lead firms and suppliers) claim that the demands of NGOs to extensively 
respect human rights are not ‘realistic’, ‘pragmatic’ or are even ‘utopian’, as the 
companies want to remain globally competitive. The example of living wages illustrates 
this dilemma: BSCI members regard the costs for implementing living wages as too high. 
They argue that production will be more expensive, and buyers will move to competitors. 
In addition, BSCI and members say that it is the responsibility of governments and 
production countries to set an adequate wage level. However, producing countries’ 
governments and factory owners claim that national minimum wages cannot be raised too 
much, because otherwise investors would leave the country. Factory owners even argue 
that politics should stay out of business (! CH 8.2).  
In contrast, the BSCI, some suppliers and consultants do not accept the complaints of 
many producers arguing that global competition does not allow them to respect the laws, 
and regard competition as a ‘normal’ situation in an open free trade market (! CH 10.1). 
In their view, good working conditions that are determined by the laws can be achieved 
within a competitive environment. They argue that producers who do not work efficiently 
and who do not work according to the laws should not produce. If a producer thinks the 
price paid for an order is too low to produce the goods according to the national labour 
laws, he has the responsibility to decline this order. The problem with this view is that it 
does not take into account three issues:  
• First, factory managers or owners and their employees are not the same actors; if the 
employer decides something, this need not necessarily be the employees’ wish. This 
is particularly problematic when managers are influenced by their local socio-cultural 
context in such a way that they do not treat their workers well.  
• Second, many producers have a different perspective on working rights than worker 
representatives. They frame providing work as charitable and see that it is better for 
the workers to have a job (that might be badly paid) than to have no job. This 
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corresponds to the opinion of those arguing in favour of sweatshops, like Paul 
Krugman did131.  
• Third, if national governments and their laws do not adequately protect workers, this 
position allows producers to exploit workers. We simply do not know, whether the 
factory managers arguing in an interview that it is no problem to comply with the 
laws in global competition are in reality complying with the laws. 
These findings suggest that competition can be used as an excuse for violating human 
rights, which is only possible in a voluntary system.  
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Many lead firms (in particular BSCI members, not the FWF) point to the responsibility of 
governments and national institutions in production countries and argue that it is their 
responsibility to see that producers acknowledge the labour laws, i.e., make and enforce 
national labour laws. Companies that support this vision see their own role merely in 
initiating a process that encourages or forces producers to respect national laws. 
According to this logic the buyers do not have a responsibility to set something like living 
wages, because it is seen as the role of the national governments to do so. Minimum wage 
approaches are thus excused by referring to the responsibility of governments to deal with 
this issue.  
However, this view does not recognize that global competition makes it unlikely that 
producing countries increase the wages in such a way that, e.g., workers can decently live 
on the minimum wages because they also fear competition, as chapter 8.2 shows (! CH 
3.1.3 & 8.2). According to Young’s (2006) theory this background condition would 
require from responsible lead firms to collectively engage, for instance, either by ensuring 
that higher wages are paid, or by engaging in lobby politics that would have the effect 
that the national minimum wages would be raised. An example of the latter engagement 
is the letter some brands wrote to the Prime Minister of Bangladesh (! CH 7.2). Having 
said this, just referring to the fact that national governments must regulate this, does not 
correspond to Young’s idea of shared responsibility. 
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Many lead firms argue that the fashion market and consumers dictate the need for low 
prices and multiple seasons, and they only deliver to these demands. Suppliers then use 
the low prices paid by some buyers as an excuse to not be able to provide good working 
conditions.  
However, NGOs criticize that lead firms do not question whether it is acceptable to 
generate consumer demands that produce injustice, for instance, by selling cheap clothes 
that make it almost impossible to implement fair working conditions. The CCC argues 
that a company does not have to sell cheap clothes, as Lidl does. If a company can only 
sell clothes by violating human rights, it should not blame the fashion system or the 
suppliers for creating injustices. The concept of shared responsibility suggests that 
companies consider whether their business model will produce injustices.  
                                                      
131 In 1997 Krugman e.g. wrote one commentary about cheap labour in SLATE: http://www.slate.com/id/1918 (1.7.2010) 
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The trust relationships between various actors in the global production networks 
(particularly workers, local NGOs, factory managers, auditors, lead firms) that are often 
in conflict can prevent standards from being fully implemented (! CH 8.1.3, 9.1, 9.3). A 
key problem particularly regarding the inclusion of stakeholders into regulation practices 
is: who trusts whom, and how do new relationships influence existing trust relationships. 
The diversity of local NGOs and trade unions is very high, and corporate actors often 
mistrust civil society actors, and vice versa. Whereas some NGOs are little trustworthy, 
others are more. The question is, how are these identified? Due to the variety of local 
NGOs, one necessary condition for gaining legitimacy through stakeholder participation 
is that not only the stakeholders that are included are made transparent, but also how they 
are included. However, the findings highlight a key problem that seems to be unsolvable, 
namely the fact that the producers often do not trust those stakeholders, whom the 
workers trust, and vice versa. Future research should therefore look deeper into the 
relationships between companies and civil society actors in the production countries, i.e.: 
How to identify local NGOs that represent the workers?  
11.1.2 I'<%/&
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From the results I suggest that there are at least four different understandings of the lead 
firms’ power in the supply chain that are all connected to their responsibility for 
improving working standards (! Table 21). NGOs argue that lead firms can exert all 
types of power listed in the table, and have to make use of all of them. The BSCI, FWF 
and CCC agree that responsible use of power includes that the companies demand and 
control social standards (! Table 21 – 1,2). One difference between the BSCI and the 
FWF (and CCC) is that the FWF and the CCC demand that lead firms make use of their 
power to support producers with the implementation of standards, that they verify this 
and make the results transparent (! Table 21 – 3,4). BSCI members might also do this, 
but they are not obliged to and it is not transparent what they do.  
Furthermore, exerting power in the supply chain conflicts with the need of trust in the 
chain, and this leads to a situation where either the trust or power needed to implement 
standards is missing. Power is needed, it is argued, to be able to enforce social standards 
on the suppliers. However, a more balanced ‘fair’ trade relationship between buyers and 
their suppliers is rather based on trust than on power. But if lead firms trust that producers 
implement standards, consumers and NGOs fear that this does not happen. 
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The findings suggest that many companies believe that they ‘do good’ because they rely 
on the technical information provided by auditors and consultants and on the technical 
methods applied. They take for granted (or at least argue that way) that audits provide 
reliable information about the working conditions inside the factories, and act 
accordingly. The claim by the BSCI and paid auditors that standards are implemented (! 
CH 9.1) is trusted more than claims by the CCC or workers that this is not true (! CH 6). 
Similarly, consultancies support the belief in the BSCI by recommending companies to 
join this initiative instead of considering multi-stakeholder approaches. However, what is 
finally important is how the consumers interpret the information provided by the BSCI 
and its members and by the CCC, and how they react upon the information. I suggest that 
a company would not become member in the BSCI if it did not have any advantages from 
it. The fact that the membership of the BSCI is rising more than that of the FWF indicates 
that consumers either believe that the BSCI is sufficient to increase the working 
conditions or that consumers do not signal their protest against this initiative sufficiently. 
This also points to the limitations of voluntary regulation.  
Further research should look at the role of consultants: In how far they deliver an image 
of PSIs as an optimal solution and how they evaluate the critique by NGOs and trade 
unions. Research should also examine the power that consumers hold over companies: 
how do the demands of consumers influence the CSR policies of companies?  
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Most actors in GPN agree that workers in factories in developing countries lack the 
knowledge of their rights as workers, and many argue that workers are not empowered to 
complain about their workplace situation. The findings suggest that power relations 
inside factories discourage workers from telling the truth about the workplace situation or 
from claiming their rights. While the CCC regards it as useless to include workers inside 
factories, e.g., in audits, the BSCI system does not recognize this as problematic (! CH 
9.3). NGOs and the FWF claim that an environment must be created outside factories 
allowing workers to protest, whereas BSCI favours solutions inside factories (! CH 9.3).  
11.1.3 c"$1%&
I''/&8"*"7%8%*+&,C3$$,&"+&+=%&9/'012+3'*&("2+'/3%,&&
Most lead firms and also stakeholders in the production countries argue that factory 
managers in the production factories do not have the skills to run a factory, and that this 
contributes to work-related problems (! CH 10.2). The BSCI regards the main problem 
of poor working standards in the skills and thus focuses the solutions on this. The FWF 
argues that management skills need to be improved, but this is seen as one of many 
problems in supply chains that has to be solved.  
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Many lead firms argue that their CSR is limited by the costs it incurs, what NGOs 
criticize (! CH 11.1.1). However, to companies the costs of standard implementation 
define the limitations of voluntary CSR, and so lead firms and standards initiatives 
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develop several strategies to reduce these costs of taking responsibility (! 7.3, 8.2, 9.4, 
10.2). The efforts of the BSCI to reduce costs are more elaborated than those of the FWF. 
I argue that many claims referring to costs of standard implementation are based on 
beliefs and speculations. Hardly any company could tell, what it really costs to 
implement, for instance, a living wage. Many also do not know whether consumers 
would really buy from another brand if prices increased. They fear that higher costs might 
frighten away actual and/or potential buyers and therefore they neglect responsibility 
issues. In addition, whereas it is quite common to argue that improving environmental 
issues can be cost-neutral, only few think that the implementation of social standards 
might save costs.  
However, the fact that FWF members, in contrast, accept most claims of NGOs that 
other companies deem as ‘utopian’ (e.g. living wages) underlines two possible 
explanations: (a) Some companies do not fully understand the costs of CSR. (b) 
Individual companies for some reasons interpret very differently what CSR costs and 
what they are prepared to pay. The reasons for this are found inside lead firms and in the 
way they govern their supply chains. Findings suggest that ownership of the company 
plays a role, but also external influences and other factors. In the future, more empirical 
research should thus focus on why individual companies take certain decisions.  
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I argue that the different interpretations of the causes of labour rights violations lead to 
different CSR practices that are seen as necessary to improve working conditions. Table 
22 sums up how the rules the BSCI and the FWF use to implement standards differ (! 
CH 7).  
The findings also show that actors in global production networks use different strategies 
to legitimize the credibility, legitimacy and effectiveness of their CSR practices. I suggest 
that the strategies mainly differ with regard to stakeholder inclusion (! CH 11.2.1), 
transparency and accountability (! CH 11.2.2), worker empowerment (! CH 11.2.3), 
and the purchasing practices (! CH 11.2.4).  
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Most actors argue that stakeholders have to be included to make the regulation of social 
standards credible and legitimate. BSCI and FWF both argue that their approach is 
credible and legitimate, particularly because they include many stakeholders. But, the 
quality and scope of stakeholder inclusion varies between the two approaches and also 
between individual companies within either the BSCI or the FWF (! CH 7, 8.1, 9.3, 
10.3). Major differences occur regarding the question, what kind of stakeholder inclusion 
creates credibility or legitimacy (! CH 3.1.4 & 3.3.2)?  
Based on the theoretical literature discussed (! CH 2.4, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3) I suggest that a 
more political concept of CSR must include stakeholders who (a) represent the intended 
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beneficiaries, i.e. the workers. Furthermore, stakeholders must be included in such a way 
that (b) their arguments are fully recognized in decisions, and that the final decision is 
taken on the basis of the better arguments. Because different people have different 
opinions on what the ‘better’ argument is, transparency is required regarding how a 
decision came about. Only this generates discursive/moral legitimacy. 
However, even though all claim to generate legitimacy and credibility by the way they 
include stakeholders in the CSR practices, the differences in how they are included are 
large.  
In legislative regulation stakeholders are fully included in the decisions the FWF takes 
on the rules of the system (! CH 7.2, 8.1). Local NGOs criticize that only stakeholders 
from Europe, and not production countries, are represented, while the CCC thinks this is 
not necessary. The BSCI includes some stakeholders from Europe in a consulting 
function, which is criticized by the CCC for not being enough. In addition, the BSCI and 
the FWF consult stakeholders in the production countries; this participation is mainly 
meant to identify relevant issues, generate organizational learning, through projects etc. 
While this kind of inclusion of stakeholders might help solve problems, it does not 
generate a more democratic legitimacy. I suggest legislative regulation should be made 
more transparent and inclusive by applying transparent and discursive procedures, as 
developed by the INSEAL Alliance132 that publishes rules related to codes of conduct and 
opens a web-based public consultation process. 
Judicial regulation tries to identify labour rights violations inside factories that reflect 
the reality inside the factory. Audits have to be credible in order to generate consumers’ 
trust in a lead firm. The problem is that there are different views on what audits and 
which auditors can be regarded as credible (! CH 9). NGOs argue that workers and local 
civil society groups need to be included: this way they are empowered, they best 
represent the workers, and the workers can provide relevant information from inside the 
factories better than any auditor. However, they also have to be integrated in the ‘right’ 
way, e.g., workers should not be interviewed where managers can observe who is 
interviewed. The FWF tries to achieve this by interviewing workers outside a factory.  
In order to generate discursive legitimacy and allow a better public discourse, the FWF 
could be even more transparent on the audit results, the supply chains, and the local 
partner groups it interacts with. Local NGOs criticize that they are not recognized 
enough, whereas others again criticize audit approaches that are too close to workers or to 
local NGOs, who are said not to help the workers, but mainly want to gain money, that 
they are not competent, or that too much trust in those would negatively effect the 
relationship to the managers (! CH 9.2, 9.3). The BSCI claims it is not relevant to 
include local worker representatives or workers, because it takes for granted that auditing 
companies deliver the right information from inside the factory due to their quasi-
scientific audit methods (! 9.1, 9.2). Thus, the BSCI has a different understanding of 
how credible information can be gained and it is more interested in gaining information 
(even if the validity of this information is doubtful) than in the empowerment of workers.  
                                                      
132 www.isealalliance.org 
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I argue that due to the many different viewpoints on legitimate and credible CSR and the 
need to generate accountability, transparency plays a central role in making CSR 
regulation work. However, neither BSCI nor FWF disclose their members’ supply 
factories, nor audit reports related to individual factories, both of which are demanded by 
the CCC.  
While the BSCI publishes aggregated results of audits as ‘our progress’, the CCC 
regards it as a PR instrument trying to generate pragmatic legitimacy and tries to 
deconstruct this image, as the Lidl case illustrates (! CH 7). Local NGOs from the FWF 
partner network criticize that they do not get information about which factories the FWF 
auditors visit. Also board members in the FWF are not allowed to look at concrete audit 
results that are regarded as secret business information by the FWF. In terms of 
accountability and a political approach to CSR this is problematic, as social audits are 
subjective interpretations of the situation in a factory and lacking transparency does not 
allow deliberation (! CH 3.2.2). Without any possibility to verify audits, their credibility 
is low. Still, the FWF argues that being a multi-stakeholder initiative and applying the 
‘right’ methods is sufficient for generating credible audit results. But the fact of being a 
multi-stakeholder initiative does not have anything to do with the credibility of the audits. 
Paradoxically, even though the CCC does not have access to the audit results, it 
recommends companies to become members in the FWF. Does the critique of local 
stakeholders remain unheard? The CCC regards the complete initiative as legitimate, 
because it includes worker representatives (e.g. the CCC) into the board and because the 
whole system has adapted to most of the demands by the CCC. However, the FWF only 
allows access to handpicked people. Basically the FWF and the CCC decide, who is 
legitimate, but they do not explain why certain actors are seen as legitimate and others 
not. While the FWF argues that more transparency would frighten away new member 
companies, based on the concepts of shared responsibility and political CSR, I claim that 
more transparency is necessary to allow external actors to participate better in the system 
and not run the danger of being called paternalistic by actors in the South (! CH 3.2 & 
3.3). Transparency also enables more inclusiveness. However, a barrier to achieving a 
more political concept of CSR is that companies are unlikely to adapt this level of 
transparency voluntarily.  
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Furthermore, there are different views on (1) the role of workers’ empowerment in 
improving the working conditions inside a factory and (2) how this shall best be done (! 
CH 10.3).  
First, while NGOs regard the empowerment of workers as the most important issue to 
improve the situation of workers, others turn down the idea of empowering workers, 
arguing that it does not function, for reasons that are presented in chapter 10.3.  
Second, there is disagreement about the way workers should be empowered. NGOs 
argue that the aim should be to create an ‘enabling’ environment that allows workers to 
criticize their situation without fearing they will lose their job, i.e., by acknowledging 
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power relationships inside factories. Three main strategies are suggested:  
• Trade unions: While the CCC and most other civil society actors regard it as 
essential that workers organize in trade unions, trade unions are criticized a lot by 
companies and also by NGOs (! CH 10.3.1). They are said to not represent the 
workers, be difficult to work with, be negative for the job situation of the workers, 
and that they are not interested in the workers’ well-being. Trade unions could 
certainly create an environment that allows for discussion. The findings, however, do 
not give a solution to the following dilemma: on the one hand, NGOs like the CCC 
demand cooperation with trade unions, yet on the other hand, hardly anyone 
interviewed has a good relationship with a trade union. I suggest that more research is 
needed on the relation between NGOs and trade unions. 
• Worker committees: Particularly the BSCI regards worker committees as a solution 
for giving workers more voice to solve problems inside factories (! CH 10.3.1). 
Many local NGOs, however, criticize these committees as problematic, because they 
are influenced by the power of the management and they do not allow the workers to 
speak freely. They see them as instrument used to pretend that workers have the right 
to discuss, while workers are not really free.  
• Complaints mechanisms are seen as a possibility to empower workers (! CH 
10.3.2). However, it depends on how they are organized, on whether the workers feel 
free to use them, and that workers might not use them because they might fear losing 
their job, if they do. While many complaints mechanisms work via telephone 
numbers, local NGOs suggest that workers only use the mechanism, if they have trust 
in the people behind it.  
Civil society actors argue that any such mechanism is based on trust and would need to 
be embedded in the local context and interact with local actors. This requires, they say, 
permanent and direct interaction on the local level. However, here again, it is 
questionable which groups to involve and how.  
11.2.4 I1/2=",3*7&9/"2+32%,&&
There are different views regarding whether lead firms should adapt their purchasing 
policies, i.e., particularly the prices they pay, the lead times they allow and the flexibility 
in sourcing they allow (! CH 10.1). While many (e.g. CCC, FWF) argue that lead 
agents’ purchasing practices contribute to a situation where suppliers cannot recognize 
the workers’ rights anymore, others (e.g. BSCI) rather argue that it is the suppliers’ 
responsibility to stick to the rules of the governments and that the purchasing practices 
should be no reason why workers’ rights are violated. And if a company cannot finish an 
order with the given practices within the laws, they should not accept this order. The later 
view corresponds to a belief that state regulation works (! 3.1.3). 
Accordingly, whereas the FWF intervenes into the members’ purchasing policies, 
‘verifies’ them and publishes results of their analysis, the BSCI does not check whether 
the purchasing practices allow standards to be implemented.  
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Membership figures of both initiatives show that many more companies have joined the 
BSCI than the FWF (! CH 7.1). This confirms research indicating that scaling up 
impacts of more credible MSI is difficult (! CH 3). Why do so many companies join the 
BSCI, even though the CCC and others strongly criticize it and recommend membership 
in an MSI? The empirical findings suggest several possible answers.  
• Some companies are not interested in the differences between the two initiatives, but 
just require CSR for protecting the own reputation (! CH 3.1.2).  
• Some companies are not aware of or do not understand the differences in the 
approaches. I argue that this is partly connected to the public relations strategies 
conducted by initiatives like the BSCI that create an illusion regarding the quality of 
private regulation initiatives. While on the paper the approach is increasingly adapted 
to competing multi-stakeholder approaches like that of the FWF (the very recent 
introduction of the complaints mechanism is one example for this), the rules remain 
different in many small details that are said to make a difference in the impact.  
• Membership in the BSCI is propagated by strong coalitions of politics and business: 
industry association, consultants, the EU Commission, the BMZ, the GTZ etc.  The 
FWF, in contrast, is only supported and recommended by the CCC and some other 
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civil society groups. In the Netherlands and in Switzerland FWF representatives work 
on member acquisition, but German companies have not been targeted very much, 
and in Germany the support of the BSCI is very strong. This underlines that PSI are 
embedded and influenced strongly by a national institutional system (! 3.1.3). 
• Membership in the FWF is more expensive than membership in the BSCI, mainly 
because FWF members are obliged to take more responsibility for their supply chain 
(! 7.1.2, 7.3, 9.4); companies that do not understand the differences between the two 
initiatives do not join the more expensive MSI.  
• Some see the BSCI as an international approach – through its connection to the SAI; 
this is advantageous, as many suppliers know the approach; the FWF, in contrast, is 
seen as too much focused on Dutch companies.  
Voluntary regulation and how it develops is very much dependent on the power of 
stakeholders. Ethical campaigning is one part of this pressure. The findings suggest that 
many more companies become member in an initiative like the BSCI that is criticized by 
the major ethical campaign, than in an MSI (which is recommended by the ethical 
campaign). This implies that the power of ethical campaigning is limited, and therefore 
many have been calling for mandatory regulation (! CH 3.3). Even if scaling up of MSI 
is partly connected to ethical campaigning, it is questionable why companies reject rules 
that are mandatory for all at the same time. According to Zervas (2008) and others it can 
be helpful to make corporate responsibility practices obligatory for all at the same time as 
this could prevent actors from complaining of disadvantages in competition (! CH 3.3). 
Future research could analyse, why companies oppose mandatory rules for all.  
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The BSCI, the FWF and their members all say they share a responsibility for improving 
working conditions in their supply chains. However, my analysis shows that the two 
approaches follow two different concepts of corporate responsibility. I suggest that the 
FWF adapts a ‘political’ concept of CSR based on ’shared’ responsibility, whereas the 
BSCI adapts a ‘positivist’ concept of CSR based on ‘delegated’ responsibility (! CH 
2.4, 3.1.3). I argue that the two approaches are based on different ideas what causes 
injustices (! CH 11.1), and thus apply different practices to act responsibly (! CH 
11.2), and are confronted with different limitations (! CH 11.3). Here, I present what 
exactly lead firms are seen to be responsible for in each of the two initiatives (! CH 
11.4.1 & 11.4.2). Box 15 sums up some questions that can help to differentiate and assess 
CSR approaches that aim at implementing social standards.  
11.4.1 P"3/&Q%"/&P'1*0"+3'*D&KI'$3+32"$N&)MF&Z&,="/%0&/%,9'*,3#3$3+>&&
The concept of ‘political’ CSR requires that companies become ‘politicized’, i.e., engage 
in public discourses about their practices. This way they shall gain organizational 
legitimacy (! CH 3.1.4). This ‘political’ concept of CSR corresponds with concepts of 
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democratic legitimacy of private regulation that suggest (democratically) legitimate PSIs 
should be inclusive, transparent, accountable and engage in deliberative practices (! CH 
3.3). In my view, the FWF comes close to these theoretical ideals of corporate 
responsibility. The initiative tries to engage its members in a shared responsibility 
through a discourse between companies and worker representatives regarding the 
legislative regulation and in a discourse with local stakeholders in the production 
countries. Even though the inclusiveness and transparency of the FWF has a high quality, 
it also has some limitations (! CH 8.1 & 9.1 & 9.3). 
I have been arguing that the FWF approach to CSR/private regulation is more 
legitimate from a political perspective and generates legitimacy from public discourses, 
as compared to the approach of the BSCI. More legitimacy in this sense also generates 
more credibility. This confirms other studies that claim that multi-stakeholder initiatives 
are a more legitimate and credible approach to private regulation than business 
approaches (! CH 3.2 & 3.3).  
11.4.2 L1,3*%,,&M'23"$&)'89$3"*2%&.*3+3"+3J%D&KI',3+3J3,+N&)MF&Z&0%$%7"+%0&
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The concept of ‘positivist’ CSR regards companies as a-political actors. Liberal 
democrats believe that companies are not seen as subjected to immediate legitimacy 
demands, as long as they comply with moral and legal rules (i.e. laws), and thus they do 
not have to expose their decisions to public scrutiny (! CH 3.1.4). According to this 
concept, the state establishes the rules, which the companies follow. I have been arguing 
that the BSCI follows this approach for gaining legitimacy. I suggest that the BSCI can 
be seen as delegating most of the responsibility to stakeholders in production countries 
(! CH 7, 8.2, 9.4, 10.1.2), following the blame/liability model of responsibility (! CH 
2.4). 
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The empirical research has various limitations. First, it only analyses the arguments of 
different actors. Thus it mainly juxtaposes different arguments, but does not say anything 
about the truth of the statements. Second, it does not allow for assessing the effectiveness 
of any approach. However, it does present the arguments by different actors regarding the 
effectiveness of different approaches and compares them. Third, it was not possible to 
interview suppliers to the companies that I interviewed, because they were not disclosed; 
this would have allowed for a better reflection on the suppliers’ problems in specific 
interactions. Fourth, it was not possible to access and assess any more detailed data on the 
supply chain relationships, because it is secret business data that few companies disclose 
to the public or to researchers.  
I have already pointed out possible questions for future research. Here are some 
suggestions that could help dealing with the limitations of this research:  
• Participatory research should experience the practices of setting rules and standards, 
auditing standards and implementing them in order to understand how the actual 
practices function. This could help identify power and trust relationships; however, 
there is always the danger that the presence of a researcher would strongly influence 
the research results. 
• There is very little academic evidence that assess the effectiveness of a voluntary 
regulation approaches (! CH 3.3.1). More input/democratic legitimacy in regulation 
might promote a higher effectiveness, but this has not been proven yet. Such research 
could help identify whether the costs for CSR and particularly audit costs are really 
worthwhile.  
• Future research should collaborate more with companies, the standards initiatives, 
and the local worker representatives – either in individual projects or in projects that 
bring all actors together. Such research could help understand the specific interaction 
within a supply chain in more depth, as it would provide access to the supply chains. 
This allows gaining knowledge concerning, e.g., power relations in connection to 
CSR in the supply chain, the buyers’ flexibility in raising prices or in the difficulties 
of implementing standards. Research in collaboration with local worker 
representatives could help to better understand how workers on the local level can be 
empowered, how to deal with the problems regarding conflicting trust in the 
production networks, and how these groups could be included in the CSR practices. 
Research in collaboration with companies and civil society actors might generate 
something like a ‘discursive arena’ that could help learning.  
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My research examines struggles about the legitimate and credible way to regulate 
business, and it questions whether the modern catch-word ‘CSR’ only creates a ‘grand 
illusion’, i.e., “the state or fact of being intellectually deceived or misled”133.  
For instance, the Lidl lawsuit criticizes that the company deceives its customers by 
projecting the illusion that working standards in their supply chains are implemented by 
referring to BSCI membership. In contrast, the CCC has collected evidence showing that 
the working conditions in factories supplying to Lidl are poor. I have argued that, on the 
one hand, the BSCI does not deny that the working conditions are bad, on the other hand, 
it does a lot to show that their members are taking responsibility for improving working 
conditions in their supply chains. Due to little transparency of the system, it is very 
difficult to evaluate how much responsibility each single BSCI member takes. The BSCI 
therefore creates a level playing field for its members, which allows members to ‘free 
ride’ to a certain degree with the implementation of social standards and to delegate 
responsibility, which has been criticized by some fellow members. Thus, BSCI members 
can use the initiative to create an illusion and deceive customers, or they can try to use the 
tools to improve working standards.  
Only ten days after the lawsuit was filed, Lidl and the Verbraucherzentrale Hamburg 
agreed that Lidl sign a declaration to cease and desist134. The company is no longer 
allowed to advertise by referring to its membership in the BSCI. The 
Verbraucherzentrale declared that this now makes it more difficult for firms to deceive 
the customers135.  
“This is a big victory for all consumers who care about how their clothes have been produced - but 
are being cheated by false advertising,” states CCC campaigner Sapi Ullrich. “We really hope that 
Lidl will not only stop advertising false claims but will also invest into actually improving working 
conditions throughout their supply chain.136 
While the lawsuit has certainly not made the working standards in the Lidl supply chains 
any better, this research shows that the BSCI runs danger of being presented as ‘The 
Grand Illusion’ in the media, only trying to create pragmatic legitimacy, and maybe even 
possibly deceiving their customers. As a result of the lawsuit, all other BSCI members 
must fear that they might also be sued one day.  
I suggest that the BSCI can counter that risk by adapting a much more inclusive, 
transparent and discursive approach to CSR. This approach would have to go beyond the 
inclusiveness and transparency of the FWF and fully engage with all stakeholders and 
discuss how the situation in the factories can be improved. But the empirical findings 
suggest that it is unlikely that companies voluntarily agree to take on such an approach. It 
is much more likely that companies will either stop advertising with a CSR label, or 
rephrase their definition of responsibility. While Lidl agreed not to advertise anymore that 
they promote fair working conditions, it has now rephrased its responsibility by arguing 
that they are aiming to achieve ‘sustainability’:  
                                                      
133 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/illusion 
134 Unterlassungserklärung 
135 Welt online, 21.4.2010, 15:28: Unterlassungserklärung. Lidl gibt umstrittene Werbekampagne auf 
136 http://www.cleanclothes.org/media-inquiries/press-releases/german-retailer-lidl-retracts-false-claims-of-fair-working-
conditions, 30.4.2010 
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Als Unternehmen ist es grundsätzlich unser Bestreben, die sozialen und ökologischen Belange in 
Einklang zu bringen, um das in uns gesetzte Vertrauen zu rechtfertigen. ’Nachhaltigkeit’ hat seit 
vielen Jahren für Lidl einen bedeutenden Stellenwert, welcher in unseren Engagements innerhalb und 
außerhalb unseres Kerngeschäfts sichtbar wird. Unsere vielfältigen Engagements im Bereich der 
Nachhaltigkeit werden dabei von Anfang an intensiv betreut, damit die Verantwortung da ankommt, 
wo sie gebraucht wird.137 
Replacing the aim to promote fair working conditions with the more general aim to 
“harmonize social and ecological issues” cannot be seen as progress in terms of political 
CSR or democratic legitimacy.  
                                                      
137 http://www.lidl.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-1AF94E85-FBCD6A32/lidl_de/hs.xsl/5705.htm, 2.5.2010 
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